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THE MEXICAN HERITAGE OF BENITO JUAREZ
The Political, Social and Economic Background
for the Mexican Scene in 185U
The long glanced rays of the rising sun shimmered over the countryside
and bathed the whole of Mexico in gold. Bouncing off the dark green mesquite,
they rainbowed the coarse sand grains of the northern desert. The life-
saving milk of the spiny cactus, chilled by the desert's night winds, grew
warm. Undaunted by the forbidding sheerness of the awe-inspiring gray
cliffs, the dawnlight lit their mineraled cracks. Having thus penetrated
the outer defenses, the lights rippled over the mountains into the sleeping
valleys of the mid-plateau. They surprised a plodding Indian on his way to
work amid the tasseled corn and dried the dew in the thick, deep grass.
After stirring the sweet-toned mission bells of the slumbering pueb^los,
they stole slowly south to the tropical jungles. Slipping under the dense
foliage, wakening the budding orchids, they climbed higher, their task
completed.
The whole day gave a promise of plenty, that Mexican day in the year
of Our Lord 1851*. The silky corn betokened a bountiful harvest, and the
tolling mission bells a sentiment of peace. But events in Mexico in 185U
were belying the promise of the day. The plodding Indian cultivated a
field not his own and starved in the midst of abundance. In the capital
the redoubtable Santa Anna had declared for a strict centralist government
2and was seriously considering the establishment of a monarchy with himself
as king. This move on the part of Mexico' s most versatile turncoat
aroused strenuous opposition. Juan Alvarez, an ardent federalist, rose in
rebellion in the state of Guerrero in a raovement which later became a
revolution to end all revolutions and an attempt to introduce a new societal
base in the land of Montezuma. But waitJ This is getting ahead of the
narrative which really begins centuries earlier.
By I65ti Mexico had been independent exactly twenty-three years. During
that time her several presidents had raced in and out of office with the
agility of the legendary Atalanta. But even this record of political insta-
bility did not provide enough data for a competent analysis of the Mexican
scene in 1851*. The real story was much older. It stretched back three
centuries into the closed shadowy past to the time when Huitzilopochtli was
propitiated by blood sacrifice and the Virgin of Guadalupe was unknown in the
land of the feathered serpent.
Analysis began with a legend, the legend of Quetzalcoatl, the benign
god who sprang from the earth to bring the blessings of civilization to the
Mexican people. For many years he stayed among them, teaching them count-
less things. Under his guidance the Indians learned to grow the golden
corn that became the staple food of the country and to ferment the sweet
honey liquid of the maguey plant. They developed the art of pottery and
lived in harmony with each other. But Quetzalcoatl' s beneficent rule was
soon interrupted. Another contested his authority and displaced him in
the loyalty of his people. Saddened by this turn of events, Quetzalcoatl bade
farewell to his now repentant people and sailed into the rising sun. But
he had not forsaken then forever said the legend. Quetzalcoatl would one
day reappear from the East to rule once more his virgin land.
3Centuries rolled over the sparse deserts, green plateaus, and lush
tropical jungles of Mexico. And over the ages a complex, communal civilis-
ation emerged, derived from the simple arts imparted by Quetsalcoatl. In
1519 this civilisation had reached an apogee of power. Centered in the
Venetian-like city of Tenochtitlan high in the plateau valleys, this culture,
known as the Aztec, radiated over the whole of central Mexico. Its ruler,
Montezuma II, reigned in sumptuous splendor in the midst of a temple-crowded
city. The temples were devoted to the horrendous god of war
Huitzilopoehtli and bespotted by the blood of human sacrifice. In the
provinces tribute was exacted from the conquered tribes. Outwardly nothing
seemed to threaten the Empire. But in fact
—
Strange reports of white-winged vessels in the eastern waters came
trickling in from the outer seacoast provinces. These apparitions flew
over the sea without any apparent propelling power, emerging from, and
retreating into, the morning sun. Already, reported the messengers, the
superstitious masses once more bruited about the legend of Quetzalcoatl
.
Was it not the time for the noble high priest and representative of
Huitzilopoehtli, the illustrious Montezuma, to attend to this matter? The
messengers were right. As the official representative of Huitzilopoehtli,
Montezuma knew that the potential homecoming of the feathered serpent posed
a threat to his throne. Two powerful gods could not hold sway in Mexico
at the same time. Nevertheless Montezuma vacillated. He did do something
to be sure, but that something was solely a negative action. Ke waited
and worried.
Toward the end of 1519 the eerie white-winged birds glided again onto
the Mexican horizon. But this time they did not flit away as before. They
stayed to disgorge tall stalwart llght-skir-ned men with hair the color of
hthe ripened corn and four-legged monsters that could, perhaps, outdistance
the wind. The leader, relayed the messengers, called himself Cortes, but
that most probably was only a pseudonym. Had not the legend whispered of
(Juetzalcoatl's flaxen hair and fair skin? This Cortes wooed the tribes on
the coast, enticing them to his banner. Rumors depicted him as invincible
in battle, and, had he not whipped the Tlascalans? Montezuma hesitated,
and Cortes marched inland. Montezuma sent presents, but this only whetted
the appetites of the Spaniards for the fabled Aztec gold. In 1520 they
triumphantly entered the Indian capital, and a little more than a year later,
despite various reverses, the flaxen-haired "gods'1 had conquered the
vacillating ruler.
After the subjugation of the hub, the victorious band fanned out into
the barrenness of the sparsely populated North, into the deep tree-lined
gorges of the tleat, and into the steaming heat of the overgrown South. The
subjection of this vast area speedily introduced problems of transportation
and administration. And, it was the loi:g term unsatisfactory solution of
those problems that bred the restless, potentially explosive uneasiness
endemic in the Mexican scene in 185U.
Cortes conquered the Mexican empire with a relatively small nucleus
of bold, daring Castilians. These men joined his expedition for many
reasons. Some sought adventure, grasping eagerly at the proposed campaign
as a means of escaping the unrelieved boredom of colonial life in the
Antilles. The call of gold lured others. They followed the golden promise
in the setting sun. Some came for the Cross, the unequivocal, controver-
sial standard of ardently Catholic Spain. These toe saw promise in the
sinking sun, but a promise that forecast treasure in heaven and not gold
upon earth. With the campaign's success all the conflicting ambitions
5clamored for reward. After all, hardship deserved some recompense.
Cortes and the; Spanish monarchs responded. The adventurers received
vast tracts of land and the title of hidalgo. The gold-seekers secured
extraction rights for the rich veins of gold and silver hidden in the
Mexican mountains. The followers of the Cross acquired the privilege and
duty of instructing the heathen in the ways of truth.
Theoretically this subdivision of labor presented the possibility of
a viable, balanced economy. The cultivation of the rich green valleys would
provide enough food for the population, and the development of mineral
resources an exchangeable source of wealth. The Roman Catholic Church would
unite the Indians to the Crown via the Cross (or vice versa) by promoting
both a supernatural and a natural loyalty.
In practice this idyllic picture exhibited two basic flaws that
permanently warped the economic and societal base in Mexico. The first
flaw emerged from forces extraneous to the Mexican scene and swept across
the whole of Europe in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries.
This flaw was the theory of mercantilism. According to this theory a
conquered territory existed for the profit of the victorious nation-state.
The latter possessed the right to exploit any and/or all of the colony's
resources and to use them without regard for the welfare of the colony.
As this theory also placed an inordinate emphasis on the possession of
gold bullion as evidence of a nation's prosperity, Mexico's apparently
inexhaustable mineral resources became a liability rather than an asset
during the colonial period. Ship after ship weighed anchor in the ports
of Vera Crua and Acapulco bound for the Antilles, the Azores, Seville,
the Philippines, and the rich spice islands in the Moluccas. Spain
received everything, Mexico almost nothing. To be sure a few Mexican
Creole merchants sneculated their way to fortune and fame, but the mass
of the people benefited not at all from their land's mountains of gold.
They remained poor and isolated on their land. But the agriculture?
Surely the wealthy, fertile earth of Mexico could feed its people. The
silky tasseled corn stalks still rustled when the wind whipped down from
the high peaks and skimmed across the lowlands. Even in subjugation th»
Indians remembered the simple arts imparted by Quetaalcoatl, What mattered
the export of a mineral that excited only the greed of men? The land gave
and sustained life—thus had revealed the gods of old.
The gods gave life, but men also had a hand in sustaining it. And
here lay the second flaw in the Mexican scene. The vast acreages or
encomiendas
,
given to the conquistadors by the Spanish kings precluded
cultivation by one man or one family alone. The few Spaniards in the
country regarded themselves as gentlemen. Menial labor lay beneath their
dignity. Obviously an independent source of labor was needed. This the
Indians supplied. But the subjected Indian population did not furnish this
labor in accord with their dignity as free men, but only as menials, almost
as serfs, in a system that bound them relentlessly to the land that they
tilled for their Spanish masters. Mexican society was based on a principle
of subservience.
When the Spanish monarchs granted the encomiendas , the colonists
immediately recognized the need for cheap labor and petitioned the Crown
for the services of the Indians. This the Crown granted with some
reluctance and with numerous qualifications designed to safeguard the
welfare of the native population. The Indians, declared the Crown, were
not to be regarded as slaves. The inviolability of their families was to
be preserved. The Indians could remain in their villages, grow their own
7crops, and pursue their own interests after fulfilling their duties to the
encomenderos . The encomenderos in turn shouldered the obligation of
providing for the material and, more importantly* for the spiritual wants
of the Indians. Unfortunately these decrees speedily came to be more
honored in the breach than in the observance. Colonial thought regarded
the Indian as something less than the Thomistic definition of a rational
animal. Thus he was unworthy of an education or an assured place in the
social structure of Mexico. In the beginning most of the friars
strenuously opposed this arbitrary position of their colonial compatriots.
They devoted their efforts to native education with a view to integrating
the Indians into the new Spanish-oriented Catholic society. Gradually,
however, outside pressures forced a change. The Indians' education within
the religious missions confined itself more and more to the imparting of
relatively menial technological rather than intellectual skills. Thus the
missions became in essense little more than liberal encomiendaa . Cn the
eneoaiendas themselves Indian service obligations swiftly degenerated into
Indian peonage. The colonial overlords' demands far exceeded the legiti-
mate requirements envisaged by the Crown. Indian labor built tha
beautiful palaces and churches of Mexico. Indian artists adapted the
Spanish baroque to the Mew World, carved the friezes, and painted the murals
of the colonial cathedrals.
These and other services left the Indian little time to cultivate his
own meager crops or to engage in activities that might tend to render him
independent of his Spanish master. But even if he had had the time, other
factors were operating to keep him in subjection, among them the wage
requirement imposed by the Crown. Fair wages, or even wages, for the
Indian aroused considerable amusement in the Spanish community. Did
8Isabella (with all due respect to her exalted position of course) actually
think that they, the Creoles, were going to pay the Indians in gold or
even silver for the services they so grudgingly gave? Being highly
irrational animals the poor devils would only squander it anyway. It was
much better, and much cheaper also, although no one voiced the latter
sentiment, to reimburse them in the form of a small portion of the
cultivated crops and a few yards of cotton or woolen cloth. A lack of
material goods would, it was argued, enable the Indian to devote his
attention to the cultivation of the spirit of holy poverty.
Even the family was not inviolate. The repartimlento system snatched
away the men of whole villages for work in the silver mines of Ifexico.
Although the stipulated contracts imposed a ninety day limit, this
provision was often violated. The owners often forced the Indians to work
up to two years or even more in the mines. In addition the ninety day
provision usually caused the owners to work the Indians far beyond their
capacity in order to make full use of them. Many of the Indians never
returned to their villages, but died in the mines . Although the system of
repartimiento was used less extensively in Mexico than in Peru and Bolivia,
it still represented an additional factor designed to keep the Indians in
subjection.
This suppressment of the legitimate desires and aspirations of the
Indian population, which represented aost of the country's human resources,
continued throughout the colonial period and into independence. It
fostered the growth of a distinct class structure in Mexico with the
Indians at the bottom of the social scale. A class above then; in terras of
legal status at least was the mixed race, or the mestizo. Then came the
Creoles, the native born descendants of the first Spanish conquistadores.
9This social class aimed many of the great haciendas of the country and were
relatively active in commerce. At the top of the social scale ranked the
peninsular Spaniards, or gachupines, as they were contemptuously called by
the Creoles. The gachupines filled most of the important political offices
in the colonial society—a cold fact hotly resented by the Creole
aristocracy.
One other institution of Mexican colonial society contributed, albeit
unintentionally, to the Creole and gachupin subjugation of the Indians. This
institution was the Roman Catholic Church. In many ways the Church, both in
the colonial period and even perhaps later, remained the staunch champion of
Indian welfare and acted as a levoling influence in an extremely stratified
society by its emphasis on Christian charity. It established numerous
hospitals and orphanages open to all classes of society, and attempted to
alleviate, where it could not erase, the most flagrant abuses of Indian
labor. But the Church, acting on the precepts of its Founder, Jesus Christ,
stressed the necessity for submission both to authority in supernatural
matters and to an all-embracing philosophy that extended into every branch
of the individual's existence and relationship with others. These two
concepts caused severe practical difficulties. Given the close identifi-
cation of the Church with the Spanish state, the principle of absolute
submission to authority in spiritual matters tended to become also the
principle cf submission in temporal matters. The two intermingled and
merged inextricably and were reinforced by thr concept of a total philosophy.
The distinction between the two worlds was lost, and the interests of the
one became ipso facto the interests and concerns of the other. Thus the
Church appropriated the right of justice administration in both civil and
criminal cases involving clerics, and the state interfered in the
10
appointment of bishops and in other spiritual disciplinary matters. The
idea of the state as an entity existing for the promotion of the kingdom
of God on earth became reciprocal. The Church now had the function of
fostering both God's kingdom and the aims of the state, which were often not
totally in accord. Right merged into privilege} privilege degenerated into
abuse; and the line between them was razor-thin.
The stratified society set up by the conquistadors and their immediate
descendants remained in force throughout the colonial period. During this
time only one significant effort to revolutionise the system occurred.
Appropriately enough this began as a move for Mexican political independence,
led by Miguel Hidalgo, Jose' Maria Morelos, Vicente Guerrero, and Miguel
Allende in 1810.
The French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte produced
devastating repercussions in the Spanish colonies south of the Rio Grande.
In 1806, despite the prohibitions of the iniquitous Inquisition, Mexican
literates were devouring the works of men like John Locke, Jean Jacque
Rosseau, and Denis Diderot. Literary circles formed to discuss the
implications of these earth-shaking ideas. One member of such a circle was
Hidalgo, a priest in the small Mexican village of Dolores. Together with
his colleague Allende and a small group of confederates, Hidalgo plotted
the demise of the Spanish rule. But Hidalgo and Allende differed rather
drastically on the means to, and the ultimate objective of, the proposed
revolution. Allende meant to implement the revolution by encouraging the
Creole garrisons stationed throughout the country to rise, seize the
government, and form a constitution. He aimed for political independence.
Hidalgo, on the other hand, envisaged the revolution not only as political
but also as social. He wished for a spontaneous uprising of the oppressed
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Indians and mestizos, as well as of the Creoles. This revolution would thus
achieve both social and political independence. Hidalgo translated his
ideas into action in September, 1810, with the famous "Grito de Dolores."
After some spectacular successes he was betrayed, tried, and executed by
the Inquisition. More interesting than his failure, however, were the
reasons for it. The 1810 independence movement collapsed because the
Creole propertied classes denied their support. And they denied this sup-
port principally because they foresaw the consequences of Hidalgo's social
program. A constitution on the basis of social as well as political equality
spelled an early end to their privileged status, and they opposed such ideas
vigorously. In fact the successful independence movement of 1821 represented
an attempt to avoid the threat of social equality that the Creoles feared
might be imposed on them by the liberal Spanish Cortes. The Constitution of
182b wrote into law the special status of the Creole minority and the
privileged position of the Church. Conventional bows to the inalienable
rights of man meant little under such circumstances.
Even after the ratification of the 182U Constitution, events in Mexico
over the next thirty years followed the colonial pattern with at least one
exception. This exception consisted in the lack of a stable government.
Independence removed the guide of a continuing political tradition and
instituted a merry-go-round of governmental changes and civil intrigues.
January 1, 189i, gave no particular hints of being any better or any
worse than the years before it. The Creoles, minus their partners in crime,
the gachupines
,
still dominated the Indian masses both economically and
socially. The Church retained its exclusive privileges. Political intrigue
muddled blindly on. Juan Alvarez rose in protest against Santa Anna with
his proclamation of Ayutla. Just another year—opening blind.
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But in the onrushing movement of history something more came out of
this proclamation of Ayutla. Out of it came a social idea, espoused by
a small group of then unimportant exiled liberals, among them one
Benito Juarez, that significantly altered the history of Mexico. Out of It
arose another attempt to separate the interests of the two worlds, the
spiritual and the material, that had imperceptibly merged in the sixteenth
century. Although the Ayutla revolt did not, perhaps, accomplish all its
goals immediately, it pushed Mexican society a long way toward human
equality. And in this thrust Benito JuaYez played an outstanding role.
Who was Juarez? Why was he honored above all other mid-nineteenth
century !.;exican liberals? Was it merely because it fell to his lot to is
shoulder the burdens of the Mexican Presidency from 1858 to 1872? Or was
there another deeper reason that fastened to him the devotion of a people
not overly praised for political constancy? A deeper reason there wasi a
devotion to truth and the law and a social philosophy that, like Hidalgo's,
was based on equality. These elements in the character of Juarez captured
the imagination of the people and sustained their fidelity. For them he
represented a new hope, the Mexico of the future.
Benito Juarez wa3 a small figure in 1855 as he slipped, scarcely
noticed, into Alvarez's revolutionary camp. By the end of 1855 he
represented (depending upon one's point of view) something very white or
very black in the development of Mexico. And by 1861 the world focused on
Juarez. The glass through which it looked varied, but it was never neutral.
It praised and exalted, it excoriated and condemned j but it did not ignore.
What was the social philosophy of Juarez? Was he successful in
implementing it in Mexico? Did the watching world, and more especially
his republican neighbors to the North appreciate what he was trying to do
13
for Mexico? And did they praise, condemn, or only ignore his efforts?
These are the questions that thi3 study proposes to examine. And Just as
the spokss of the wheel turn only on its hub, so too do the theses and
antitheses of mid-nineteenth century Mexico turn on Benito Juarea, the
"Benme'rito de las Aaericas."
CHAPTER I
THE LIFE OF BENITO JUAREZ
A Survey from his Humble Indian Childhood to hie Position
as Executor of a New Social and Political
Philosophy for Mexico
Just exactly who was Don Benito Juarez? The birth register in the
small town of San Pablo Guelatao, Oaxaca, stated that Juarez was an Indian,
born on March 21, 1606. Ralph Roeder, one of his biographers, opined that
the man Juarez was diligent and reserved in character. He had few friends,
but to those few he invariably showed formality and good sense. William
Seward, the American Secretary of State during the Lincoln administration,
thought Juarez the greatest man he had ever met. The Mexican people
honored him as a national hero, the savior of their independence, and their
hope for the future.
But even these few statements tell very little about the man himself.
They describe only his external characteristics and fail to reveal the
essential philosophy of the man, his concept of the Mexican existence,
and his hopes and/or fears for its future place in the sun. And this
knowledge is mandatory for an accurate evaluation of his contribution to
Mexico.
When Juarez's parents died shortly after his birth, an uncle
Ralph Roeder, Juarez and his Mexico! a Biographical History
(New Yorki Viking Press, 19U7 ) , I, 6.
li»
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sheltered the homeless lad. In return Juarez tended his uncle's sheep to
help augment the family's ir.eager finances. The narrow confines of the
small pueblo fretted the boy's spirit however, and in lBlf> he set out for
Oaxaca, where, thanks to the kindness of Antonio Salanueva, a well-to-do,
kind-hearted Oaxaqueno, he began his education at the Royal School. Here
he experienced his first lesson in the evils of a stratified society.
Instruction was based not on ability but on wealth. The master tutored
the sons of the city's first families, while the po rer students labored
under a harsh ill-educated assistant. 2 In 1621 Juarez's thirst for knowledge
and the gentle prodding of Salanueva induced hira to enter the Seminary of
Oaxaca. Although feeling himself unsuited for the priesthood, Juarez
completed his theological studies. He was partly motivated in this perhaps
by a desire to plaase Salanueva, who strongly advocated the virtues of the
clerical state.
By 1827 Juarez had all but exhausted the educational possibilities in
Oaxaca. Fortunately, however, just at this time a small group of Mexican
liberals established in the city an Institute of Soiences and Arts. This
institution speedily aroused a storm of controversy. As it had no specific
affiliation with the Church, the clerical authorities immediately branded
the institute ay secular and materialistic even though it boasted some few
clerics on its faculty. Despite community pressure Juarez entered the
Institute in 1828. With this step he definitely transferred his allegiance
to the state. The Church, he declared, based its power on error and
interest and impeded the mind in its quest for truth.
3
2Ibid
., p. 9.
3 Ibid
., p. U5.
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The Mexico of Juarez's youth generated excitement. The hard battle for
political independence had been fought—and won—after eleven years of
struggle. A new constitution had been set up in 182U. Ideas floated
abroad, challenging the staid, well-accepted concepts of the last three
centuries. Hidalgo had advocated the abolition of slavery, castes, and
tributes, the reduction of taxes, the proscription of estate servitude, and
a profit-sharing plan for the workers. His disciple Horelos went even
further. Exploiting social forces as levers of revolution, he ordered the
confiscation of bureaucratic property and Church wealth and the expropri-
ation of the great estates for the benefit of the landless peons.''
The ideas of these two revolutionary thinkers were not accepted by the
landed Creoles. The Constitution of 182li wrote in all the old colonial
privileges. But the new ideas fermented in the minds of the younger
generation and gave a promise of things to come.
Cnce in the Institute, Juarez abandoned the study of the laws of the
Creator for the study of the precepts of the creature. In 1829 he defended
before a board a thesis predicating public opinion as a force in maintain-
ing a balance among the divided constitutional powers. The following year
he spoke of the necessity of direct election in a republican system. This
popular election, he said, grew ever more necessary as the intelli^nce of
the people increased.
As a young law student, Juarez passed the bar in I83U and immediately
set up practice. One of his first cases was destined to have a major effect
on the affirmation of his social philosophy. The villagers of Laxicha
jilbid., p. 18.
-Raines Magner, Men of Mexico (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co.,
1942), p. 355
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petitoned him to defend them against the exorbitant exactlona of the local
curate. Juarez agreed. But although clerical injustice was rather clearly
present in this particular case, the state courts found against the defense.
Juarez received a prison sentence for his pains, and the villagers were
subjected to heavier penalties. As a result of his personal experience
Juarez wrote that he became firmer in his resolution to destroy the union
of the privileged classes and the civil power. °
After this first eventful brush with the authorities, Juarez more or
less withdrew from the active political scene although he accepted various
minor appointments. As Secretary to the Governor of Caxaca, he was instru-
mental in hastening the reorganization of the judiciary, in liberalizing
public affairs management, and in setting up a Sanitation Junta.' Juarez
held this post for only a short while. When the Governor directed him to
sign an order to the courts empowering them to prosecute directly those refus-
ing to pay ecclesiastical tithes, he resigned. He did not, however, remain
inactive long. In 18U7 he served as a delegate to the National Congress in
Mexico City and, together with the other Oaxaca delegates, introduced a
provision to mortgage 15,000,000 pesos worth of Church property for the
prosecution of the American War. Although Congressional work was interrupt-
ed by an appointment to the governorship of Oaxaca, Juarez's short stay in
Congress made an impression. In an assembly saturated with polemic, the
Zapotec was remembered for his sphinx-like silence.
Under the governorship of Juarez, Oaxaca became the pivotal state in
the defense against the American invasion.' Strong in patriotism, Juarez
Benito Juarez, Epistolario, with prologue and notes of Jor'je L. Tamayo
(Mexicoi Fondo de Culture Eccnomica, 1957), p. 19.
.(ibid ., p. 20.
iRoeder, I, 67.
yIbid ., p. 73.
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determined to continue the war against all odds, just a3 he would do
fifteen years later in the war against the French. Kith the end of the war
and the signing of the Guadalupe-Hidalgo Treaty, state attention turned to
the organization of an efficient administration. And between 10U8 and 1852
Juarez, as the Governor of Oaxaca, accomplished the antithesis of what
Santa Anna stood for. The new government was honest, public-spirited, and
thrifty. Education was stressed, and attempts were made to better public
administrative organization.
Santa Anna's return to power in 1853 forecast a trying period in the
life of Juarez. His arbitrary arrest, forced peregrination, and ultimate
exile to Havana and New Orleans had an important effect on his political
and social philosophy. For it was in New Orleans that Juarez came into
contact with Melchor Ocampo, Pedro Santacilia, and other radical liberals
who would shortly exert a formative influence on the future of Mexico. The
small group of exiles formed a revolutionary junta in Brownsville and waited.
They did not have long to wait.
Liberalism as a movement in Mexico first found significant expression
in the reforms initiated by Gomez Farias in 1833. These reforms, however,
had insufficient popular following and were speedily crushed by ^anta Anna.
For twenty years liberalism languished. It gained individual victorias in
the state elections only to bow again before the strength of the Conserva-
tive power. But with the beginning of the decade of the fifties, liberalism
again began to revive. This revival was due to the education of new leaders
and to the spread of the new ideas among some few old liberals who could
arouse at least a temporary enthusiasm among the masses. 10
10Wilfrid Hardy Callcott, Liberalism in Mexico, 1857-1929 (California:
Stanford University Press, 1931), p. 3.
1?
The Liberal program was essentially federalist in character. It
predicated a weak central government, and it wished that most of the political
and social power be left in the hands of the states. It espoused republican
institutions and opposed central power concentration. Even the famous Plan
of Ayutla, which ultimately led to the Reform Laws, began only as a
separatist movement against the political ambitions of Santa Anna. The
Plan, as published by Alvarez in 185U, contained no hint of its future
Importance and role in the history of Mexico. Stripped of its pretentious
verbiage, it represented little that was different from the 101 pronuncia-
mlent03 t113* "ad been issued by other ambitious generals. It charged
Santa Anna with despotism and disinterest in the future of the country.
He had failed to observe the Plan of Jalisco. He had sold the national
territory. He had destroyed individual liberties and attempted to establish
a tyranny. The nation, the Plan of Ayutla observed, could never continue
under the repressive will of one man.u A return to republican institutions
was necessary.
In view of the horrendous crimes committed by Santa Anna, the Plan of
Ayutla provided for withdrawal of recognition from the existing Mexican
government. On the positive side it provided, in the case of its military
victory, for the establishment of a provisional government and for the
convening of a constitutional congress. An interim president would be
elected by a representative congress called before the constitutional
congress. The acts of both the representative congress and the interim
exeoutive would be subject to review by the constitutional congress. 12
-htoberto Blanco Moheno, Juarez ante Dios y ante los hombres (ad. ed.-Mexico^ Libro Mex. Edits., 19gg), p.
'W. " * ' "
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The Plan decreed the abolition of the draft and poll taxes and declared the
Geballos tariff plan to be in effect. Interestingly enough, however, it
also pledged the sustaining of the army as well as the care of commerce. ^
Subsequent minor modifications expressed in the Plan of Acapulco did
little to change the basic structure of the revolt initiated at Ayutla.
In the beginning the revolution was essentially a military uprising and
distinguished itself by its military successes. It did not partake of
an agrarian character either by Inspiration or by expressed ideology, even
though some of the poorer classes fought the dictator, Santa Anna, under
their village priests who probably would not have lent their support if the
Plan expressed violent anti-clerical provisions.
With the capture of Mexico City, the victorious Federalists faced the
problem of reestablishing a viable central government dedicated to the
implementation of their programs. Program implementation, however,
immediately encountered serious obstacles. The first was created by a
rather deep dissension within the Liberal narty itself. Both moderates
and radicals agreed on the necessity of a federal system, the separation
of executive, legislative, and judicial powers, universal suffrage, freedom
of speech and the press, the promotion of internal improvements, the right
of free transit for Mexican citizens, and the free movement of comnerce.
Both paid at least lip service to the principles of equality before the
law and individual rights. In this regard Baiter Scholes would say that
in the llexican Liberal philosophy of the mid 18$0's economic rights would
be guaranteed by the conferment of political rights. In his view the
13Richard A. Johnson, The Revolution of Ayutla, lBgU-1655 (Rock Hill,
Illinois; Augustona College Library, 1939), p. 1*3.
^Ibld
., p. 91.
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freedom to own property and to follow any trade had little value without
freedom of speech and the press. Although it is doubtful that the
Mexican moderates of the mid-nineteenth century would completely agree with
the above view, still their emphasis leaned more heavily on political rather
than on economic questions.
Mexican radicals, however, insisted that these measures of common inter-
est did not extend far enough. They demanded a strict equality before the law,
the importance of free, obligatory lay education, the institution of a civil
register, and some form of religious freedom
—
preferably the total separa-
tion of church and state in Mexico. They aimed at a lay society by further-
ing those things that constituted the life and activities of modern peoples
and gave brilliance to civilization.
The second serious roadblock in the way of a settled, established,
peaceful coexistence came from the popular temperament. Rightly or wrongly
the Plan of Ayutla had assumed throughout the Mexican republic a character
that predicated the initiation and implementation of radical reforms in
governmental structure and policy.^-?
With the victory in Mexico City complete, a provisional president,
Juan Alvarez, was elected in accordance with the Plan of Ayutla. The
Liberals convened a Constituent Congress with the delegates chosen by
direct election. This resulted in a dearth of Conservative representatives
and in only a small minority of radical Liberals. Juarez was not among
these since he was then serving once again as the Governor of Oaxaca; but
l5vialter V. Scholes, Mexican Politics During the Juarez Regime
,
l85S-lg72 (Columbia, Mo.: The University of Missouri Studies, 1957), p. 17.
I5p7 Parra, Estudio Historico-3oci<Slogico sobre la Reforma en Mexico
(Mexlcoi n.p., 1906), pp. 22, 16«.
l^Qorham Drummer Abbott, Mexico and the United States i Their Mutual
Relations and Common Interests (New Yorki G.P. Putnam & Sons, 1869), p. 121*.
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the convention felt his influence. Several convention orators cited his
name and beliefs in support of the legislation they were trying to further.
The Constitutional Congress achieved three things, one directly and
two indirectly. First, of course, it framed a new constitution for the
Mexican people that would serve as the organic law of the land until 1917.
Second, it provided a fairly accurate measuring stick for the gauging of
public opinion within the republic itself. Third, it set up a framework
within which Juarez could later work out his social and political
philosophy and which influenced him substantially in his later role as
President of the Republic.
Full of righteous indignation at the tyranny and duplicity of the late
President of the Republic, one of the first projects of the Constituent
Congress consisted in dredging up the acts of Santa Anna in order to condone
or condemn them. The Development Commission of the Congress wished to
revise the dictator's laws on uncultivated land and on the Tehuantepec
land concession to Jecker, Torre and Company. The Justice Commission wished
to revise the properties of partiality of San Juan and Santiago, the
concession of passage to the papal bulls of the apostolic delegate, the
establishment of the Jesuits, and some of the laws on Justice administra-
tion. Congress proposed the recall of exiled citizens and the reexamina-
tion of the Treaty of La ?;esilla, by virtue of which the national territory
was disengaged and Article Eleven of the Treaty of Guadalupe was abolished.
Debate on the Treaty tended to become a bit vituperative, Jose Maria Mata
roundly condemned both the Treaty and the responsibility of Santa Anna in
signing such an infamous document.
l8Zarco, pp. 71, 73, 109.
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Mata also advocated one rather important piece of legislation. Early
in 1856 he introduced a proposal calling for Congressional ratification of
the 1855 law of justice administration proposed by Juarez which suppressed
ecclesiastical and military privileges in civil matters. This project was
accepted on March 31, 1856. At that time its author characterized it as
the most important act of the Alvarez government because it contained in
miniature the reforms which the Liberal Party desired to establish and
consolidate throughout Mexico. -^
Ponciana Arriaga went even further than Mata, attacking a constitu-
tional draft patterned along the lines of the United States Constitution
because the basic right of economic democracy was forgotten. He stated
that, while a constitution should be the law of the land, the condition of
the land was not constituted or even considered. If popular government
was to be predicated on a hungry, naked, and miserable populace, Arriaga
thought it more logical to declare the poor as things and not persons,
deny theiu the vote and establish an aristocratic government based on
money or talent, as the result would be the same.20
Congress buried Arriaga 1 s proposals and his advocacy of land reform
principles. Even Juarez's name, which speakers cited as standing for
principles of progress, failed. The loss of fruitful discussion on the
issue of land reform resulted in a cardinal weakness for the new Consti-
tution. Political freedoms without an economic foundation became a
liability rather than an asset for the submerged masses."-
On seeing the potentially radical nature of what they were currently
^Ibid
., pp. 100, 110.
2°Roeder, I, 127.
21Ibid.. pp. 12?, 13U.
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doing, the moderate liberals drew back in alarm and qualified the elementary
rights of self-government. They frustrated universal suffrage by indirect
election, restricted trial by Jury and the power of impeachment, tried to
refine away peaceful assembly and lawful petition, and hedged the freedom
22
of the press." As a result the Constitution of 1857 emerged as an
unfinished product—a door to liberty, but a door without a key. Its basic
precept—the equality of all before the law—had a political rather than a
social character. It stressed democracy, states' rights, the authority of
Congress over the Executive, and national law over particular interests.
The result of the labors of provincial lawyers, small merchants and fiery
Journalists, the new organic law aimed almost exclusively at solving
23political problems. Corresponding to Auguste Comte'a methodological princi-
ple, it. emphasized not a single absolute liberty which comprehended all, but
specific and determined liberties that corresponded to the most well-defined
forms of human activity and were limited only by the respect for another's
rights. Liberty existed not as a metaphysical entity per se but only as a
form or manner of organizing social cooperation. In this context the
notion of right existed only in correlation with that of duty. 214
The Constitution began functioning on February 5, 1857, under the
presidency of Ignacio Comonfort. Its interpretation, however, speedily
led to complications. The Conservatives regarded the document as anathema
and utilized every expedient to annul its provisions. The Liberals disagreed
among themselves. In an effort to preserve peace in the country, Comonfort
"Ibid
., p. 137.
'^Howard Francis Cline, The United States and Mexico ( Cambridge
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2i
*Parra, pp. 123, 126.
25
made several moves designed to placate the Conservatives, even going so far
as to attempt a coup d'e'tat. At thi3 juncture Juarez, who had been elected
President of the Supreme Court, announced his ascent to the presidency for
the avowed purpose of preserving the Constitution. This action precipitated
a bloody three years' civil war from which Juarez and the Constitutional
Liberals emerged victorious.
What part, if any, did Juarez play in the Revolution of Ayutla and the
Reform movements in Mexico in the mid-fifties? How did he regard the ideals
and purposes that were expressed and fostered?
Juarez joined Alvarez's protest movement relatively late. When the
outbreak started in 1851*, he was still marking time in New Orleans and
Brownsville. And, due to a lack of funds, he did not leave the United
States until June, 1855. On reaching Alvarez's headquarters at Acapulco,
he became the General's personal secretary. After the victory he became
the Minister of Justice. This previously rather unimportant position Juarez
turned into the most vital ministry of the government—the political ministry
par excellence that defined the revolution and converted it into the Reform. 25
In November, 1855, JBareu submitted to Alvarez hia plan for the reform of the
justice administration, wnich involved the abolition of the religious and
military courts and the suppression of their fueros, privileges. Alvarez
signified his approval, and the measure passed into law. By that first step
25pablo Prida Santaoilia, Siguiendo la vlda de Juarez (Mexico: n.p.,
1°U5), P. 236.
SPAN. CRIQ. "La Secretaria de Justicia y Negocios Eclesiasticos, bastante
anodina hasta entonces, tornose en raanos de Juarez en el mas importante de
los ministerios, fue el ministerio politico por excelenci a, fue la
supresion de los privilegios de las clases eclesiastica y militarj fue,
bajo una formula sencilla, el encargado de definir la revolucion, el que*
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Juarez took alone, he breathed life into two major movements in Mexican history,
the Reform and the religious revolution. His personal initiative contributed
in many ways to the heroic impulse of the Mexican people, and his incomparable
firmness sustained them in the drive to victory,c"
Reaction to this stringent measure aroused stormy emotions on both
sides of the political fence with the Conservatives very generally against
it and the Liberals for. Acclamation rang through the Constitutional
Convention. Vincente Oamboa, speaking on the necessity for liberty of cults
in Mexico, prophesied that Benito Juarez was going to conquer a beginning
and that he feared nothing because he was a man of heart. He asserted that
this same Juarez was acclaiming that very day from Oaxaca reform, tolerance
—
all that was progress. Anaya Hermosillo regarded Juarez as a boon to the
democratic cause. Francisco Zarco, however, proved the most effusive in his
praise. He claimed that Juarez had realized the triumph and equality of the
people by emancipating them from the yoke of the privileged classes and had
taken a giant step forward in the name of progress.2 '
Juarez, however, did not reuain long in the Uinistry of Justice. With
the advent of Comoni'ort to the presidency, he returned home to once again
take over the governorship of his native state and to secure the implementa-
tion of the Ley Juarez . Apparently some conservatives intended to contest
his rule, but they decided to lay down their arms. On February 2, 1856,
Juarez issued a manifesto to the people of Oaxaca promising to implement
the revolution initiated in Ayutla and to respect its subsequent modifi-
cations. 2
"
2
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Juarez's second term program sought to extend and to capitalise on the
progress of his first. He further reformed the public instruction within
the state, reorganised the treasury and Justice administrations, secured
the due sanction of the civil and criminal law codes, and caused the
legislature to adopt a broader-based municipal system and the direct elec-
tion of the governor. 29 With the abolition of the coimandancies general,
the previously independent military captains of the state fell under the
governor's authority. 30 This removed a very dangerous source of unrest, fie
also drafted a new state constitution in accord with the federal Constitu-
tion in order to brace the state government for the storm which he felt
would follow the latter's ratification. 31
Interesting, however, in view of Juarez's supposed insistence on the
inviolability of the law were his relations with the federal government in
Mexico City. Although he undertook immediately to enforce the federal
Constitution and insisted on strict compliance with the ley. Lerdo and the
ley. Juarez, nevertheless, he refused to comply with another Comonfort
decree curbing state power. 32
Federal elections in 1857 catapulted Juarez into the Presidency of the
Supreme Court. Then when Comonfort executed his coup d'e"tat, Juarez fled
to Quere*taro where ho was proclaimed the legal President of the Republic.
Comonfort, declared Juarez and his small group of followers, had failed to
support the law of the land. Three years of civil war followed between the
government of Zuloaga and Mlramon on the one side and the government of
^bbott, p. 127.
<:=„+ ^f1^ J"&ea ' Archivo privado de Don Benito Juarez y Don Pedro
-antacilia (Mexico. Sria. de Educ. »ub., 1926), p. l<i.
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Juarez, Ocampc, and the Lerdo de Tojada brothers on the other.
Military reverses forced the evacuation of Quere'taro and subsequently
of Guanajuato. The peregrinating cabinet dodged into the western Mexican
port of Mazatlah and eiAarked via Panama for the Liberal stronghold in
Vera Cruz. Arriving in aid-1858 Juarez set out to coordinate the efforts
of his far-flung independent generals. This presented a great many more
problems than iiraedlately met the eye. Hot only did Juarez have to oontend
with enormous distances and a definite dearth of communications facilities,
but also with the radically individualistic spirit of his generals and the
lack of a tradition in the country which would support a principle over a
personality in government. In addition, he was handicapped by a lack of
support from foreign powers. The only nation that recognized the Liberal
government during those black days was the United States, and even its
motives were questionable.
Both sides experienced reverses in 1858, and proposals were advanced for
an armistice predicated on constitutional reform. But Juarez, despite his
avowal to work during the short period of his administration for the re-
establishment of peace, 33refuSed to lend his support. The compromise
proposals failed. This would appear rather strange in view of Bulnes 1
assertion that the war was nothing more than a factional fight between
Liberals and Conservatives.^ Bulnes' premise would seem to be particular-
ly easy to quarrel with in view of the issue of the Reform laws of July, 1859.
If the division were not something more than factional, it would then place
33Francisco Bulnes, Juarez y las revoluciones de Ayutla y de Reforma
(Uexiooi n.p., 1905), p. 281.
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3hlbld„ p. 512.
29
Juarez in the undesirable position of not having the interests of the
nation's neace and prosperity at. heart. Unfortunately the division was
something more than factional. As Juarez wrote during some of the blackest
days of the wari
I am not the chief of a party. I an the lawful represent-
ative of the Nation. The instant I set aside law, my powers
cease and my mission is ended. I cannot, I do not desire to,
and I must not, make any compromise whatever. The moment I
should do so, my constituents would cease to acknowledge me,
because I have sworn to support the Constitution, and I
sustain, with entire confidence, the public opinion. When
this shall be manifested to me in a different sense, I shall
be the first to acknowledge its sovereign deliberations.55
The political result of the issuance of the Reform laws in Vera Cruz
was to still further estrange the other side. The opening paragraphs of
the Vera Cruz proclamation placed th: blame for the current abominable
state of affairs in Mexico squarely on the shoulders of the clergy. They
had oppressed the people and violated their mission as a "perfect organiza-
tion" by taking outside material aid. 36 To correct this unfortunate
situation, the decree then nationalized Church property and the goods of
the clergy, suppressed the monastic orders and forbade the wearing of habits,
ordered the return of the nuns' dowries, turned the religious articles used
in the convents over to the diocesean bishops, made religious contribu-
tions optional, and declared marriage a civil contract. Lastly, it postu-
lated the complete and absolute independence of church and state.37 Further
decrees followed. A decree of July 28 established the Civil Register, cm
^Abbott, pp. lUl-it2.
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July 31 came the secularization of cemeteries and other burial sites. The
government broke relations with the Holy See and with the Pop* in his capa-
city as head of the Italian states on August 3. A decree of August 11
established tlio recognized national holidays. 3"
The emergence of the Reform imposed a new organicity to the Mexican
state. The Liberal .'arty merged into the personality of JuaVez, and the
personality of JuaVez blended into the Liberal Party. It and he became
the owners of the republican territory, the establishes of the race he
called hia own, and the cultivators of a potentially flowering new civiliza-
tion. Juarez and the Liberal Party imposed a new identity on the Mexican
nationality. 39
The Importance of JuaVez in the Reform movement, however, lias not been
universally recognized by all historians. Francisco Bulnes charged that
during the three year civil war Juarez served as no more than an uncondi-
tional servant of the state's will. His I860 proclamation pledge to
reconvene Congress and to hold new elections only showed that Juarez con-
sidered the revolution of slight importance and thought nothing of reform,
but desired only to retire from office as soon as possible. According to
Bulnes, JuaVez had decreed the Reform Laws against his will only to secure
money and concerned himself only with preserving legality. Furthermore,
the 1859 laws only formed a part of the Mexican Reforu.^
Direct examination indicated that the innuendoes implicit in Bulne»'
statements are self-contradictory. If JuaVez were interested only in peace,
^Castillo, p. U2.
39Andres Molina Enriquez, Juarez y la Reforma (3rd ed.; Mexico D.F.i
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why did he not accept the compromise proposals in 185" when the majority
of his cabinet were in favor of the measure? If hp proved insusceptible
to pressure then, why would he have succumbed under stress to issue the
Tteform laws in 1859 if he had not believed that they would bring something
above and beyond their rather dubious monetary value and military advantage?
If the reforms were designed to gain money only, why the multiplication of
further decrees, few of which possessed any tangible prospect of immediate
remuneration?
With the decisive defeat of the Conservatives in late i860, the
Liberal government under Juarez again faced the task of rebuilding a
shattered country. Ju&rez entered "exico City in triumph in January, 1861,
Realizing that recriminations would avail little in reuniting the country,
he proposed a liberal moderate policy for the punishment of the rebels .^
He then held open elections. The results returned him as president and
provided hia with a Liberal Congress, which immediately began to attack the
previous and present polioies of the administration. One deputy,
Jose" Maria Aguirre, proposed to declare Juares a traitor for the
formulation in 1858 of the WcLane-Ocampo treaty with the United States.
This treaty, although not ratified by either government, contained seme
provisions which many Yexican liberals thought lessened the freedom and
sovereign action of Mexico. Aguirre' s proposal failed, partly because of
the vigorous defense initiated by Francisco Zarcn and the influoncial
daily newspaper El Siglo. Zarco noted that in 1859 when United States
recognition end aid was deemed indispensable for the success of the Liberal
cause, it wa3 Mwt who opposed all ideas for loans that would occasion
^Juarea, ^pistolario
, p. 121».
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great international compromise and any use of foreign mercenaries. As
—
Siglo commented:
In vain the President was entreated} in vain were
proposed the most studied precautions to avoid any circum-
stances which might injure or impair the independence or the
dignity of the Republic; in vain the idea was combined with
some other projects, joining it with the absolute necessity
of colonization, of making religious liberty effective, of
maintaining after the victory an element of material force
that would complete the pacification of the country. Juarez
rejected all these ideas; he had disagreements even with
many of his friends.. In his correspondence he always
opposed the project»"
But even Zarco's successful defense ultimately proved no match for a
vigorous offense, and the specter of the abortive treaty remained to
plague Juarez throughout his career. In addition to the political sniping,
the new President faced another and more serious problem. This was the
pacification of the country. Guerilla bands of conservatives roamed the
countryside, robbing and terrorizing. They captured and murdered Ocampo,
and the whole country proclaimed its protest and demanded vigorous action
by the government. But during June, 1861, the forces of social decom-
position continued to spread. The resources were drained from the treasury
to pay the interest on Mexico's numerous foreign debts. Nothing remained
with which to rebuild the economy of the nation. In this situation Juarez
decided on drastic action. On July 17, 1861 he suspended payment on the
foreign debts with the object of saving society and of reorganizing
affairs at home in order to be able to pay scrupulously in the future. A
one vote margin in Congress sustained the President's action.
k2Ibld
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The European powers reacted violently to this display of independence.
The suspension threatened vital monetary interests. In October 1861 England,
France, and Spain signed the Convention of London agreeing to intervention
by force to collect their debts.
The English detachment joined the Spanish fleet in Vera Crua harbor
on January 6, 1862. The French brought up the rear of the invasion party
on January 8. A week later the three oonspirators dispatched a diplomatic
note demanding payment of the foreign debt and satisfaction for diverse
incidents and for assassinations of Spaniards in the Mexican republic.
Against such an offensive the Mexican government could do little.
Such diplomatic defenses as it possessed in early 1862 were purely moral,
"but at the head of the government sat a man accustomed to making much of
little, and he employed them for more than they were actually worth."""
Although the government had by this time both loudly condemned the Allies
as pirates"? and quietly repealed the debt suspension act of July 17, 1861,
neither action had any particular result. Mexico was unable to forcibly
evict the Allies. And the repeal of the debt suspension clause effected
nothing since the invasion had already started.
Meanwhile from the Mexican point of view some very promising and yet
disturbing incidents were occurring within the Allied camp. As it turned
out the three powers of Europe had signed the Convention of London for
very different reasons. The English and to a lesser extent the Spanish
interested themselves in the Mexican situation almost solely for its
commercial implications. The English invading force was small, almost
!*|juarez, Epistolario
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token, and the Spanish, while slightly larger, came nowhere close to
representing a significant threat to Mexican independence. The French on
the other hand, as their supposed Allies soon discovered, had disembarked
in Mexico with a primarily political objective. Napoleon III had been
listening to the whispers of the monarchy-oriented Mexican exiles
clustered in Paris. He had visions of establishing a new French Empire
in America to counter what he regarded as the baneful Yankee influence in
the Caribbean. The French troops in Vera Cruz attained sizable proportions
and reinforcements were expected momentarily. This circumstance plus the
overbearing insolence of the French diplomatic representative in Mexico,
Gabriac de Saligny, fostered dissension. On April 9 the experiment in
joint intervention ended. The Allies agreed to disagree at Orizaba.
The British concluded a separate convention at Puebla on April 29, but as
this involved some transfer of the customs both the Mexican Congress and
Juarez refused assent."
When the French marched troops into Orizaba, thus violating their
promise signed at Soledad to negotiate differences with the Juarez govern-
ment and when the Conservative Plan of Cordoba announced its intention
to make peace with the enemy on any terms, Juarez abandoned his moderate
policy. He declared unequivocally that he would defend the national
sovereignty until the last drop of Mexican blood was spilt. 1*9 And the
French General Forey would remark a year later at Puebla on the moral cause
of the Mexican tenacity.'
{%bid., pp. It23-2li.
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Juarez's declaration in 1862 marked only the beginning of five years
of hit-and-run warfare and passive civil resistance to the French invasion.
The government fled north to Guanajuato, to Chihuahua, to Paso del Norte.
The French fell back at Puebla in May, 1862, but finally conquered Puebla in
March, 1863. They entered Mexico City and established a provisional govern-
ment to await the arrival of the future Mexican emperor, Maximilian, Prince
of the House of Hapsburg. Maximilian came with his beautiful wife. He stayed
three years in Ciudad, Mexico, and laid out the Avenida Reforraa. He toyed
with innumerable projects and accomplished nothing. In 1865 and 1866
Napoleon III became worried. The pacification of the Mexican countryside
was nowhere near completed. The European scene was darkening, and with the
end of the American Civil flar the United States was beginning to cast dis-
approving eyes south and was sending troops to the border. Discretion
became the better part of valor, and the French withdrew in 1867, leaving
Maximilian to his tragic fate. The Mexican government moved triumphantly
south tc Chihuahua, to Queretaro, to Mexico City, where Juarez issued a
proclamation. The government would not be vindictive as duty hung on the
demands of justice. It would respeot the rights of all, for respect for
another's rights constituted peace both between individuals and between
nations. Having completed the first of its duties by not compromising
either in interior or exterior affairs anything that could prejudice the
country's independence or sovereignty, its territorial integrity or the
rospect owed to the Constitution and the laws, the government would now
work to obtain and consolidate all the benefits of peace. Within the
country's free institutions the people would be the complete arbiters of
their own destiny.-'
5lpere Foix, Juarez (Mexicos Ed. Ibero Americanas, 19k9), pp. 216-17.
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Once again the Liberals faced the task of reconstruction interrupted
in 1861. Juarez wrote of the difficulties after the battle of Quere'taroi
The impatient are going to the devil because they want
everything to be over at once, although the great criminals
will go unpunished, and the future peace of the nation will
not be guaranteed; but the government without heeding them,
continues to make haste slowly with the firo determination
to do what best befits the country, and without being
influenced in its decisions by personal vengeance, misguided
compassion, or any foreign threat. We have fought for the
^
independence and autonomy of Mexico, and it must be a reality.-'
The national elections of 1867 returned Juarez to the presidency, but
defeated his plea for substantial constitutional reforms that would place
considerably more power in the hands of the Executive. This defeat weakened
his ability to attack the pressing problems crying for solution. In addition
an ardent parliasentarlanism raged through Congress. The delegates guarded
their prerogatives so jealously that little constructive legislation was
passed. Then, too, both Congress and the press tended to discourage
Executive initiative and to insist on the strict interpretation of the
Constitution. J But while impeding Juarez's constructive programs, the
opposition, nevertheless, took every opportunity to castigate Juarez for
do-nothingness. They accused him of being a puppet, of doing nothing but
collecting a salary, and finally they settled on the country's poverty as
an effective needling instrument. The government under Juarez's guidance
introduced highway and railroad expansion measures into Congress. It
tried to effect at least a partial social reform by proposing to tax
uncultivated lands. In this way the big estates would degenerate into
smaller properties. But Congress refused to act, and the legislation
^Roeder, II, 670-671.
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languished.^
In 1871 Juarez ran again for reelection amidst cries of outrage and
vicious recrimination. He won, but the country's impetus for reform seemed
to have vanished. Then in 1872 death struck, and all but the reaction-
aries of Mexico mourned the loss of one of their great ones.
Despite diverse and brilliant ministers, the politics of the Juarista
period were monolithic in nature because the successive cabinets sublimated
their ambitions, personal characteristics, loyalties and phobias to the
granite personality, mystique, and all-consuming ideal of their leader .55
Even Francisco 3ulnes, one of Juarez's most severe critics wrotei
Since the day that he established the Reform, we have
been really Mexicans and sociologically distinct from the
Spaniards
. ... Adhesion to the memory of Juarea means
belief in our dignity as free men. 5°
But there was a reason for this voluntary subjection to the leader-
ship of Juarez that went beyond devotion to a dominant personality or to
a mystical quality in his character. And that reason sprang from a
fundamental agreement with the principles, social and political, for which
Juarez stood and which he carried out in his daily life. Those events
influencing the life of Juarez and to a lesser extent his part in them
have been traced. But there remains the necessity to examine the
philosophy of the man, to see how events shaped it, and more importantly
how he shaped by his philosophy the events in which he played a part.
forbid., pp. 700-702.
^Bianco Moheno, p. 235.
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CHAPTER II
JUAREZ'S DREAU CF A HEW SOCIETY
The Political and Social Thought of Benito Juarez
and its Relation to Mexico
Did Juarez have a concrete philosophy which guided his actions? And,
if so, was this philosophy purely political, or did its ramifications
perhaps extend much further than pure politics and reach the social,
economic, and even into the religious fields? What were Juarez's most
cherished ideals for old Mexico, or more specifically, for the new Mexico
that he dreamed of creating?
t«'any men had dreamed of a new society and a glorious place in the sun
for the Mexican nation. Sane few, among them Hidalgo, had attempted to
implement the dream and had failed. Juarez too had a philosophical vision
around which to rally the 5,'exican people, "art of it was political,
liberal, democratic Part of it was economic, commercial, progressive.
Part of it was social, unprivileged, equal. Part of it too was even, in
a sense, religious. But in any case the philosophical vi3icm that Juarez,
the poor Zapotec Indian of Oexaca, envisaged for the Mexican nation emerged
complete and total. It allowed no room for compromise or for equivocation.
It included the ideas of predecessors, such as Hidalgo, but it went much
further and wrapped the whole of Mexico in a new ideal.
Most of Juarez's philosophical thought, as written, dated from the
period before he left Oaxaoa since afterwards the political maelstrom
3«
3?
engulfed him more and more. His thought found its unifying thread in
social rather than in political or economic principles. Political reforms
were but the means to the end. For to finish Hidalgo's work it was
necessary to strive for the good of the country and to purify the political
system of the anti-social maxims with which the people were governed and
educated. The framers of the Constitution of 182U had surrendered to
abstractions and had failed to take into account the silence, labor, and
solemnity proper to the Mexican people.
"
For Juarez the twin principles of authority and Justioe underlay his
whole social philosophy. This concept of authority, however, embraced
something more than just the power of enforcement. It was not only
physical but also knowing and moral. It carried responsibility more than
representation or legality. Civil authority resided in social feeling
and not in political forensic. It established a continuity for the know-
ledge and rational choice of authority and for the relations between thi3
authority and the individual. Thus, although constitutions remained valid,
they were not absolute entities and determinants of political functionalism.
They served as moral codes—a semblance of universal aspirations to the
perfection of the 3tate. Given this concept neither liberalism nor
jiasonry as practiced on the llexican scene over the first half of the
nineteenth century constituted a precise characterization of mexicanidad .
A constitution could not bo a neat little package copied almost, verbatim
from another land, for then it would neither relate to Mexico nor be able
-"Andres Henestrosa, Textos polfticos de Benito Juarez (Mexico:
Sria. de Educacion publica, 19UaJ, p. 1U. Also Jose" C. Valades,
El pcnsaaiento -,'Olftico de Benito Juarez (Mexico: Libr. de Manuel
Parrera, s.a., n.d.), p. 150.
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to relate Mexico to the world. It should embody only the means by which
the native tradition of the country could be developed without losing its
truly Mexican flavor and the Indians could be integrated into the national
life. 58
From this ideal of authority and its organicity, Juarea evolved a
theory of politics that sprang from nature. ?ersonal authority must be
limited to avoid violence and to realize a rational way of life. For it
was nature or authority and not politics that provided the unity for the
basic culture of America, the primeval mixture and continuity of man,
society, and the state. Liberal professions had a future as a part of the
fr«e determination of the Mexican. But this, although it marked a new
political dawn, a Mexican nativity, failed to provide the whole solution.
The answer lay in the ancient Mexican idea of command in an associative
authority which valued equally the establishing of a rapport between
government and society and a feeling of hierarchy and coaoon benefit.
For this reason Juarea advocated the presidential rule which, he thought,
gave inspiration and made for social democracy. He wished to link the
state and the individual and to make proportionate the relations of the
government and the society.59 The road to liberty, however, did not begin
in meaningless constitutional abstractions. Constitutional liberties were
spiritual guides and the duty of constitutional government was, as far as
possible, to set the moral tone of society by both obeying the law and
enforcing with strict impartiality the moral prohibitions implied in it.6°
Thus progress for Mexico should be one of spirit and not necessarily
of industry. And since this ideal also included an element of social
58Valade*s, pp. 61-62, 132-33.
^Ibid., pp. 11-12, 16, 29-30, 1$, 50, 59-60, 92.60EMd«r, 1, 258.
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justice, the monopolies—of the Church over property and education, and of
one class, the Creole, over the state—had to be destroyed. For under the
society that Juarez envisaged, the feeling of a hierarchy in government was
not one of persons or classes, but rested in the ordering and execution of
moral and political principles. He regarded the presidential regime as the
ideal but set it within the limits of Justice and democracy and, even more
importantly, within a moral practice without which the government would
degenerate into monarchy. Tor the function of the state did not live either
because of its command over individuals nor because of its position as theix
representative. Its function existed to bring order from the chaos of
excessive personalise or exaggerated parliancntarianism.
Order, brought about by an essentially moral authority, would foster
the principle of a civil and voluntary law. It would coordinate all parti
of the government and society. The Ibwb enacted under such authority would
exist from nature since they emerged from a moral base that was complete unto
itself. Ho outside agency, such as a religious institution, had a place in
such a society, and the democracy founded on these premises demanded a
strict observance of the law. Therefore it followed that the first duty of
a governor was to comply with the law.
Juirea wrote of the leader's obligation to have no other aim than the
securing of the common happiness through a just enforcement of the law. The
just ruler could consider only merit and virtue or crime and vice in reward-
ing or punishlig the people. 3
^Wade's, pp. 70-71, 75-77, 95.
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SPAK. ORIO. "El primer gobernante de una sociedad no debe tener mas bandera
que la ley} la felicidad comun debe ser au norte, e iguales los hombres ante
su presencia, como lo son ante la ley; solo debe distinguir al merita y a la
vlrtud para recompensarlosj al vicio y al crimen para procurar su caatigo."
1;2
The concept of the moral force of the state was to be cemented through
instruction and education, for public instruction constituted the first
base of a people's prosperity and the most sure means of preventing the
abuse of power. Simply multiplying the schools, however, guaranteed no
solution. It was first necessary to remove the public misery. For, a
man that lacked the essentials with which to feed his family; ILooked on
education for his children as a remote benefit at best. More frequently
he regarded it as an obstacle to the procurement of daily sustenance.
This education, when under way, would also furnish a strong basis for
social regeneration. It belonged to the people—all the people—by a right
that no one could take from them. Juarez pledged himself to sustain that
right
i
As a son of the people, I will not forget you; on the
contrary I will sustain your rights, I will take care that
you are educated, advanced and suckled for the future, and
that you abandon the road of disorder, of vice and of misery,
to which those men have conducted you that only with their
words call themselves your friends and your liberators; but
with their deeda are ycur most cruel tyrants. '
And in the fight for education and social regeneration on the basis of the
moral authority underlying the state, women would play a very vital role.
To form a woman in all the ways—including education—that her necessary
and elevated mission demanded was to fori the fecund seed of regeneration
"klbld
., p , 185. Also Rafael de Zayas Enriquess, Benito Juarez, su
vida, su obra (iicxico: liditorial del Siagisterio, 19?C), r. U3.
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, p. 186.
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sostendre sua derechos, cuidare' de que se ilustre, se engrandezco, y se
orie un porvenir, y que abandone la carrera del deaorden de los vicios y
de la miseria, a que lo han conducido los hombres que solo con sus
palaoras se dicen sus amigos y sus libertadores; [;ero que con sus hechos
son 3us mas crueles tiranos."
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and social betterment. Thus it was vital that her education not be neglect-
ed.66
Juarez's concept of justice for the masses reached far beyond the grant
of simple political privileges. It predicated the removal of economic
obstacles that precluded a complete break with the past. And since in his
view economic interests and social culture approached the synonymous, the
implementation of the one implied a recognition for the necessity of the
other. Nothing should be lacking to the campesino who produced the wealth.
This primarily represented an economic statement. But when the concept of
what was just extended out to include as a duty the payment of a living
wage, the right to adequate housing and education, security against
illness and layoffs, and the right to other economic relief services, the
preliminary economic statement moved rapidly into social reform.
™
Juarez did not shrink from the results of this statement. In a
paragraph to Santacilia, he espoused socialism as the natural way to better
the human condition and to promote the free development of the physical and
moral faculties. While despotism and oppression flourished, this inclina-
tion to socialism would increase, but socialism's power to destroy existing
things would diminish where despotism and oppression disappeared in
governments.
Taken together these ideas of Juarez formed the beginning and the core
of his philosophical ideals. Later events led to small variations and care-
fully considered expansions, but his basic philosophy remained the same. And
with this philosophy he influenced to a considerable degree the diversities
^Hector Perez Martinez, Juarez el impasible (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe,
193M.-P. 77.
"'Boeder, I, 1»8. Also Foix, p. 278.
Juarez, Archivo privado
, p. 275.
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of his time and the unity of the future.
In 1821 eleven generations of oppression had considerably strengthened
the Liberal movement, which favored equal rights, progress, and freedom of
conscience, opinion, speech, and press. As a young student Juarez joined
the Liberals and in 1829 made his first public declaration for the sepa-
ration of public powers and the establishment of a force
—
public opinion
—
that could maintain and insure their independence and equilibrium. The
force of public opinion, however, never became an absolute for Juarez.
Although he at least made reference to it throughout his life, he did not
hesitate to attempt to mold it or to go against it when the underlying
moral authority of the state so demanded. For the majority of the people
rarely examined the causes of things and always admired and extolled what
was to them new and extraordinary."'
In I830 Juarez moved slightly away from academic theory and made a
daring sally into practical politics by protesting the coup of Antonio
Bustaraente. Significantly, he condemned him not necessarily for
violating the Constitution of l82lt, but for not having a comprehensive plan
of state, administration, or justice. Bustamente, said Juarez, did not
worry about the improvement of the people nor about the lack of schools
and teachers. He did not even concern himself with the creation of a
disciplined army to defend Mexico from possible attacks on her territorial
integrity. Juarez then announced his Intention to undertake the painful
labor of repairing the country from the robbers who infiltrated into
politics with "unconfessed looks".' The same year Juarez also proposed
fbauu, p. 232.
<°Fzn, pp. w-ijo.
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a system of direct election.
Juarez declared himself much in favor of the Reform Laws of 1833.
But his acceptance of these reforms did not necessarily mean his undying
support of constitutionalism. In commenting on the federalist Constitution
of 162l», Juarez criticized it as the breeding ground of subsequent troubles
because it recognized religious intolerance and the fueros . More
important, however, in determining just how much emphasis and value Juarez,
both in 1833 and later, placed on law per se was a resolution that he
introduced into the Congress of Oaxaca in 1&33. This resolution contained
a proposal to honor the memory of Vincent* Guerrero, a patriot who had
revolted against the Constitution of 182U. In addition, around the same
time, he also initiated a bill advocating the confiscation of the estate
of Cortes for the benefit of the state.'2 These two resolutions would seem
to be inconsistent with the contention of many of Juarez's biographers that
he was attached above and beyond all to the concept of the law. On the
other hand it would not be at all inconsistent with the wider ideal of
Juarez's total social philosophy that envisaged law only as an expression
of the basic underlying moral authority of the state. Law represented a
means to an end, not the end in itself.
After the fall of the Liberals in Mexico City and Oaxaca around the
end of 183b, Juarez occupied his time in various minor duties. In I836 he
was imprisoned on suspicion of a conspiracy to overthrow the Conservative
government, thus indicating that in Oaxaca at least he represented a force
to be reckoned with. In this connection Foix stated that by 161*3, his
activities in Oaxaca and his position as Secretary to the Governor of the
"Wder, I, y*-55.
Juarez, Archivo privado, p. 233.
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state had made him known all over Mexico. " Despite this comment, however,
there was little to indicate that in 181i5 Juarez had much influence outside
his native state. But in Oaxaca he was important enough to be a member of
the ruling triumvirate which administered executive power in 1SW. Shortly
thereafter the state of Oaxaca sent him to Mexico City as one of its
official representatives to the National Congress. And, although noted for
his taciturnity, Juarez, nevertheless, made an impression on the other
delegates. In conjunction with the rest of the Oaxaca contingent he
sponsored the redaction and approval of a law authorizing the government to
mortgage a part of the wealth administered by the clergy to carry on the
North American War, He also condemned the alcabalas
, or sales taxes, and
denied the ability of a centralized government to effectively interpret
and to remedy the needs of the people. Contrary to the prevailing custom,
he opposed the creation of unnecessary jobs to accommodate the friends of
the party in power. Positions, he argued, should be apportioned on merit.
™
Juarez did not remain long in Congress. The following year he accepted
appointment as Provisional Governor of Oaxaca and in 18U8 was officially
elected to a four year term.
The election of Juarez to the governorship of Oaxaca represented his
first opportunity to implement his total philosophy.
The state of Oaxaca had at that time a large Indian population that
constituted an almost alien people within its territorial borders. The
Mexican laws hardly benefited the Indians at all for other classes were
continually encroaching upon their communal lands, and the Indians tended
£3Foix, p. k9*
'"Zayas Enriquez, pp. 39, Ul.
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to try to live within their own laws and customs. They mistrusted the
governmental framework set up by the Spanish and the newly independent
Creoles, and they appealed tc Juarez for aid by virtue of his Indian blood. 7^
Juarez rose to the challenge. In 1650 when an Indian delegation came
to express sorrow for the death of his son, Juarez pledged never to forget
his origin or the rights and desires of his people. 76
As governor Juarez organized the defense of Oaxaca, reconstituted the
National Guard and established a hospital for its use, initialed I.O.tJ's
to cover the state debt, surveyed the resources of the state, set up a
competent bureaucracy, and promoted public education—including education
for women. He attempted also to establish a mint, but the central govern-
ment, which had already compromised itself to an English firm by promising
that no money could be coined within fifty leagues of the city, forbade the
enterprise. One of his first concrete acts was the reestablishment of the
Oaxacan Institute of Arts and Sciences, and hi3 administration issued the
first civil and penal code published in Mexico. 77
Economic projects also advanced. Acting on the supposition that road
building, not revolution, cured poverty, the Zapotec governor undertook a
system of public works and completed a road to Huatluco. Its opening was
marked by a solemn high Mass, sung by the clergy of the state. The
introduction of agricultural crop rotation provided much needed Improvement
over the older methods of Indian farming. 7®
During his term Juarez, being a practical man, did not advocate the
impossible. But by pushing forward the possible to the greatest extent,
7|Hoeder, I, 76-77.
3>oix, pp. 61-62.
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whe, in the long run, enlarged the limits of what was feasible. The people
of Oaxaoa were not yet ready to look upon society as their God, as the
Creator's manifestation in man's creation. They still thought in terms of
corporate institutions—to which they gave their fullest allegiance, rather
than giving it to Justice and the state. This situation badly needed
corseting. But years of tradition could not be immediately overturned and
Juarez, endowed with the patience of his race, could afford to wait.
To what extent could the activities of Juarez's first administra-
tion in Oaxaca be regarded as either significantly different from those
of previous administrations or as constituting steps toward social re-
form? Bulnes, for instance, charged that as Governor of Oaxaca from
18U7 to 1852 Juarez had brilliant programs in pure administration and
nothing at all in the way of political reform. 80 And this charge as far
as it went perhaps was relatively sound. But here lay the crux of the
matter. Bulnes did not go far enough since for Juarez political reform
did not constitute the be-all and the end-all of his program. He wished
to change the entire structure of society and to reorient its direction.
Juarez's ideal society was to be a product of this world, based on the
values of this world and not of the next. With such a concept Juarez
was forced to proceed slowly. An undue emphasis on political reform dur-
his first term would have turned the vested interests against him and
ruined his program before it was safely under way. Thus, Juarez started
with adoiinistratlon. He issued a civil and penal code to reorient the
ideals of the state courts. The courts of the fueros continued—inaccess-
J
9 Ibid., pp. 80-81, 90.
o03ulnes, pp. 170-71.
ible at present. Any attempt to issue reforms here would have brought
disaster. Therefore, Juarez waited. He started on a seemingly innocuous
subject—the installation of an honest bureaucracy—nothing very specta-
cular. But as this represented the continuity of the moral authority of
the state and its guarantee against the abuses of personality, its
orientation toward moral principles became immensely important. In line
with his conception of the close identification of economic and social
events, the liquidation of the debt and the resource survey would
ultimately become a basis on which to build more socially pointed reforms.
Equally vital was the promotion of education. The use of women as the pivot
of a social regeneration denoted a significant departure from the old
Spanish concept of woman, not necessarily in terms of dignity but at
least in terms of function. Even if woman's role as the guardian of the
hearth continued paramount, she would still have to raise her children
in the image desired by the state. Also noteworthy in the field of
education was the reestablishmtnt of the secular Institute.
The Church participation in the opening of the road to ifuatluco
Roeder considered as a sign that Juarez had broken through the Church's
isolation from civic service. ^ Although the contention in the latter
part of the statement that the Church had previously isolated itself
from civic service would be open to serious question, the remark presents
an interesting speculation on the intentions of Juarez. Lid he perhaps
envisage manipulating the Church through its participation in civil
endeavors into cooperation with the aims of his ideal society?
Interestingly enough one of Juarez's first acts as governor in 181»7
8lRoeder, I, 79.
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was to prohibit cock and bull fights as unworthy of a civilized peonle. 82
The experiment, like that of the Eighteenth Amendment in the united
Ststea, probably was relatively unsuccessful, but it once again illustrated
Juarez's determination to use the law for the purpose of promoting certain
moral principles for the society.
On September 10, lfili7, Juarez addressed the people of Oaxaca. In this
address he affirmed independence or death. The old Spanish state, ruling
by the might of the strong, was forced to make the Mexicans less mindful of
their rights. Thus it inculcated blind obedience, created class interests,
prohibited foreign contacts, imposed impoverishing tribute, mixed politics
and religion with the object of securing adoration for state personages,
and fostered a dislike of work. Spain's ultimate defeat resulted from these
principles, but the Mexicans who then adopted republican forms of govern-
ment obligated themselves to liberate and protect man from the remaining
obstacles to true freedom—to abolish the oppressive tributes that lessened
the sustenance of their sons, to remove the obstacles that impeded the free
exercise of natural rights, to prize virtue and merit, and to downrrade men
who tried to leap into public iosts through favor, adulation, lowness,
chicanery, or infamy, "he minister of the sanctuary who practiced the pure
moral of the Gospel, harmonizing it with the politic, saw in Mexican youth
the seeds of patriotism, liberty, and virtue which ought to be protected.
Conduct arranged on those principles would render the Oaxaquenos truly
independent of the arms and the musty, pernicious customs of the House
of Castile. 83
8?Foix, p. 58.
^Ibid., pp. 59-61.
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On the surface the speech represented good political rhetoric. Below
it there lurked the seeds of bitter conflict depending upon the text's
interpretation. Did Juarez classify Roman Catholicism as one of Castile's
musty and pernicious customs? What did the term the pure moral of the
Gospel signify? Did the tributes branded as excessive also include the
tithes paid to the Church? And what were the hindrances to the free
exercise of natural rights? If the obstacles impeding the free exercise
of these natural rights were interpreted as purely political, then the
situation could be coped with fairly easily. The owners of the large
haciendas needed only to tell their dependents and their Indian tenants
how to vote, and all would be well. But if, on the other hand, these
obstacles were to be viewed as social and economic also, possibilities
arose that the more wealthy classes, and perhaps even the Church (as a
property owner), did not like to contemplate. Implicit in this interpre-
tation lay the seeds of social revolution.
Thus Juarez found it necessary to make haste slowly, reforming only
those areas which would arouse least opposition. And the lack of opposi-
tion from 18U7 to 1852 was due primarily to the fact t hat the reforms
initiated touched no vested interest directly.
With the expiration of his term in 1852, Juarez once again retired
briefly to private life. The following year, however, with t he return of
Santa Anna to power, Juarez was arrested and summarily exiled without trial
to Jalapa, thence to Vera Cruz, Havana, and New Orleans. There he remained
until June, 1855. At that time he left for the Mexican west coast to join
the revolution of Ayutla fomented by Alvarez.
The Ayutla planners, Juarez among them, moved into Mexico City on
52
August 13, 1855, and established a provisional government under Alvarez.
Shortly thereafter t he remainder of the Brownsville exiles returned to
Mexico City to push for the inauguration of the program that Juarez and
Melchcr Ocampo had formulated while in exile. The plan espoused the com-
plete emancipation of the civil power through the enactment of modifying
legislation to suppress the privileges of the clergy and the religious
communities and, if necessary, to nationalize the goods of the Church.8^
Theoretically the Church could, however, retain its purely spiritual
function
—the government of consciences.
m November, 1855, the new Liberal government took a long step toward
the implementation of this controversial ideological plan with the
promulgation of toe Ley, Juarez . This law, drawn up, signed, and publicized
by Juarez with the backing of President Alvarez, removed the special
jurisdictional privilege from the religious and military courts in civil
matters. Henceforth all civil cases involving clerical and military
personnel were to be tried in state courts. Seven months later followed
another electrifying law, the Ley Lerdo . Juarez's influence in the
promulgation of this law has been extensively debated by historians, but at
the very least he did approve the measure. The law itself prohibited any
corporation from holding real property, although it was entitled to the
enjoyment of toe fruits of said property. One target of the new law was
the Church's vast acreage acquired over the years by inheritance and fore-
closure. Unfortunately, however, the law also succeeded in overturning the
Ol
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communal land ownership system of the Indians—the ejldo—and, it failed
significantly in creating a nucleus of small landed proprietors. 8?
After the bombshell of the Lev Lardo the Liberal split into two
opposing factions quickened md sharpened. The moderates under the
leadership of ^resident Comonfort became more and more alarmed at the drastic
consequences of their actions and sought increasingly to placate the Con-
servatives. The radicals on the other hand continued to press for further
reform. Py the end of 1857 the split had widened into an open break.
Comonfort executed an abortive coup, and Juarez declared himself the
President and the preserver of the Constitution. Three years of civil war
followed.
One more civil war, one more constitution I Mexico had seen both
phenomena before. What made this one more important, more passionate, more
uncompromising, more bloody than preceding ones? Did it have anything at all
to do with the total political and social philosophy of Juarez?
According to Simpson, the efforts of Liberal leaders like Juarez in the
mid-1850' s brought on one of the bitterest conflicts in Mexican history—
a
conflict that has continued down to the present day and whose outcome will
profoundly affect future life in Kexico. He further analyzed the situation
as a contest against
-the colonial regime that lived on in the Church—
a
contest even more complicated by racial (Indian) and economic (foreign)
issues. In this setting the solidity of privileged social institutions
made compromise impossible. On the one side was arrayed the Church, on the
other the moral pretensions of the Constitution as upheld by JuaVes.89
fjsimpaon, p. 268.
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In that last sentence lay the crux of the matter. The conflict was
not against a colonial regime, or against particular economic or social
injustices. It was not even against the Church as institution. The concept
of society envisioned by Juarea could have undercut the pretensions to
privileges of the colonial regime. It could have, given a willingness to
compromise on both sides, made a stab at ameliorating or even perhaps
solving the racial and economic issues. It might perhaps have arrived at a
compromise with the Church as institution
. What it could not do, however,
despite its protests to the contrary, was to allow any other agency besides
itself to exercise a dominion over the consciences of the people. Juarea 's
concept of the state's moral authority implied the right to legislate con-
cerning the consciences of its citizens. The Constitution's moral pretensions
represented only a highly logical extension of the basic premise. The only
thing necessary was to grant the basic premise, but this the Church could not
do. In its execution of its divine mission and its dogma of infallibility in
the guardianship of supernatural and moral Truth, it was congenitally unable
to entrust a vital part of the responsibility to a fallible state. It could
cooperate with an earthly government based on moral principles that it
sanctioned. But with Juarez's claim of moral supremacy for the state the
Church could not compromise. And so the conflictl Unfortunately however
the civil war in Mexico and afterwards the French intervention were not
fought on principle by the Conservative and clerical elements. They were
fought rather on the retention of privilege. The explicit moral issue
underlying the struggle received no dramatization. The Conservatives
emphasized the safeguarding of property over the defense of principle. On
this basis they lost.
The Mexican press and people recognized Juarez as the incarnation of
55
the social stamina of the revolution. Even before 1861, the newspapers
stated that "'The name of Juarez was a banner for the revolution, not a
man. ' "90 JuBto Sierra credltod Lerdo> 0oaapOt and Ramfrea with ag^g
the revolution a possibility and Juarez with making it. The revolution
was social because it destroyed clerical privileges and served as a
prologue to the economic measures necessary for reform. 91 Once again
Sierra was right, as far as he went. But he did not push the question to
its ultimate Units. Juarez himself saw the revolution primarily as social.
In 1855 his decision to stay in the Alvarez government resulted from the
hope of Initiating some of the many reforms the society needed to better
its condition. Laws consecrating the disappearing despotic power had to
be altered. This applied especially to the former laws on justice adminis-
tration. Thus although the reform statue of 1855 should have affected all
the courts in both civil and criminal matters, circumstances within the
cabinet forced the enactment of an incomplete reform. Nevertheless, it
served as the spark producing the flame of defiance flung at the privileged
92
classes. Yet reforms in the Justice administration were patently
9°Roeder, I, 296, 300.
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° que me d8cidi0 era la esperanza de iniciar alguna de tantas
reformas que necesitaba la sociedad para mejorar su condicidn."
"Triunfante la revolucion era precise hacer efectivas las promesas
reformando las leyes que consagraban los abuses del poder despo'tico queacababa de desaparecer. Las leyes anteriores sobre administracio'n deJusticia adolecfan de este defecto, porque establecian tribunales
especiales para las clases privilegiadas haciendo permanente en la sociedadla desigualdad que ofendfa a la justlcia; y yo me ocupe* de trabajar la ley
I IL27 u.1° 8u,Pr°yeet0 en «1 ^e • auxiliaron los jovenes Manuel Dublane Ignacio Mariscal, lo presente' al Presidente Alvarez, que le dio' la
aprobacion y mando se publicara como Ley general de administracio'n de
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insufficient. More extensive work remained in order to make the Reform as
perfect as possible. The ideal method for the efficient accomplishment of
this work consisted in the formulation of a general plan of action in the
cabinet. Unfortunately however, the strenuous opposition of Comonfort,
who was not in conformity with the aims of the revolution, rendered that
impossible.93 Once again the imperturbable Zapotec waited to make haste
slowly.
Juarez did not remain continuously in the federal government from 1855
until he assumed the presidency in 1856. For a short period in 1856 to 1857
he returned again to his native state to serve as its governor and to
continue his campaign for reform. On reestablishing the Institute at
Oaxaca, he once again expressed his belief that public instruction
represented the foundation of social happiness. Knowing its importance, he
resolved to give it all the impulse the necessities of the state demanded
justicia. Autoriaada por ml se publio el 23 de Noviembre de 1855."
"Imperfecto como era esta ley, se recibio con grande entusiasmo por el
Partido Progresista, fue' la chispa que produjo el incendio de la reforma
que mas tarde consumio el carcomido edlficio de los abusos y preocupaciones
:
»« SO fin el cartel de desaffo que se arrojo a las clases privilegiadas ..,
'•^Prida Santacilia, Siguiendo la vida de Juarez , p. 61t.
SPAN. ORIG. "No solo en esta rama [Justice] , sino en todas las que
formaban la administracidn publica debfa ponerse la mano porque la
revolucion era social. Se necesitaba un trabajo mas extenso para que la
obra saliose perfecta en lo posible y para ello era indispensable proponer,
discutir y acordar en el seno del gabinote un plan general, lo que no era
posible porque desde la separacion del senor Ocampo, estaba incompleto el
gabinete y el Sr. Comonfort no estaba conforme con las tendencias y finesde la revolucion.
... Era, pues, muy diffcil hacer algo iftil en semejantes
circunstanceas y esta es la causa de que las reformas que consigna en la
ley de Justicia fueron incompletas lijiiitandose solo a extinguir el fuero
eclesiastico en el ranio civil y dejandolo subsi3tente en materia criminal,
a reserva de dictar mas adelante la medida conveniente sobre este
particular. A los militares solo se les dejd el fuero en los delitos yfaltas puramente militares. Extinguf igualmente todos los demas tribunales
especiales devolviendo a los comunes el conocimiento de los negocios de que
aquellos estaban encargados."
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by boldly protecting its development. 91* Interestingly enough, the concept
of the necessities of the state in the provision for education rose again
to the surface. It fit in well with Juarez's total philosophy.
Juarez labored diligently to ingrain the Constitution of 1857 in the
soil of Oaxaca. He flagellated opponents who refused to accept its social
reforms and who bent all their efforts to destroy the Constitution. They,
however, he prophesied, would never succeed but would only serve to esta-
blish the true practice and to free Mexico's destinies from dependence on
one man or party. He declared the norm of his own action to be subjection
to the Constitution and called all to follow his example. The Constitution
was the only rule to which the Mexicans ought to subject themselves.^ Thus
once more Juarez proclaojned the moral authority of the state as the ultimate
guide to the consciences of its citizens. Juarez flung his challenge, and
within a year the Church took it up. The struggle was bitter because the
participants played for ultimates.
In enjoining subjugation to the state, however, Juarez had one supreme
advantage over the masses in Mexico. His executive office entitled him to
interpret as well as to obey. And in his function as interpreter he could
also disobey. This he did. As Governor of Oaxaca Juarez could (power wise)
and did disobey certain decrees of the Comonfort government. And within a
9ll
Ibid., pp. 67-68.
SPAN. CRIO. "Persuadido de que la instrucoion publics es el fundamento dola felicidad social, el principio en que descansan la liberatad y el
engrandeciraiento de los pueblos, una de sus primeras providencias ha sido
volver a esta ilustre casa el esplendor que los enemigos de la ilustracion
y de todo progreso, habian quitadole en una e'poca de funesto recuerdo para
Oaxaca. El Oobierno, que conoce la importancia de la instruccion mfblica,la iniluencia poderosa que ejerce en la moralidad y adelantos sociales
esta resuelto a darle todo el impulso que las necesidades del Estado
deraandan, protegiendo empenosaraente su desarrollo."
95valade's, p. 25.
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year of the Constitution's adoption, Juarez found himself in a position
which he used to remold the document to his liking. The Constitution
became an instrument of his bidding, its articles subject to his interpre-
tation. For Juarez had never, contrary to Simpson's assertion that the
Mexican Constitution symbolized for hiia a Corpus Juris Civilis—the embodi-
96
ment of Law and the Fatherland—regarded the Constitution as an absolute,
but only as a means to the absolute. In a speech before the state constitu-
ent convention in June, 1857, Juarez stated that the Constitution had not
established with fullness and liberty all those principles necessary for
a lasting peace in Mexico. Amendments had to be made. In this task the
wisdom and patriotism of the Oaxaqueno representatives could prepare the way
in opposing the vested interests resisting the betterment of society.-''
Thus when Juarez assumed the presidency in 1858, he undertook to
construct within the framework of the Constitution a delegated jurisdiction,
to establish the principle of a moderated authority, and to initiate a change
of persons within the continuity of the state to avoid the possibility of
either a central republic or a personal regime. He faced the problem of
giving new forms to the public institutions—in line with his own concepts
naturally—without specifically being commanded to do so by the Constitution.
Perhaps in implementing such reforms he would transgress it. But then
which was more important: the giving of reality to the dreams of Juarez or
the chimera of an imperfect Constitution? Obviously the former, for as the
Governor of Oaxaca stated, government was the science of guiding the people
and the art of convincing the citizens.'"
^Simpson, p. 273.
^'Juarez, l^pistolario
, p. 60.90Valade's, pp. 16U-65, 175.
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Juarez regarded the so-called presidential regine as the ideal
solution for the problems of Mexico. The presidential regime fixed a
doctrine of political, social and moral responsibility for the President
of the Republic that was direct and intransmittable
. This system would
have the advantage of a strong Executive to enforce the moral authority of
the state, but would be restricted enough by Congress to guard against the
dangers inherent in the excessive parliamentarianism toward which the
Constitution of 1857 leaned. Deliberative assemblies often tended to be
impractical because of a lack of tradition outside their formal composi-
tion.?? The greatest aberrations of thought often occurred in Congress
where a standard of quantity rather than quality reigned. 100 If then
Juarez accepted the 1857 Constitution and made it his own, it was only to
realize, solemnize, and substantiate the principle of a national authority.
He saw in the Constitution only the beginnings of a return to the ancient
culture of Mexico—a workable tool for his purposes.101
As president he declared that he would do all in his power to see that
the democratic revolution chosen by the nation followed the road of sooial
and humanitarian conquest. Economic evils had to be remedied. Proposi-
tions thus emerged: to accept customs reduction, to establish direct
contributions and suppress acabalas
. to reorganize other federal rents,
to consolidate the public debt, and to reduce almost all offices and com-
pletely suppress some. 102 In a sense he was continuing the administrative
work he had begun at Oaxaca. There was, however, a very significant
W|Mfl-| P- 15U-
f-^Iturribarrfa, p. 317.
lOlvalade-s, p. 155.
L0ZHenestrosa, pp. l»9-3>0.
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difference. The beginnings had been made toward a shift in the base of
society. It remained for Juarez to consolidate the institutions he had
helped erect and to mold them according to his ideas. And interestingly
enough, Juarez denied the possibility of either liberty, peace, independ-
ence, or constitutional order outside of the Reform. He championed public
liberties and the legitimate interests of society against those of
minorities. For him democracy—social and political—represented the
destiny of future humanityj liberty, its armorj and perfection its
ultimate direction.
During 1858-1859 the civil war dragged on with each side growing more
desperate with the passing months. Obviously some move to decisively turn
the tide in favor of the Liberals was required. Juarez deliberated. He
had had some measures planned, but these, in concert with the rest of his
thought, were primarily social and not military. And foremost among them
was the oomplete nationalization of Church property, toward which a
beginning had been made in 1856.
Juarez's advisors urged immediate action. The situation, they in-
sisted, was desperate. The nationalization of clerical property would
provide an added source of revenue for the nation. It would lift the norale
of despondent or fearful followers. It would deprive the Conservatives
of a lucrative source of revenue. Juarez weighed the arguments. Finally,
on July 7, 1859, he spoke to the people of Vera Cruz and to the nation in
the famous Vera Cruz Manifesto. In order to facilitate stability and free-
dom, he decreed the separation of church and state, the nationalization of
Church property, the elimination of the function of civil authority in the
collection of clerical tithes, the formulation of civil and criminal codes,
103lbid., pp. 27, 35, 39.
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the Introduction of the jury system and the elimination of court fees, and
a plan for more free primary schools, secondary schools, and colleges.
Fire days later more decrees were issued—notably, the secularization of
marriage and the recognition of legal separation. 101*
The furor raised by the Reform Lars of 1859 rang throughout the land.
Most especially condemned was the nationalization of Church property. But
for Juarez this article, although possibly rendering some assistance in
continuing war operations, did not represent the most important factor in
the July Manifesto. As he wrote to a friend:
I take great pleasure in sending you the decree I havejust signed. The most important things that it contains
are, as you will see, the absolute independence of the civil
power and religious liberty. For me these were the capital
points to be won in this revolution, and if we succeed we
shall have the satisfaction of having rendered a service to
our country and to humanity. I also enclose the program
I have published, in which other measures have been noted
that are certain to improve the condition of this society. 10^
Nationalization signified "... merely the material lever that raised,
released, and supported the ideal structure of a secular society."106
In i860 the British representative, considering Her Majesty's
financial stakes, offered to mediate the Liberal-Conservative feud. He
failed. The end of I860 saw the triumphal entry of the Liberal government
into Mexico City, and one of its first public acts proclaimed anew the
Reform Laws of Vera Cruz and the absolute necessity of free education.
In February Juarez decreed the secularization of hospitals and other
eleemosynary institutions. 10?
10£soholes, pp. Wi, 1*9
feeder, I, 209.10
°Ibid
., p. 210.
••"'Callcott, pp. 33-3$.
62
If the objectives of Juarez were to be considered purely as an attempt
at political reform, then the secularization of hospitals could easily be
viewed as an extreme measure. If on the other hand he aimed at the
creation of a secular society, the clerical ouster from this apparently
apolitical field made sense. Also logical, if the second assertion were
admitted, was the subsequent expulsion by Juarez of certain obstreperous
ecclesiastics. Many of Ms Cabinet resigned in protest over this "arbi-
trary" measure. And equally interesting here was the extra-legal way in
which JuaVea operated—using the Constitution as an instrument rather than
as an absolute. For, strictly speaking, under the Constitution the
authority to exile belonged to the judicial and not to the executive branch
of the government. let Juarez did not hesitate to exceed or even to
bypass the Constitution when the needs of the more important social
revolution demanded it.
From 1861 on the Liberals under Juarez tried several times to transfer
the confiscated Church properly to the poor tenants on the giant estates.
And in an effort to reduce the power of the Church still further, Callcott
intimated that Ocampo, acting on Juarez's behalf, invited a priest to
form a schismatic Mexican church. 109 While this statement would appear of
doubtful authenticity in view of Juarez's enunciated principles, it could
nevertheless indicate, perhaps, that Juarez once contemplated using the
Church to implement his concept of the moral authority of the state. And
in this connection a schismatic, national church dependent upon state
suffrance for existence would be more amenable than an international
££gid.. p. 36.
109Ibi3.. p. 2k.
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congregation based in Rome.
Juarez's victorious entry into Mexico City on January 8, 1661, hardly
signified a complete conquest for the Liberals. It represented only a
truce—a breathing point in a potentially very Ions struggle—if Juarez
could not immediately consolidate his shaky authority. Bandits roamed
the highroads outside the city, plundering and killing. Domestic and
foreign critics blamed him for the accumulated evils oi forty years of
blundering government. Mexico had fallen into debt over this forty year
period, and, although the Liberals recognised obligations to the various
European governments of up to 80,000,000 pesos and pled^d payment as 30on
as possible, Mexican credit standing on the world market was non-existent.
To the iiuropean mind Mexico, as a direct result of her civil strife,
poverty, and general underdevelopment, appeared as a beginning republic,
paradoxical and erring. The Mexican had not yet tuned his tradition to
the requirements of nineteenth century statehood. "**
The first half of 1861 found Juarez, the executive, trying to bring
order to the administrative affairs of the nation, and Juarez, the
politician, attempting to parry attacks within the Liberal ranks
against his power. Recurring Cabinet orises and Congressional strife
led United States Minister Thomas Corwin to doubt the ability of Juarest
to survive the onslaught. He opined that the plan to place Gonzalez
Ortega in the executive chair via the Presidency of the Supreme Court
112
would succeed, "*" Interestingly enough the Cabinet disagreements also
revealed that some of the dissension stemmed from a conceptual conflict
^Simpson, pp. 27U-75.
jj£valade*s, pp. 163, 170.
•^Scholes, pp. 67, 73.
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in the interpretation of the cabinet's fundamental role. 113 Once again
Juarez was acting to secure an increase influence for the Executive over
the other two branches of government in conjunction with his idea of a
•presidential regime.
In Hay Juarez surveyed the state of the nation both internally and
externally. The reactionaries were complicating the conduct of foreign
affairs. The meddlesome interference of the Spanish ambassador, the
apostolic delegate, and the Guatemalan minister in the internal affairs
of the Mexican state had led to their expulsion. On the other hand,
diplomatic relations had been reestablished with Qreat Britain, France, and
Prussia. Most cordial ties continued to exist with the United States.
Juarez did not, however, minimize the seriousness of the foreign situation,
especially in relation to the interest on the European debt. Executive
pacts pointing to solution of this problem would be reviewed in conformity
with the Constitution by the Congress, which without doubt would care for
the honor and decorum of the nation. ***
That wa3 in Uay. In July economic conditions in Mexico forced the
announcement of a temporary suspension of payment on the interest of the
foreign debt. The European powers—France, Spain, and Great Britain—at
once protested this affront to their vital interests. .Vhen protest
availed nothing, the Great Powers acted. At a convention in London in the
fall of 1861, they agreed on an armed expedition for the purpose of collect-
ing their debts. Within weeks the news had rocketed across the Atlantic
and reverberated throughout Mexico. Juarez alerted the generals, gritted
^Juarez, Archivo privado
, p. 3lU.
^Henestrosa, p. Ii3.
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his teeth and waited.
Kvents between 1861 and 1867 exerted a very important influence on
the mind of Juarez. They forced the development of an ideology underlying
the externals of his foreign policy, just as the events prior to 1861 had
shaped the flowering of the theory behind his domestic policy. Juarez '
s
concept of the conduct of international affairs grew logically from his
role of the ideal state. Just as within the country the state's prime
function consisted in harmonizing the actions of the individual with the
universal state principles of justice and peace, so toe was it the
responsibility of every state to also live in accordance with these Ideals
in their mutual relationships. And although in his capacity as the
President of the Mexican Republic Juarez well understood his obligation
to preserve the country against invasion} nevertheless, his concept of
authority precluded the employment of illegal, or more properly, immoral
means. For Juarez's view of the world and his conduct of Mexican affairs
within that world was primarily moral. Thus although he aoclaimed his
intention of preserving Mexican independence and devoted all his efforts
to the development of defenses against invaders, he could, nevertheless,
accord the European interventionist powers a refuge for their troops in
the mountains when the dread yellow fever raged in Vera Cruz. And he
could do this without sacrificing his principles or the integrity of the
nation. When the French violated the solemn pact of Soledad, the
Juarez government still expressed its policy as the application of its
normal procedure in international relations—a precedent moderation, the
abstention from all aggressive acts, and only then the preparation, if
necessary, to repel force with force. It would, of course, in the case of
u
a resort to force strictly observe the laws and established uses of war.
And it prophesied world acclamation for the Liexican valor in order to
sustain the courage of the Mexicans who hail to stand up to one of the most
powerful nations in the world.11
''
The use of morals in international politics, however, did not brand
Juarez as an impractical dreamer unanare of the world's realities. No one
realized more than he the seriousness of the Mexican situation in April,
1862. As he wrote his friend and trusted collaborator in Paris,
Monsieur Manilas!
We must be under no delusions, my dear sir. "here is
a deliberate intention on the part of the Imperial Govern-
ment to humiliate Mexico and impo-e its Trill upon us. This
is a truth confirmed by facts; there is no help but defense.
The Mexican people are resolved upon it, and their govern-
ment will employ every means permitted by international law
in self-defense. The arrival of new aid numerous troop3
has caused no fear or discouragement; on the contrary it has
revived public spirit, and today there is but one sentiment
in the whole country, the defense of the liberty and
independence of Mexico. The Imperial Government will cause
us great damages and great misfortunes; such are the
inevitable consequences of war; but i can assure you I who
see and feel with my finger the determination of my country-
men—that whatever elements may be employed against us, the
Imperial Government will not obtain the submission of the
Mexicans, and that its armies will not have a single dav of
rest. 116
This was in 1862 when the intervention had not even left Orizaba, and the
rumors of the establishment of a Mexican throne for Maximilian, Prince of
Austria, floated through the hazy air of International politics only as
straws in the wind. Neither did Juarez's international political morals
deter him from unequivocally condemning the French action. He emphatically
115
^iiayas Uoriquez, pp. Ih9, 153. Also Prida Santacilia, Siguiendo la
vida de Juarez
, p. 136.
—
-L-LORoeder, I, 1*62-63.
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asserted that to proclaim as the French did that they were not warring on
the country but on the government was an empty premise because one
offended a nation when it attacked a government that the people desired to
support. If his (Juarez's) authority had resulted from mutiny, he would
sacrifice it to save the country from war; but since it represented a trust
given him by the people he could not; and he would wage war until justice
was recognised. *
Juarez from 1862 to 1867 was fighting not only to preserve the
integrity of Mexico; he was fighting to show the moral validity of Mexico's
claim to self-deternination. This was a principle he believed in
passionately—above his life, above his family, above everything. In the
dark days of 186ii when advised by the Governor of Chihuahua to cross the
border into the United States, he replied:
Don Luis, no one knows this state better than you. Show
me the highest, most inaccessible, and dryest mountain, and
I will go to the top of it and die there of hunger and
thirst, wrapped in the flag of the Republic, but without
leaving the national territory. That nevertHS
And a little later while fleeing along the road to Kl "a»o del Norte, he
wrote!
Wherever I may be, on the summit of a mountain or in
the bottom of a ravine, abandoned by everyone perhaps, I
shall not cease to uphold the banner of the Republic until
the day of triumph.
W
This attitude presented a rather marked contrast to one of Juarez's pre-
decessors in the presidency—Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna.
The concepts of social revolution and reform in domestic affairs and
^Jsimpson, p. 276.
^-°Roeder, II, 602.
Wlbid.
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the inherent right to territorial integrity and self-determination in the
conduct of international affairs were for Juarez intimately hound together.
Thus he castigated Maximilian's adoption of the Reform Lairs a3 a sorry
attempt to buy the submission of the Mexican people. It would never
succeed, for the Mexican people before all defended their independence.
Even though a foreigner interfered with his bayonets and wished to impose
his will, Mexico would never consent to his domination} it would war
against him to the death and reject all his offers even though he performed
miracles. Mexico did not need
had constituted without help.
a foreigner to establish the Reform Laws it
120
Both at home and abroad the moral stature of Juarea and the position
of Mexico grew by leaps and bounds during the French intervention. The
withdrawal of the English and the Spanish had weakened the legality of the
French cause. Juarea exploited his moral superiority to the utmost.
Although Callcott claimed the English withdrawal "... was, as usual, a
question of cotton and of Bibles,"121 Martin asserted that Juarea recognized
a certain hesitation in the foreign policy of Lord John Russell and
iZOprida Santacilia, Siguiendo la vida de Juarea
, p. 216.
SPAN, ORIG. " ... por los conservadores y por el clero que estan ahora
disgustados con Uaximiliano que los ha traicionado, adoptando a medias las
Leyes de la Reforma, porque creia que los verdaderos liberales eraraos tan
candidos que nos habfanos de convertir en partidarios suyos solo por que
adoptaba algunas de nuestras leyes de Reforma sin advertir que aun cuando
las adoptara todas, jamas conseguiria nuestra submision porque nuestros
ante todo defendemos la independencia y dignidad de nuestra Patria y
mientras un extranjero intervenga con sus bayonetas en nuestros negocios
y quiera imponernos su voluntad despo'tica como lo intenta Maximiliano,
jama's consentiremos en su dominacion, le haremos la guerra a muerte y
rechaaaremos todas sus ofertas, aun cuando haga milagros. Nosotros no
necesitamos que un extranjero venga a establecer las reformas en nuestro
paas i nosotros las nemos establecido todas sin necesidad de nadie ...
121Callcott, p. hh.
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"almerston concerning the Mexican expedition and molded his policy around
it. The manifesto appealing to the Mexican patriotism with which Juarez
countered the Allied landing in Vera Cruz was, he charged, calculated to im-
press the British population. More significant, however, was Martin's
admission that never once during the protracted negotiations following the
Allied arrival did Juarez employ abuse or evident distrust of the British
government. 122
Juarez, even during the darkest days of the intervention never forgot
the integrated, total nature of the revolution he was striving to establish.
Maximilian's expropriation of the property of some liberals provoked retali-
ation. Juarez advocated the seizure of the land of apostate liberals not
only as a war measure but because!
Now is the opportunity by which is destroyed the
monopoly that these men have of immense lands with
prejudice to the agriculture and the peoples of this state.
Those lands will be able to be sold at equitable prices and
their products employed in the maintenance of our forces or
In giving some reward to our chiefs who sustain the national
cause so valiantly. 12 3
Juarez also had an astounding, unshakeable confidence in the ultimate
victory of the Liberal forces. As the end of the American Civil War
approached, the sturdy Zapotec proclaimed his confidence in Mexican self-
determination, in somewhat more colorful language. "Soon," he said, "the
fire will assume colossal forms, and we shall see whether Maximilian Is
122
Percy Falcke Martin, F.R.G.S., ':aximilian in Mexico (London:
Constable t Co., Ltd., 191ii), pp. 8O-81I
123Prida Santacilia, Siguiendo la vlda de Juarez
, p. 217.
SPAN. ORIO. "Ahora es la oportunidad de que se destruya el monopolio que
esos hombres tienen de imraensos terrenos con perjuicio de la agricultura
y de los pueblos de ese Estado. Eso terrenos po.lran venderse a precics
equitativos y emplear sua prcductos en el mantenimiento de nuestras
fuerzas, a darse algun lote a nuestros jefes que con tanta constancla
sostienen la causa nacional."
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capable of smothering it." 12i<
Did the French recognize the dynamic nature of the force they were
contending with? To a degree the answer was yes. Napoleon himself
characterised the Reform as a radical social change, 12^ but failed to
reckon correctly its full strength. He consoled himself wi+h*e thought
that he fought for the Church of Rome and her privileges raid closed his
126
eyes to all possible consequences. In 1865, when General Bazaine had
lost the confidence of Napoleon and found himself beset with troubles in
?.<exico, an obscure observer, Victor Considerant, whispered over the
American border the revolutionary measure necessary to save Mexico for
France:
If you want an army, a government, and a people in
Mexico, you must suppress peonage. If the ISmperor
Maximilian wishes to remain in Vexico, he WJST suppress
peonage. This is the condition SINE QUA NON. Mind you,
I do not say that on this condition he will remain; but
I do say that it is the obligatory condition to have a
choice of staying, and that if, having done this, he is
compelled to leave, he will leave at least with honor
and will have carved himself a great name in history.127
And then Considerant, this mysterious advisor, went on to indirectly
recognize the greatness of Juarez:
Juarez is an Indian, and it would be absurd to
deny that he has proved himself an energetic representa-
tive of modern ideas and laws in Mexico. But has he
achieved this Reform, which of all Reforms seemed to
belong to him above all men? That he favored it, IN PETTO,
I have no doubt. (But Liberal rottenness Droved itself in
not daring to slay the beast and it was) ."
. . nonetheless
true that Juarez committed his capital error by comoromis-
ing with the crime of his party."8
^Roeder, II, 600.
Genaro Garcia, Juarez: refutacion a Don Francisco Bulnes
(Mexico: Libreria de la V11" de Ch. Bouret, 1961*), p. li.12
,°«artin, p. 1:7.«
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No, perhaps Juarez had not completely abolished peonage. But he had nade
a start, and In keeping with his social philosophy, after the hard years
had passed, he was to make another—this time against the temperament of
the times and against public and Congressional opinion in Mexico. And
meanwhile the days rolled on. Neither Bazaine nor Maximilian heeded the
whispered advice from the unknown savant across the Rio Grande. Maximilian
fell and was executed in 1867. And Juarez once more entered Mexico City,
as he had left, proclaiming the keystone of his foreign policy—El derecho
del ajeno es la paz .
The Constitution of 1857 envisaged an all-powerful legislature and a
weak executive. In 1867, faced with the enormous task of reconstituting
the economy and society of the country, Juarez attempted to attain
constitutional sanction for a strong executive. On August lU, 1867, with
the issuance of the call for new elections Juarez again gave the clergy
the right to vote and sit in Congress, eliminated the residence require-
ment for deputies, and proposed five changes to the Constitution. These
new amendments would establish a Senate, give the President a two-thirds
Senate-supported veto power, permit, in principle, all executive reports
to the Congress to be in writing, lijnit the right of Congress' permanent
deputation to call special sessions, and determine the presidential
succession beyond the "resident of the Supreme Court. Approval of these
amendments would be subject, not to constitutional procedure which Juarez
thought too slow, but to popular referendum. ' Congress and the press
reacted violently to these measures. They failed, but it showed once
again that Juarez regarded the Constitution only as a means and not an end
129 Scholes, pp. 118-19.
72
In his drive to achieve the perfect secular society. This crystallized
even more clearly subsequently when Juarez intervened several times in
state affairs, often outside constitutional sanction, reestablished the
supposedly independent judicial syBten, and pushed through some laws
suspending some of the individual guarantees. 1^
Amid acrimonious criticism Juarez continued his campaign to reform
Mexican society. In economics, the government appeared willing to use its
power to base a sound society. Minister of the Treasury Romero formulated
an economic development plan based on tariff and tax reform and the
removal of mining restrictions.™ While Romero's program failed to
squarely face the social issue it represented an attempt to do it indirectly
by revising the tax laws. In defending his proposals in Congress, Romero
stated
i
The government cannot, without attacking the sacred
right of property, limit the extent of land which any
single proprietor may possess; but it does have a great
interest in trying, since the good of society so demands,
to secure the cultivation and exploitation of all such
property, as is susceptible of this improvement. *JI
Interestingly enough, after all the Congressional diatribes leveled against
Juarez, one year later Romero was again repeating his recommendations
since Congress had taken no action. "**
Faced with the impasse in Congress, Juarea again resorted to the small
way, ordering the ayuntamlentos
,
or town councils, to invite porters, water
carriers, and wagoners to give shares for schools for themselves and their
^Olbid
., p. 129. Also Callcott, p. 80. Also Daniel Cose"o Villegas,
La Constitucion de lii57 y sus criticos (Mexico! Edit. Hermes, 1957), p. 159.
O-LScholes, p. ViJ.
132Roeder, II, p. 702.
133ibid.
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sons, introducing legislation looidng toward the abolition of capital
punishment, and establishing a bank of help for laborers and poor
1 7|
artisans.
Juarez died in 1072. In assessing his life Koeder stated that he gave
the country what it needed—sound management—but could not give it what
it craved—the solution of post war difficulties without the patience and
the perservance to overcome them. 1^ But Juarez gave the country much
more than that. He gave the people a philosophy by which to shape their
destiny. This philosophy, based on the moral authority of the state was
complete. It demanded total surrender, and its precepts extended to both
domestic and foreign affairs.
The influence of Juarez as president and thinker has been examined in
this chapter. The next chapter vri.ll examine his role as statesman, and the
way he brought his total philosophy into play in his external relations,
and more particularly in his relations with the United States.
|*Prida Santacilia, Asi fue Juarez i au vida en laminas, p. 161.
"•Boeder, il, 707.
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CHAPTER III
JUAREZ'S PHILOSOPHY IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
A Consideration of Juarez's Political and Social Thought
as Expressed in his Relations with the United States
Mexican-American relations since independence had generally followed
a series of ups and downs, depending upon the season and the protagonists
in power. In 1850 the relations were very much down. The American
territorial grab after the Mexican War had heightened Mexico's xenophobic
spirit and had left her with a deep distrust of American motives. This
continuing inclination toward suspicion, even after 1850, did not lack
foundation. On the American side of the Rio Grande, the pressures of
slavery and the need for more cotton land caused many Dlxicrats to turn
covetous eyes southward. In 1853 James Gadsden left for Mexico with
instructions to secure the better part of the states of Tamaulipas,
Nueva Leon, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora, and all of Baja California. He
failed, but that did not deter determined Americans. Congressional noises
then intimated a policy of peaceful penetration. Railroads on Mexico's
northern and southern frontiers would animate the people with Americana
in all facets of their life. The absorption of Americana would result in
a relaxation of the opposition, and the question of relations would
degenerate into one of friendly calculation. 1^
136Ibld., I, 176, 178.
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After Gadsden's failure relations rocked along as usual, with the
requisite number of incidents dedicated to keeping the caldron heated.
From 1851; to 1656 while the Liberals were revolting, winning, and
consolidating their power, no opportunity for another territorial grab
presented itself. And then in 1856 a new minister, John Forsyth, went
to Mexico with a slightly modified version of Gadsden's instructions. At
first he did not appear to push vigorously for an immediate settlement of
the American claims, but devoted his time to a study of the local situation
and the policies of the Alvarez government.
While Forsyth was studying the situation in Mexico with a view to its
exploitation, presidential elections were coming up on the other side of
the Rio Grande. And in 1856 the platform of the Democratic Party shrieked
belligerence. Buchanan and his future Secretary of State Lewis Cass expressed
their dissatisfaction at the amount of territory acquired or taken from
Mexico in 181*8 and 1853. Obviously it should have been more. And as for
the outrages committed against American citizens in Mexican territory, that
was Just too much. Such criminal injustices cried out for intervention.
Forgotten in the hue and cry preceding the balloting were the frequent and
unpunished outrages perpetrated against Mexicans in California and in the
New Mexican Territories. ^
With the conclusion of the Mexican survey, the Minister of the
United States came to certain conclusions. Certain visionary Mexican
Liberals were most anxious to conclude a treaty with the United States in
order to counter-balance the forces hindering the development of Mexico—the
Church and the army. This idea was perhaps chimerical at present, but it
137Gruening, p. 556.
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offered fascinating possibilities for the future. If this treaty, which
made Mexico a virtual protectorate of the United States, could be effected,
might it not provide the United States with an opportunity to enjoy the
fruits of annexation without its attendant responsibilities and avert the
danger of introducing into its enlightened electorate the ignorant Mexican
masses? Then too the Mexican Liberal government had evidenced a favor-
able disposition toward the settlement of outstanding issues. Lerdo de
Tejada had indicated in an interview that he regarded Mexico as the natural
ally of the United States and did not partake of the vulgar prejudice preva-
lent throughout Latin America that the United States followed only a policy
of territorial aggrandizement. He saw the American government as a staunch
promotor of human rights, aiming more for the conquest of ideas than for the
139
conquest of arms. Taking advantage of the friendly inclinations of -the
Comonfort government, Forsyth undertook to negotiate and sign in February,
1857, four treaties: a reciprocity treaty, a postal treaty, a claims
convention, and a treaty of commerce and loans. *"* The last of these
four documents was a direct outgrowth of Forsyth's analysis of the Mexican
situation and represented a radical departure from accepted United States
foreign policy. As such it is worth examining in greater detail.
As a result of his study, Forsyth thought that current Mexican
opinion unalterably opposed any idea of territorial cession. Therefore he
proposed to the Mexican government an ingenious way around the adverse public
138,
.Yilliam R. Manning (ed.), Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1660 , Vol. DCi
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States (12 vols.; Washington;
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1932-1939), pp. 855-56.
I39ibid., p. 87U.
W^dgar Turlington, Mexico and Her Foreign Creditors (New York!
Columbia University Press, 1930), p. 106.
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opinion through the negotiation of a loan in the form of a floating
mortgage on land which the United States with Mexican consent would
eventually foreclose. hX This proposed loan ran to #15,000,000. Of this
sua $8,000,000 would be imnediately made available to Mexico in antici-
pation of the customs revenues. It would not be subject to repayment by
the Mexican Government, but would form the basis for a twenty per cent
reduction in import-export duties for American goods. The remaining
£7,000,000 would settle the American claims against Mexico and would liqui-
date the English convention debt. This sum would be repaid at four per cent
interest and thirteen per cent of the Mexican customs revenue.
In February, 1857, Secretary of State William Harcy laid the treaties
before President Franklin Pierce who immediately discerned the momentous
consequences to American foreign policy which underlay its provisions. And
to these potential shifts he had some very "weighty objections."^
The United States government changed hand3 in March. But the new
policy makers were no more susceptible to Forsyth's projects than were
the old. Although Buchanan avidly coveted Mexican territory and was willing
to play on Mexican financial difficulties in order to attain it, he
strenuously opposed Forsyth's scheme for buying commercial privileges
with government funds. Both Presidents refused even to submit the
treaties to Congress. Stymied, Forsyth attempted to Justify his conduct.
In a dispatch of April 2k, 1857, he argued that it was in the true interest
of the United States to see that Mexico was wisely and firmly governed,
independent of undue European influence, and, through the strengthening
F.S.Dunn, The Diplomatic Protection of Americans in Mexico (2 vols.}
New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), II, 78.
^Turlington, pp# 106-107.
^Ibid., p. 108.
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of political and commercial relations with the United States, ultimately
elevated into the position of a good, useful, and friendly neighbor.
Although he was aware of the insatiable appetite for Mexican territory
currently existing in the United States, he was sure that it was not the
government's desire to satisfy it at the expense of the honor, dignity,
and Justice of the country. He cited the political advantages for the
commercial interests of the North, but most important of all he stressed
the need for a definite United States policy toward Mexico in the light of
Mexican weakness and her need to lean on someone.'"''* Forsyth stated that:
What Mexico wants is a firm and good master t o hold
her destinies in his hands and save her from herself.
Mexico can not furnish such a master and may welcome one
from abroad. It is high time for the United States to
take present means to provide for har future stake in the
destinies of this Country. 111'
This could not be done, however, by territorial annexation, despite
all Instructions to the contrary urged by Buchanan. In November, 1857, when
Cass reproved Forsyth for not pressing the point, the latter pleaded as an
excuse the certainty of an official rebuff. As for the proposal to
establish a United States protectorate, put forward by Senator Sam Houston,
from Texas, significantly enough Forsyth doubted the wisdom of selecting
Juarez as chief, but recommended Lerdo de Tejada as the latter was
resigned to the idea. 1^6
Such was the diplomatic situation when the Liberals split toward
support of either the Zuloaga or the Juares regimes in early 1858. This
split forced the diplomatic community to choose. The United States,
fj%annlng, pp. 905, 908.
'James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932), p. ikl. —
"
lil6lPld., pp. 251, 255.
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following its previous practice of inclining toward the faction having
control of the capital, recognised Zuloaga. Nevertheless, it did not do so
without scruples. In January, 1858, Forsyth wrote Cass that, although the
other diplomats had early recognized Zuloaga, he had had to struggle with
his natural sympathies in favor of a party professing to stand on constitu-
tional government and the consent of the nation. At that time he had had
only hearsay intelligence of the existence of the Juarez government. If,
on the other hand, the Juarez government had submitted to him its constitu-
tional organisation and requested recognition, the case would have been
different. 1'*7
In accordance with instructions Forsyth immediately renewed his
attempts to secure a treaty of cession. Zuloaga agreed to remove the one
cabinet member opposed to the project, but suddenly reneged and announced
a capital tax on both native and foreign property owners that was tanta-
mount to a forced loan. The infuriated Forsyth protested on the grounds
that in another state a citizen's property as well as his person was under
the protection of his government and asked for his passports. 1'*8 He did
not leave, however, without one final cynical comment on Mexican government
in general. He wrote
i
My experience has taught me that all parties and all
changing governments in Mexico are so much alike, that I
do not believe that whatever Mexican policy our government
may see proper to adopt should be varied in its essentials,
whether Conservatives or Liberals are in power. The only
difference should be in the manner of insisting upon it. If
the present government should stand, nothing but force would
accomplish the purpose ... In either case, determination
is indispensable. ix*9
7Stuart A. HacCorkle, American Policy of Recognition towards Mexico(Baltimore! Johns Honkins Press, 1933), p. UB. ~
Moatm, II, 125.
^Roeder, I, 182.
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In 1858 Forsyth was right In his assertion of the sameness of the
faotions in Mexico. Three, two, or even perhaps one year later he would
have been wrong. For between the period he wrote and the end of the War
of the Reform, one of the Mexican factions began conducting its international
relations differently. It began conducting them in terras of a moral authority.
The development was at first slow and hesitant perhaps, but it was there and
it reached full bloom in the period from 1861-1867.
Before Forsyth left Mexico, he noted one other significant detail of the
Mexican scene—a detail which framed Juarezian diplomacy both during the
civil war and the French intervention and provided a strong justification
for some of the most severely criticized aspects of Juarez 1 s foreign policy.
In a note of March 1, 1858, Forsyth opined that "Proscrastination is, at
once, the genius and the bane of Mexican diplomacy."1^ Not a particularly
brilliant statement perhaps, but it was one that would go far to explain
United States-Mexican relations in the next ten years.
With the breaking of relations in 1858, Buchanan went on the rampage.
In a Congressional address in July he declared that if Zuloaga prevailed
all hope for a peaceful settlement of disputes would expire. There was hope
that the Juarez regime would prove more friendly. In the absence of this
consideration, however, he would have recommended immediate possession of
Mexican territory until the desired redress was forthcoming. As it was, he
asked Congress for the authority to take over Northern Sonora and Chihuahua.
Congress refused his request.151 Subsequent messages urged the necessity
of a military force to protect American citizens traversing the Isthmus of
fanning, p. 970.
l;,1Dunn, II, 8li.
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Tehuantepec and to obtain "indemnity for the past and security for the
future,"1?2 but to no avail. In the face of the bitterly intense sectional-
ism preceding the Civil War, the legislative branch remained adamant. There
would be no military forces for Mexico.
Despite Congressional balkiness something had to be done with respect
to Mexico. So Buchanan decided to send a special agent to prepare an
impartial investigation of the situation. The man selected was
Vfilliam M. Churchwell. In Eexico Churchwell decided that the Constitutional
or Liberal Party represented nan's capability for self-government. As for
Juarez, he characterized him in a rather contradictory statement. Juarez,
he declared, had a voice in his council and a respectful audience, but
possessed little influence over his ministers. This comment appeared rather
unusual since the respect of his audience would seem to imply some influence
for Juarez. Despite this limiting factor, Churchwell concluded that the
United States had no alternative but to recognise the Juarez government.
In addition his report sat the tone of things to come:
The present condition of affairs in Mexico affords the
best and it may be the last opportunity which will ever be
presented to the United States to form a Treaty with this
Republic that will secure to them not only ttie sovereignty
over a country which recent disclosures and the most
authoritative accounts respecting its soil and mineral
resources represent as being even more valuable than upper
California
. . . The occasion is one which should be
improved without the. intermission of a single hour of
unnecessary delay.-"1
Meanwhile Cass, in writing to Churchwell in December, 1858, noted that the
Liberal Party enjoyed United States sympathy. The American government
^Scallahan, p. 259.
^Manning, pp. 1025, 1030.
^Ibid., pp. 1028, 1030.
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was prepared to give the Liberals the moral support resulting from
recognition whenever ouch appeared desirable according to the usual policy
155followed in these matters.
Thus matters stood at the end of 1856. In March of the following year,
Buchanan commissioned Robert Z. IfcLane as minister to Mexico with
discretionary powers to recognize the government in general control of the
country—preferably Juarea—without regard to the Tightness of its
existence but only to the fact. The Department of Stat* favored the Juarez
regime not only because it took a constitutional form, but also because
its general views entertained more friendly sentiments toward the United
States. The Department could not, however, directly intervene in its behalf
without violating a cardinal tenet of its foreign policy.1" Nevertheless,
it was intimated that oertain discrepancies could be overlooked.
Almost immediately after arriving in Mexico, McLane extended de facto
recognition to t he Juarez government and began to lay the groundwork for
the negotiation of a treaty of commerce and limits. His precipitous action,
however, caused him some rather grave scruples. In justifying it to the
State Department, he noted the special considerations present in the
country which demanded the prompt acceptance of some government. It was
his considered opinion that only the Juarea faction offered any of the
substantial elements of a de facto government or a reasonable stability. 1'^
What had been Juarez's considerations in viewing and reviewing these
actions of the United States? Had he made any requests for support, moral
or otherwise?
^MacCorklo, p. 50.
^Ibid
., pp. 51-52.
157ibid\, p. 53.
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Early In 1858 the Constitutional "arty bid for the support of the
Americans north of Rio Grande. A discouraging reply informed them that
whil£ sympathy for the Liberal cause existed in the United States, it
was non-negotiable without recognition.158 Consequently Juarez sent
Jose* Maria Hata to Washington to represent the Constitutionalists. Mata
arrived in Washington just about the tine that the Buchanan administration
was breaking relations with the Zuloaga government and succeeded in
meeting with President Buchanan. The latter manifested great sympathy
toward the Mexican republican cause and asked Mata to translate the
Constitution of 1857, especially those portions relating to the presidency
and the electoral law. Subsequently Hata interviewed Secretary Cass who,
although assuring him of his good dispositions in behalf of Mexico,
refused to intervene in what he considered strictly Mexican affairs.
Extra-governmentally, however, Washington sentiment favored the Liberals.
One George Fasher found people ready to donate the war materials necessary
for the continuance of the Mexican crusade. And one of Mata's com-
patriots conducted a troop raising campaign which, it appeared, had never
been authorized by Juarez.l5'
The unauthorized troop raising conducted by Vidaurri served to
illustrate a cardinal aspect of Juarez's foreign politics that would
recur again and again over the next ten years. Ostensibly, it could be
charged the Juarez's refusal to employ foreign troops stemmed from his fear
of a potential threat to his own power or to a xenophobic distrust.
l58Roeder, I, 175
l?9?ernando Ocaranza, Juarez y sus aralgos (Mexico: Editorial Polis,
1939), pp. 127-28, 130-31.
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Actually his refusal, or more properly his later acceptance of the
practice only under the strictest qualifications, derived from his
social concept of authority and the Mexican nationality. From his
surrender to the moral authorily of the state, the Mexican derived certain
privileges and also incurred certain obligations that were intimately
conneoted with one another. The incursion of foreign mercenaries into the
Mexican scene would break the totality of identity between the Uexican and
the cause. For while the foreigner could integrate into the Hexican scone
militarily, he could never, by virtue of his foreigrmess and his natural
inclination toward a short term military victory, fully realise the urgency
and the vitality of the cause for which he was fighting. He could not
share the poverty of the Mexican private without complaint. Thus it was
that Juarez noted frequently in his letters the fact that only under the
most severe restrictions, such as supplying their own monetary resources,
could foreigners be employed.
Jlata, as Mexican representative, was quite amenable to binding the
two republics on the North American continent together in a treaty of
friendship, but with reservations. He saw a treaty as advantageous in
forcing the United States to gaarantee Mexican sovereignty and ending the
filibustering spirit. The future interests of Mexico required that she
adopt a liberal enough course to satisfy the reciprocal interests of both
countries. Fitting it was, Mata thought, that the Liberals initiate this
new policy which would not only save the nation but which also followed
directly from enunciated Liberal principles. Nevertheless, Mata winced
when confronted with the preliminary American negotiable points.
Buchanan's desire for more territory, the question of right of way over
the Tehuantepec Isthmus, and the pressure for the settlement of claims
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fostered uneasiness*
Juarez devoted six months to the examination of Buchanan's proposals
with the consideration due to a proposition that tied the permanence or
transience of the Liberal cause to Forsyth, Buchanan, .ienjamin, and
Le Suceur. The interacting connection between the American President's
recommendations hammerlocked Juarez in a tangle of conflicting claims.
Uexican reaction was mixed, irieto surmised that "... the lankees were
merely looking for the best market;"1"2
Juarez, however, could not afford, in vieo of the Liberals' extremely
exposed position, to reject out of hand the American offer. And so began
the policy of procrastination, to negotiate until it was no longer possible,
to temporize, but to give up nothing that would injure the present or
future sovereignty of Mexico.
Churchwell in his stumping tour of conversations vd.th Mexican liberals
had persuaded them to indicate their willingness to negotiate affirma-
tively on such points as the cession of Baja California, rights of way from
the Gulf of California to the Rio Grande and across the Isthmus of
Tehuantepec, the settlement of claims by a board of joint coinaissloners,
trade reciprocity and the abolition of transit duties, and the consideration
16 ^
for the United states of most-favored nation status.
Treaty negotiations between McLane and the aexican foreign minister,
Helchor Ocampo, began in the early spring of 1859, with the latter evidencing
considerable uneasiness concerning several of the proposed bargaining points,
160
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especially the cession of Baja California. To McLane's insistence
that the government had compromised itself by promising to cede Baja
California, Ocampo stubbornly asserted that it had conceded only a
willingness to negotiate. Even Bullies, one of Juarez's most severe critics,
admitted that Juarez had compromised nothing in expressing a willingness
to dicker. Despite the foot dragging of Ocampo, however, McLane con-
fidently asserted in April that the question of cession was only a matter
of time. He counted mistakenly on the consent of Juarez. By July
even the optimistic McLane had concluded that the prospect of a terri-
torial cession looked almost hopeless. But he nevertheless counseled
the State Department that if Lerdo de Tejada were refused the loan he was
coming to negotiate on the security of the nationalized Church lands,
something might be worked out. In late August McLane became certain that
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Juarez would cede nothing—loan or no loan—and shortly thereafter he left
for the United States.
Lerdo returned in October empty handed, and the Liberal government
could procrastinate, at least at the negotiation stage, no longer. A
combination of factors—the Liberal military defeats, desperate pecuniary
needs, the threat of foreign intervention, previous transit and terri-
torial pacts, and intense American diplomatic pressuri^forced the
adoption of a more conciliatory policy when McLane returned that fall
from consultations in Washington.
l6
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The Mexicans argued that the time had come for a disinterested
policy of good neighborship and service to the cause of universal liberty
on the part of the American government. In doing this the United States
would derive more glorious and ultimately more practical advantages.
°
The United States refused to consider this argument. Ocampo was prevailed
upon to insert the "except in the case of sudden emergency" clause, so
much damned later, but McLane failed in alienating liexican sovereignty
over the transit routes. '
The two ministers initialed the treaty on December 111, 1859, and
sent it to t heir respective governments for ratification. The text of the
treaty aroused spirited controversy on both sides of the Rio Grande. Its
stipulations granted to the United States perpetual right of way over the
Isthmus of Tehuantepec and a free transit for those goods not destined
for Hexican consumption. It conceded non-discriminatory duties for
foreigners and free closed-bag mail transit for the United States mails.
In case of danger troops from the American government could be employed to
protect the Isthmus only—and then only on the request or consent of the
Mexican government. There was, however, a rather grievous qualification
in the case of the last provision, which concerned the "extreme emergency"
clause inserted under American pressure in October. This clause authorized,
under particularly adverse conditions, the presence of United States troops
without Mexican consent. Americans received the freedom to practice their
religion in Mexico. Rights of way were also conceded from Guaymas to
Nogales and from Monterrey to Haaatlan. Article Seven reserved to the
169R0eder, I, 203.
170Callahan, pp. 263, 265.
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Mexican government the sovereignty currently possessed over all transit
routes mentioned in the treaty, and other articles provided for a loose
defensive alliance. In case of danger one regime could ask the help of the
other with the petitioning government paying the costs of the subsequent
expedition. Mexico, said the treaty, was to receive |1», 000,000, of which
$2,000,000 would be payable immediately on ratification and the other
32,000,000 applied to United States claims against Mexico.171
In his State of the Union Message in December, 1659, Buchanan again
asked for the use of military forces for Mexico, not only to insure
American interests but also to fulfill the duty of the United States toward
Mexico. United States insistence on redress immediately could also restore
peace to Mexico. In this mission of peace restoration Buchanan proposed,
if possible, to work with the Juarez government. Although internal inter-
ference in the affairs of another country had not been an American foreign
policy principle, Buchanan made it plain that he regarded Mexico as a special
172
case. ' The tone of the address, however, illustrated that Juarez's
support was doubtful at best.
In transmitting the convention to his government, UcLane insisted that
he had guaranteed the protection of American interests without the necessity
of compromising the independence of Mexico. In seeking the emergency clause
it had been with great difficulty that he had induced the Constitutional
government to recognize its responsibility to seek United States aid when
it was unable to fulfill its treaty commitments. Only by representing
that the United States would not act without consent had it been practicable
171Scholes, p. 36. Also Bulnes, pp. 61il-lj2.172Dunn, II, B7.
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to insert the controversial section. The mutuality or reciprocity principle
prevailing in the convention seemed due to the self-respect of the Mexican
government. In McLane's opinion the recent events on the Mexican frontier
justified it. In any case it significantly strengthened the convention. 1^
The United States realized the extraordinary nature of the convention
and regarded it as legitimate only in that it would prevent serious inter-
national complications.
On January k, 1660, Buchanan submitted the Treaty to the Senate with a
recommendation for ratification. The Senate debated it acrimonously from
February to May. In these discussions "the Mexican question was not
focused in the plane of foreign politics, but [in the plane] of tne domestic
problem that dominated it in 1860, and the Treaty was complicated with the
burning question of slavery."17' The Republican Party resolved to prevent
this or any other Mexican treaty venture favorable to Southern interests.
Thus from the moment that the Treaty signified a badly hidden, potential
control over Mexican territory, the Republicans fought ratification with
all their strength. Despite the fear of a Southern utilization of any
advantages derivable from the Treaty, it was interesting to note that one
Texas senator, whose state presumably would have the most to gain from
ratification, opposed the document.
The Senate rejected the Treaty in May, i860, presumably because it
opposed the establishment of a protectorate or intervention in Mexico.
Actually the vote split was eighteen for and twenty-seven against. And of
173»Janning, pp . im, my,.
^{jCallahan, p. 270.
^J^Juarez, Eplstolario
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the eighteen senators favoring the Treaty fourteen hailed from the South.
Twenty-three of the senators opposing the ratification came from Northern
states, so sectional grievances played a relatively significant part in the
Treaty condemnation. This rejection, however, was not finalized as the
Treaty proponents provided for its restudy in the following Congressional
,
177
session.
Mexican reaction to the McLane-Ocampo Treaty was equally violent,
but for entirely different reasons. The Conservatives immediately branded
it as a clear intention on the part of Juarez to sell the independence and
the sovereignty of Mexico to the imperialists of the North. Even many
Liberals believed the negotiation of the Treaty had compromised the national
dignity, although some regarded anything acceptable which would save the
Constitution. The implications were still reverberating two years later in
1861 when Jose' Maria Aguirre stood to condemn Juarez in the Mexican Congress.
Although the charge was speedily rebutted, it nevertheless indicated how
deeply sensitive was the Mexican nationality on this vital point.
Some there were, however, who came to the support of the beleaguered
Ocampo. Andres Oseguira wrote that while the critics ignored, or pretended
to ignore the fact, it was nevertheless true that the Treaty, disadvantageous
as it appeared, avoided the pretext of United States intervention in case of
a theocratic triumph. In the event of a Liberal triumph the Treaty also
177Ibid
., p. U6U. Also Juarez, Epistolarlo , p. lOlj.
178PoTx, p. 111.
SPAN. ORXG. of Aguirre 's charge: "Juarez habia olvidada el decoro nacional
hasta el punto de ponerlo a los pies de los norteamericanos por medio del
Tratado McLane-Ocampo, en que se permitfa la introducion de las tropas
extranjeras al territorio nacional y se autorizaba al Gobierno de
Washington para el arreglo de los arranceles tnexicanos."
91
skirted the protectorate reef. 1
''9
The Treaty provisions imposed a tine limit of six months for
ratification by the respective governments. Thus the Senate proposal to
reconsider involved extending the allotted time period, and the Juarez
cabinet met to debate the proposal. The subsequent vote showed three for
and one against the extension. Into this situation stepped Juarez.
Juarez opposed the project. Extension failed.
The American government exerted strong diplomatic pressure on Juarez
to reconsider his negative decision, but to no avail. SJcLane notified
Washington that Juarez vrould persist in hi3 opposition to the HcLane-Ocampo
Convention, "precisely as he resisted originally the actual conolusion of
the same."180
How did the negotiation and initialing of the controversial IxLane-Ocampo
Treaty fit in with the total philosophy of Juarez? Did it represent for
him a significant departure from the principles for which he stood in the
domestic and the international arena? What exactly did Juarez envisage for
Mexico in foreign affairs? And to what extent was this vision in accord
with or understood by his neighbors to the North?
Even in the early period of his presidency while fighting desperately
against the Conservative faction in the capital, Juarez proclaimed the
179 . *
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respect and friendship of Mexico for all nations on the basis of perfect
reciprocity for the same respect for the Mexican republic. Within that
general framework of mutual respect reposed the principle of the absolute
separation of all tutelage or foreign intervention for the government and
for the nation, a decided opposition to diplomatic meddling in Mexican
internal affairs, an energetic determination to counter protectorates or
patronages within the nation, and a most firm decision never to compromise
a single square inch of national territory. 1®1
In 1858 Forsyth wrote that Mexican parties were all alike, and he
pinpointed the place of procrastination in Mexican diplomacy. Churchwell
prophesied the finality of United States attempts at territorial grabbing.
And Churchwell was right. For the resistance of Juarez broke the idea of a
government to government treaty that proposed the sale of the national
domain. To the offers of money and troops he replied with a "no." Due
to the government's exposed position, this represented perhaps a procrasti-
nated "no," but it was nevertheless a real one. Only the Mexicans should
fight to conquer usurped liberty, as theirs was both the liberty and the
potential loss. Even McLane realised that, to an extent, Juarez had out-
witted him. When he realized that it had been the President opposing
everything so vehemently, he regretted the support he had given the Liberal
government. On the strength of a prospective bargain, Juarez had managed
to secure international recognition by the United States. And an
ostensible negotiated alliance exhibited a neutralising effect on foreign
intervention in favor of the Conservatives.183
^Castillo, pp. 132-33.
l°?Foix, p. 112.
10Boeder, I, 260-62.
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But what about the Treaty? Did it involve the destruction of Mexican
sovereignty? In this connection it should be noted that both the transit
privileges across Tehuantepec and the free passage of mail represented a
continuum and not a new policy. The trade provision was concluded on the
basis of perfect reciprocity in line with Juarista principles, as were the
defense obligations in the accompanying convention. The damning clause
concerned the "extreme emergency" provision. Obviously the article
did not involve the surrender of national territory. It presented though,
in the long run, a potential threat to the sovereignty of Mexico.
Thus Juarez opposed the Treaty and was instrumental in killing its ratifi-
cation.
While there was no reason to assume that the negotiation of the Treaty
was conducted in bad faith by the Juares government, Juarez, nevertheless
recognized that the external circumstances hardly favored the conclusion of
a totally equitable treaty. However in line with his concept of friendship
and respect for all nations based on the reciprocity principle, he was
willing to try. But the advantages of the concluded Treaty, however great,
did not completely fit Juarez's concept of his obligation as moral leader of
the Mexican state, and he rejected the compromise with principle, in spite
of a potential threat from the United States.
Pronouncements from the United States perhaps indicated the validity
of Juarez's position. Buchanan indicated that the Senate, by the rejection
of the Treaty, manifested its desire to let Mexico handle its internal
affairs. Although the United States Chief Executive still worried about the
possibility of European intervention south of the Rio Orande and the duty of
M
the American government in regard to its southern neighbor, 181* the talk
of annexation began a rapidly accelerating process of decay.
H. R. La Reintrie, sent by Buchanan to Mexico in 1860, declared that in the
case of European intervention America would "to the extent of its power
defend the nationality and independence of said Republic .
"
l85 This defense
would perhaps stem from selfish motives also, but as the statement came
after the Treaty rejection by the Juares government, it perhaps indicated
the beginning of a new respect for the neighbor below the Rio Grande.
Buchanan's phobia on the imminence of foreign intervention from Europe
was not unjustified. In 1861 the menace increased with each passing month.
But strangely enough with the intensification of the haaard, Mexico also
found Itself "courted" for the first time in its history. In April, 1861,
the new Secretary of State William Seward dispatched Thomas Corwin to
Mexico City as minister from the United States government. The appointment
was a Judicious one and presaged a new deal in Mexican-American relations.
For with the Lincoln administration imperialist history came to be recog-
nized as a sectional rather than a national United States interest. 186
Corwin had championed Mexican rights against Southern aggression,
and he sympathised with their interests. Even on the question of terri-
torial cession he was considerably more moderate than any of his prede-
18i,Bulnes, p. h6k.
Here Buchanan warned Europe: "It is a duty which we owe to ourselves toprotect the integrity of Mexico's territory against the hostile inter-ference of any other power. ... Our geographical position, our directinterest in all that concerns Mexico, and our settled policy in regard tothe Horth American continent render this an indispensable duty." See
Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston: Little, Brown
• Co.. 19U1), p. 111:.
^Callahan, p. 27lt.
186Roeder, I, 3S0.
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cessors. And as for diplomatic meddling, he stated:
I «hould not desire either to inter;neddle in their
concerns or add any of their territory to ours, except,
perhaps, Lower California, which may become indispensable
to our Pacific possessions . . . .187
This concern with Lower California however resulted primarily from a fear
that it might fall into the hands of the Confederate forces. And interest-
ingly enough also, the United States attitude toward the Mexican government
had significantly changed since Forsyth wrote in 1858, even with the
rejection of the McLane-Ocampo Treaty. Corwin's writing shows thisi
I cannot find in this Republic any men of any party
better qualified, in my judgment, for the task than those
in power} if they cannot save her, then I am quite sure
that she is to be the prey of some foreign Power, and
they, I fear, cannot without OUR AID, I say OUR AID, because
she will look in vain for help elsewhere.
^
As subsequent events proved, Corwin greatly underestimated the ability
of the Mexican leaders to survive without material aid frcm the United States.
But his remarks indicated a growing respect for the leaders of the Mexican
government that had not figured in Mexican-American relations prior to this
period. And although the circumstances fostered by the Civil Bar undoubted-
ly affected this change in attitude, it perhaps also flowed from at least
a partially increased awareness that Juarista foreign policy operated on
principle as well as pragmatism. For between 1858 and 1862 Juarez had
resisted intense American pressure for a treaty of cession and had rejected
a transit treaty that represented not necessarily a present, but only a
potential and future threat to Mexican sovereignty. He had showed a
willingness to accede to all reasonable financial demands leveled by
««IECT.. pp. 351-52.
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Mexico's creditor governments. Early in 1862 he allowed the intervention
troops refuge from the yellow fever—always on the principle of reciprocal
trust. He succeeded in lessening, at least on the part of the United States,
diplomatic meddling in Mexican affairs by refusing its influence.
In other ways also, the new foreign policy of Juares, based on the
state as a moral authority interacting with other states on a basis of
mutual trust and reciprocity, operated favorably for Mexico. On Eay 21,
1861, Corwin received a note from the Secretary of State in Washington
ordering him to strictly abstain from all intervention in factional
189
struggles or jxlitical-religious opinions existing in Mexico. In other
words it evidently would no longer be United States policy to treat ?.ith
whichever faction offered the greater advantages to American interests.
This represented a significant victory for Juares. In 1858, Zuloaga's
resort to a forced loan affected American property and precipitated an
immediate rupture in diplomatic relations. In November, 1861, Juarez's
espousal of the same tactics was approved by the American Secretary of State.
Seward declined to second Corwin' s protest of illegality and wrote that the
United States government desired to see the Juarea regime sustain itself
190
through the crisis.
In 1861 as the situation in Mexico steadily went from bad to worse,
as far as the prospect of European intervention was concerned, Seward
and Corwin began to consider ways of relieving the Mexican financial
difficulties. On June 29, 1861, Corwin proposed to Seward the negotiation
of a treaty paying 15,000,000 to the Mexican government, and an additional
18?Castillo, p. li*7.
W°Dunn, II, 130.
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810,000,000 to keep the regime going. Under the circumstances, however,
the Bale of territory was to be only a last resort—a statement that
again reflected a significant change in attitude on the part of the
United States. Security for the loan could better be secured perhaps by
a negotiated fifty per cent tariff reduction for American coods. Two
months later Corwln informed Seward of Mexican acceptance of the tariff
192
reduction on a five-ten year basis.
Seward approved the proposed bargaining in September with a very
important variation. The United States wcvld undertake to assume the
interest on the Mexican debt for five years, but the security Seward
preferred would give a lien on the public lands and mineral resources in
Baja California, Sonora, and Chihuahua. Tn default of payment such re-
sources would in six years revert to the United States.193 This proposal
aroused stiff ODDOsition both in Washington and in Europe, but Seward
nevertheless instructed Corwin to complete the draft. In October Corwin
indicated Mexican acceptance of two loans pledging the public lands as
security. Is the treaty draft, however, was not even completed until
19UNovember, this in no way implied an official committment on the part
of the Juarez government.
The conclusion of the London Convention, signed by England, France,
and Spain which agreed to joint intervention in Vexioo, increased the
apprehension of Lincoln and Seward over the future of Mexican political
independence. Both men considered the treaty so important to the fate of
Wkurlington, p. 133.
fffoid., pp. 133, U6.
AjacCorkle, p. 55. Also Scholes, p. 78.
19
'*Turlington, p. H13. Also F.L. Owsley, King Cotton Dlplomacy i
foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America "(Chicago 1 n.p. 1931),
p. 117.
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Mexico that on December 17, 1861, Lincoln submitted the draft copy to the
Senate with a request for an advisory opinion. Senate opposition sepa-
rated into three groups : those who apprehended a future annexation of
Mexican territory, those who considered it derogatory to the honor of the
United States to discuss the fate of tiexico with foreign nations (England,
France, and Spain), and thoee who regarded a Mexican subsidy as prejudicial
to United States credit.195 In January Lincoln addressed Congress., request-
ing an immediate decision so that Corwin could act in a way that "while it
will most carefully guard the interests of our country, will at the sane
time be most beneficial to Mexico."196 Nevertheless the Senate opposition
carried the day. On February 25, it disavowed the advisability of nego-
tiating any treaty providing for the assumption of the Mexican foreign debt.
The Senate resolution resulted in a modification cf Corwin >s essential
Instructions. These however failed to reach Mexico until quite late.
Corwin meanwhile had concluded a convention providing for a loan which r;as
supposedly ratified and/or aoproved by the Juarez government. The outbreak
of hostilities, however, considerably altered the advancement of a loan as
this would endanger the neutral status of the United States. In Jay
Seward relayed to Corwin the decision to hold up the convention, as it was
inexpedient, due to complications in both Mexican and American affairs to
push for immediate ratification. Despite this, the support of Mexican
independence appeared sc vital that on June 23 Lincoln laid two concluded
treaties before the Senate together with the correspondence pertaining
thereto and requested their advice on a subject whose iaportanee could not
19|rurlington, p. 150.
• °Roy P. Easier fed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (8 vols.:
New Brunswick, N. J.t Rutgers University Press, S5J57TT 10^
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be over estimated. But despite administration oleading, the Senate tabled
the convention on July lL, 1862. 197 This ended official American govern-
mental efforts to financially sustain the Juarez regime.
The failure of the protracted financial aid negotiations did not
necessarily mean that the United States had played a dallying game and now
found itself disposed to abandon Stexieo to her fate. Indications to the
contrary dated back to tiie fall of 1861.
Shortly after the conclusion of the London Convention the three
signatories issued a partnership invitation to the United States. To this
overture Seirard replied that such a venture ran contrary to the traditional
policy of the United States. In addition, Mexico, as a neighbor
"... possessing a form of government similar to our own in many of its
important features, nl9 8 was entitled to some measure of patience and indul-
gence in carrying out its foreign financial obligations. A few months later
in December, 1861, at a time when Northern prospects appeared rather dim,
Seward went a bit further and warned the Europeans against subverting
Mexican institutions!
The United States have a deep interest which, however,
they are happy to believe is an interest held by them in
common with the high contracting parties [at the London
Convention] and with all other civilized states, that neither
the sovereigns by whom the convention has been concluded shall
seek or obtain any acquisition of territory or any advantages
peculiar to itself, and not left equally open to the United
States and every other civilized state within the territories
of Mexico, and especially that neither one nor all of the
contracting parties shall, as a result or consequence of
hostilities to be inaugurated under the convention, exercise
in the subsequent affairs of Mexico any influence of a
character to impair the right of the Mexican people to
^Turlington, pp , 150-51. Also Basler, V, 281.198Perkln8, p. 125.
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choose and freely to constitute the form of its government.
He anticipated, he told Romero, an Allied quarrel that would remove the
sting from the plan's far-reaching potential. With the passage of time,
however, and despite Seward's correct prophecy of an Allied break, this
potential increased markedly. The relative position of the Onion vis-a-vis
the Confederacy limited effective action by the United States government,
but the Lincoln administration, nevertheless, felt bound to clarify its
policy. In 'iarch, 1862, Seward instructed the American Minister in Paris
thatt
The President deems it his duty to express to the allies,
in all candor and frankness, the opinion that no monarchical
government which could be founded in Mexico, in the presence
of foreign navies and armies in the waters and upon the soil
of Mexico, would have any prospect of security or permanency.
Secondly, that the instability of such a monarchy there would
be enhanced if the throne should be assigned to any person not
of Mexican nativity. That under such circumstances the new
government must speedily fall unless it could draw into its
support European alliances, which, relating back to the present
invasion, would, in fact, make it the beginning of a permanent
policy of armed European monarchical intervention injurious and
practically hostile to the most general system of government on
the continent of America. ... In such a case it is not to be
doubted that the permanent interests and sympathies of this
country would be with the other American republics. It is not
intended on this occasion to predict the course of events
which might happen as a consequence of the proceeding contem-
plated, either on this continent or in Europe. It is sufficient
to say that, in the President's opinion, the emancipation of
this continent from European control has *?een the principal
feature of its history during the last century. 200
This opinion also extended to the majority of the Americans—a fact
which Seward was later to emphasize most explicitly.
In other ways also the North indicated its approval of the Juarista
cause. After Seward's rebuke for his action on the forced loan issue in
gQQibTd
-
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November, 1861, Corwin carefully approved Juarez's two per cent property-
tax on both Mexicans and foreigners. In May, 1862, Seward instructed
Corwin that with the outbreak of French-Mexican hostilities the former
government might attempt to inaugurate a new system in Mexico. In such a
oase, it was not in the tjnited States interest to hastily recognize
revolutionary changes, nor was it always safe to Judge that a new government
201
would be permanent and satisfactory to the people.
How did Juarez rpact to events in 1861 and 1862? Did he espouse his
enunciated principles of reciprocal justice among nations in his inter-
national dealings, and more particularly in his relations with the United
States? What of the Confederate minister in Mexico? And did not the
"approval" of the Corwin Treaty encourage the demise of national sovereign-
ty? Was he thus willing to negotiate a loan on any terms to obtain the
money that was needed so desperately? Was it true, as Ilulnes and others
charged, that Juarez proposed to the United States the surrender of Mexican
territory and was ready to submit Mexico to United States domination to gain
202
his ends? Did he not commission Romero to secure an American army?
On August 1, 1851, Lincoln submitted to the 'Jnited States Senate a
postal convention for consideration with a view to ratification. This postal
convention, ratified five days later, had been concluded by the Mexican and
Amerioan plenipotentiaries. On January 28, 1862, Lincoln submitted an
extradition treaty concluded by Corwin on December 11. At the same time
ha sent a second postal convention also signed on that date. The latter
"Hj .S. , Congress, House, Papers Relating to Foreign Affairgi Mexico
,
37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1862, Exec. !;oc. 1, Fart I, pp. 733-3'j, 7U6.
20< Hagner, p. 383. Also Garcia, p. 130.
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would r"^lace the convention ratified on August 6 and later refused by the
Juarez government. The Senate acted affirmatively on the postal convention
February 10 and, after amending the extradition treaty, ratified it on
April 9, 1862.
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And what of the Corwin Treaty supposedly ratified and/cr approved by
Juarez on April 6? The Treaty was ratified. But in view of the three
treaties up for ratification, the question presenting itsolf was which one.
The action on the August convention indicated that Juarez had acted after
United States Senate approval. And on March 29, 1862, he had written
Romero that it didn't appear that Corwin had the full authority to treat
with the Mexican government as he hadn't been able to arrange anything. He
instructed Romero rather to direct his efforts not only toward seeing that
the money loaned would be used for attending to Allied reclamations but
also toward trying to obtain money for particular expenses and interests
that the "nited States could loan as a noble ?nd complete favor. And
although Manuel Doblato later mentioned the conclusion of three treaties
with the "nited States, 20" ratification or approval was nowhere inferred.
Juarez would hardly have ratified a loan treaty only six days later when
he doubted the diplomatic powers of the United States representative.
Furthermore this treaty would hardly have been ratified if it contained
any provision for the alienation or mortgaging of national territory. For
governmental Dolicy (and Juarez was to all intents and purposes the govern-
ment) remained as firmly opposed to intrigues of this nature as it had been
£°?Basler, IV, U67 and V, 113.
^Juarez, Kpistolario , op. 161, 163.
NOTE: The Corwin Treaty was concluded April 15, 1862.
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in 1859. In 1862 the Mexican Goicuourfa came to New York to negotiate a
loan offering the sale or mortgaging of the small isle of Cozumel. Juarea
immediately hastened to assure Matiaa Romero that Qoicuouria possessed no
diplomatic character from the Liberal government. The Mexican Minister
publicly protested Goicuourfa's activities and proclaimed that the govern-
ment and people of Mexico were firmly determined not to alienate a single
square inch of national territory. ' That this represented government
policy and not necessarily Romero's personal opinion appeared from a sub-
sequent letter of Romero on the basis of which Bulnes charged that Juarez
proposed surrendering Mexican territory to the United States. In a personal
opinion letter to Juarez, Romero foresaw the intervention of the United
States on the side of Mexico after the conclusion of the American Civil War.
Then in return for their services rendered, they would probably request terr-
itory. In view of the likely inevitability of this, would it not be better
to offer now what Maximilian would cede to France, even though the United
States at present would refuse even a land gift as it would complicate
their French relations? Juarez's reply scathingly condemned the pro-
posal. Offering national territory was not only anti-national—a cardi-
nal sin within Juarez's total philosophy—but prejudicial to the Liberal
cause. And it was both these things precisely because it flaunted and
distorted the moral authority of the state. The nation had set its will
against the project. And if through weakness the territory was snatched
by a usurper, it still remained the duty of the conquered to give their sons
the option of recovering that which was lost. '
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Mexican-American relations during the American Civil War and the French
intervention were not completely one-sided with the American government
holding all the aces. Despite the Senate tabling of the Corwin Treaty,
Lincoln's subsequent embargo on arms export and United States reluctance
to channel any material aid at all to the partisans fighting below the
Rio Orande, Juarw continued to support the Northern cause. He maintained
this position even though the Confederate representative in Mexico,
John T. Piokett, proposed the payment of up to $1,000,000 for recognition
and even though the proximity of the Confederacy offered certain trade
advantages. And at one point he actually proposed the closing of the
northern border to the Confederacy. Neither did he protest the intrusion
of Union troops in pursuit of Confederate marauders. 20ii
In following this policy JuaVez once again demonstrated the import-
ance of his concept of the moral authority of the state. To him integrity,
reciprocity, and justice extended to the international plane mattered
more than 41,000,000 even at a time when he needed money desperately to
sustain the Liberal revolution. He knew that the use of immoral means to
attain a justifiable end in the long run sacrificed the integrity of the
2080wsley, pp. 96 ; 130.
NOTE: Although a great deal of trade crossed the borders between theLiberals and the Confederacy, this was primarily initiated and carried
out by the state governors acting independently. Governor Vidaurrifor example, ignored Juarez's closed border proposal. «ee Francisco
J*
11"68
'
E1 verdadero Juarez y la verdad sobre la intervencidn y ellmperlo (Paris: Bouret, I90M, o. JJE
SPAN. ORiO. from Romero's letter: "Me enseno' una carta [el General
Grant i que acaba de recibir del general Carvajal que esta ahora enNueva York, en que, con referenda a la declaracion de Smith y MagruderH decia que si los confederados se posaban a Mexico, el coma
gobernador de Tamaulipas, no tendrfa embarazo en que las fuerzas de losEstados Unidos entrasen & perseguirlos. Aunque yo estoy de acuerdo con
esa idea y creo que el Supremo Gobierno no la desaprobara ...»
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end itself. So he preferred to struggle ahead with only his courage and
his faith in the 3ocial revolution and the indomitable valor of the
Mexican people.
This attitude of Juarez, as has been hinted at above, also carried
over in his attempts to buy arms and his tentative toleration of schemes
to recruit volunteers in the United States. Despite Mexico's need for
both these commodities, the principle or idea of the revolution came first.
All had to be sublimated to it.
The Liberal partisans experienced considerable difficulty in purchas-
ing arms in the United States due to Lincoln's embargo on export of muni-
tions and other war supplies. In July and August, 1862—the dark point of
the American Civil War—the government refused Romero's previous arms
clearance. Two years later in San Francisco, Placido Vega aroused con-
siderable sympathy for the Liberal position and attempted another arms
export project but ran into legal trouble. Undaunted the Juaristas
continued trying. In early l86h Juarez wrote Romero that he had heard
of a large arms cache in Philadelphia. He wished Romero to contract for
-- 209
them if possible.
Although officially arms help from the United States was small during
the intervention period, unofficialJy it flourished considerably. The
Defenders of the Monroe Doctrine, a group of United States citizens living
in New Orleans, made daring raids transmitting contraband arms and
ammunition across the Mexican frontier at Brownsville. Seward officially
Juarez, Epistolario
, p. 23°. Also U.S., Congress, Senate,
"essagg of the President of the United States in Answer to a Resolution
of the Senate on January 13, 1863, on Contraband Export to the French Army
in Mexico
,
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denied American governmental participation and any violation of neutral-
ity, but on the basis of General Nathaniel Banks' subsequent report,
General Francis J. Herron- 'isappeared from command in Prownsville. And in
El Paso, Customs Collector W. «. Mills winked at the arms scurrying
, 210
across the Rio Grande to join Juarez.
On the matter of loans and the recruiting of volunteers, Juarez
exercised extreme care in order to avoid comproaiising the moral honesty
of the republic. In November, l86li, Juarez authorized Jose* 'iarfa Carbajal
to accept the military services of from one to ten thousand foreigners and
to negotiate a loan for their salary and maintenance baaed on the federal
and state revenues of Tamaulipaa. Carbajal, however, met General Lewis
Wallace and decided to extend his activities into the United States. He
concluded a loan in Kew York with a company of rather doubtful reputation.
VShen they went bankrupt, he succeeded in negotiating another legitimately.
His activities, however, were completely disavowed by Juarez who stated
unequivocally that he had exceeded his authority. Nevertheless, Carbajal
continued his projects. With the help of General Herman Sturm, a retired
United States Army officer, he succeeded in cornering Thaddeus Stephens of
the House Foreign Relations Committee. In 1866 the latter proposed an
inquiry into the propriety of a 620,000,000 loan to prevent the overthrow
of the Mexican government and to vindicate the honor of the United States
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tarnished by the "Micawber policy" of Secretary Seward.
Juarez received a delirious letter from Gonzales Ortega in New York
in May, 1865, in which the latter announced the wild enthusiasm with which
21
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American generals were embracing the Mexican cause. The Mexican Presi-
dent's reaction was stern and moral. To his son-in-law, Santacilia, he
wrote that Ortega desired only money. To Guillermo Prieto he wrote,
commanding him not tc tell 0rtega,that he could remain in the country for
he, Juarez, never authorized anyone to follow dishonor.
Santos Degollado, also in hiding in the United States, built castles
in the air as well. And together with Edward Plumb he contrived to secure
Romero's cooperation in his schemes to get aid for Mexico. When Juarez
discovered the project and its method of operation, he exolicitly forbade
Romero's further participation. Not only that but he instructed Romero
to bend all his efforts to frustrate its advance. ^
In one other incident during the period of the French intervention,
Juarez, in his relations with the United States, indicated that he valued
the moral authority of the Mexican state and the principles of Justice
and reciprocity in international society over a presently expedient
solution or advantage.
When the Civil War ended, a group of restless American army officers,
among them Ulysses S. Grant, turned their eyes southward to Mexico and
proposed to oust the French bag and baggage from the domain south of the
Rio Orande. And in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the Union
forces, Grant ordered tt Henry Sheridan south to sit on the Texas border
with his 50,000 men. John McAllister Schofield was to enter Mexico and
help organize unemployed Confederate and Union veterans to aid the
i.-exicans 1 struggle. Meanwhile frontier officers had instructions to break
212 .
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with the French. It was further proposed to put the reputable American
General Schofield at the head of the expedition. Kb would receive com-
pensation for his service, presumably the chief command of the Mexican
2Vx
army.
As a consequence Romero, the Mexican representative in Washington,
6igned a convention with Schofield sealing the bargain. The convention
made Schofield a chief of a division of Americans and possibly others
within the Mexican army and conferred on the men in service the rights
and privileges of Mexican citizenship. In affixing his signature to the
convention Romero directly violated the instructions of the "aso del Morte
government. For when Juarez had first heard of the project he had
authorized its completion only under certain strictly specified conditions.
First, any such army had to form with the direct knowledge and authoriza-
tion of the United States government. Second, said army could in no way
attempt a crime against Mexico's independence, autonomy, territorial
integrity, republican institutions, or established government. And third,
said army ought to be organized with attention to the laws and military
regulations of the Mexican republic. The convention fulfilled some of
these stipulations, bivt Romero exceeded his powers in making it. 21^
Juarez could potentially have derived great advantages from the
successful implementation of the Romero-Schofield Convention. But he
preferred principle to advantage and so refused to sanction his
Minister's action.
Several of Juarez's biographers have charged that throughout the
^rraulnes, El verdadero Juarez, p. JkB.
Ml'« PP. 326-27. Also Castillo, pp. 1*21-22.
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French intervention, the United States simply abandoned Juarez and the
all-important Mexican social revolution to their collective fate. This
was not altogether true. Although Civil War exigencies limited Secretary
of State Seward's freedom of action he, nevertheless, put the United States
antagonism on record at various times throughout the French intervention.
Juarez's policy of reciprocity and justice had earned him a return in kind.
The United States, said Seward, not only opposed the French forces but
also the imperial authority thus maintained which contradicted the American
principles and policies and impeded the free function of the republican
government in that country. He refused to succumb to a favorable immigra-
tion policy for Americans, held out by Maximilian, which would give them
considerable local self-government (and perhaps ultimate control).
Writing to John Bigelow, the United States Minister to Paris, in March,
1865, Seward informed him thati
This government has not interfered. It does not propose
to interfere. ... It firmly repels foreign intervention
here and looks with disfavour upon it anywhere. Therefore,
for us to intervene in Mexico would be only to reverse our
own principles and to adopt in regard to that country the
very policy which in any case we disallow.21 '
When the relatively conservative American Minister to Paris John
Bigelow intimated to the French that if the monarchy triumphed it would
secure United States approval, Seward immediately reprimanded him. The
United States of America preferred a domestic and republican government
in Mexico and would strive, through the use of moral influence, to
attain it in so far as this was possible. In July Seward hinted to
Romero of a possible change in the United States policy of neutrality.
^^Martin, p. U22. Also MacCorkle, pp. 61-62.
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At the same time, however, he expressed the opinion that it would be more
honorable for Mexico to save itself using only her own resources, for any
United States interference would prejudice the goodness of the Liberal
cause. Two months later Romero informed Juarea that the United States had
finally decided to intervene actively on the French question. Washington
in a rather pointed dispatch to Paris directed attention to the upcoming
American elections and their possible repercussions. By November the
French troops in Mexico appeared "disallowable and impracticable" and
their removal was a necessary condition for the restoration of harmony
between the two governments. In December, Seward, using the polite
phraseology of diplomacy, issued an ultimatum. Unless France desisted
from her policy of armed intervention in Mexico, her relations with the
United States would be plunged into imminent jeopardy. On April 5, 1866,
Napoleon III of France announced the withdrawal of the imperial forces
from Mexico. 2X6
With the withdrawal of the imperial forces, public sentiment in the
United States concerned itself with the fate of Maximilian. A dispatch
to Juarez noted that repeated acts of severity might affect the course of
United States sympathy toward the republican government. In reply the
Mexican government indicated its definite responsibilities to the people,
which sprang from the right of nations and the laws of the republic. As
a government it had provided many proofs of its humanitarian principles,
but now it possessed an obligation to consider the demands of justice.
It expressed the hope, however, of conserving United States sympathies
as the people and government of that country were held in high estima-
216Ibid., pp. kl3-3h. Also Bulnes, El verdadero Juarea
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tion in Mexico. And so, once more, Juarez dared to be different and to
support principle (that is, his concept of proper judgment for Maximilian)
over expediency in internal and external affairs.
Between 1667 and Juarez's death in 1872, Mexican-American relations
rooked along fairly well. Border raids, the Free Zone problem, and
American claims muddied the waters a bit; but on the whole ten years of
relative harmony had had its effect. The new charge' d'affaires, Edward
Plumb, was instructed not to press American claims immediately as the
United States desired to see Mexico consolidate its republican institu-
tions. In 1667 the two countries agreed to submit their mutual claims to
arbitration. And the United States in addition promised not to tie up the
matter with territorial acquisition claims. The claims adjustment conven-
tion was signed in 1868. The following year London bondholders again
revived an old assertion and proposed an agreement whereby the United States
would guarantee the interest on the Mexican debt. Juarez rejected this
outright as leading to American tutelage. 220
Imperialism had not quite died however, but it was assuming a different
form. The next American minister, William S. Rosecrana, argued for an
increased United States control and presence in Mexico. His proposals
failed to Jibe with tiie new Mexican policy at the Department of State, and
he was replaced in May of 1869 by Thomas Kelson. Nelson believed that the
United States had a responsibility to give moral aid to the Liberal govern-
ment. Individual cases of the mistreatment of American citizens should be
regarded more as lapses, due in part perhaps to the xenophobia of the
„ .
9Pocumentos para la historia contemporanea de Mexico (2 vols.:
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Mexican people, rather than as indications of a deliberate unwillingness
»• , 221to correct conditions,
Mexican-American relations had come a long way since the Liberals
assumed power in 1856. They were based on a new respect, a new apprecia-
tion of the other's point of view, and a new concern for the other's right.
And for this change in attitude Juarez's concept of the role of moral
authority and justice and reciprocity in international affairs must be
given much credit. For Juarez brought to the conduct of international
affairs a concept of totality which interwrapped foreign and domestic
matters. Injustice abroad hindered the administration of justice at home
because it weakened the ideal of the state as a moral entity fit to guide
the consciences of men. He injected into international power politics a
consciousness of justice and an example of valor that it had not known
since the Middle Ages. In so doing it later appeared that he earned for
Mexico a new respect in the eyes of the world and more especially in the
eyes of its neighbor to the North, the United States.
The influence of Juarez's philosophy in his external relations with
the United States and the change that his philosophy caused in this re-
lationship) has been examined. But what was the attitude of the partici-
pants in the drama that took place from 1856-1872? How did Juarez react
toward the "Colossus of the North"? How did he regard its more3, its
officials, and its institutions? And the United States—how did it regard
Juarez? Did it recognize his ambitions, his dreams, his ideals for the
Mexican nation? And if so did it sympathize with them? These questions
and their possible answers will form the substance of the new two chapters.
221
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CHAPTER IV
JUAREZ'S DEALINGS *ITH HIS NORTHERN NEIGHBOR
Juarez's Attitude toward the Mexican Policy
of the United States from 1857 to 1867
Just exactly what did Juarea feel toward the "Colossus of the North"?
Empathy, fear, hatred, envy? At times he perhaps felt one of these emotions,
at other times another. He perhaps felt them singly and in combination.
But at any rate his feelings toward the United States aid his comments
about it were more or less responses to particular situations. He did not
move toward an examination of the American philosophy, although he did
credit that republic's felicity and prosperity to its espousal of the
222
principles of progress, lioerty, and republican federalism.
Juarea 's attitude toward the United States over the Reform and Civil
War years emerged as interestingly ambiguous, ifhile in 1856 he warned of
the significant dangers of a United States alliance in connection with
the British Barron-Forbes affair, less tnan six months later ho wrote
Romero that he soon hoped to celebrate the news of the approval of the
Mexican-United States agreements. Juarez opined also that Mexico needed
this aid more than ever in order to consolidate peace in the country.™»
Later in 1858 when the United States decided against further recogni-
tion of the Zuloaga government Juarez was understandably happy, and for
^^Juarez, Archive privado
, p. 233.
^Juarez, Eoistolario, pp. 56, 6ii—65.
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two reasons. Strangely enough under the circumstances, however, his
approval went beyond the narrowly selfish hope of attaining Jjnmediate
recognition for his own regime and focused on both the Mexican national
and the inter-American interests. As far as the Mexican national inter-
est went, it was vital that Juarez's struggle to protect the Constitution
and the social gains of the revolution be successful. In addition, the
Zuloaga faction had no national character and wished only to enslave the
- ptople through the use of the army. In the inter-American sphere this
same faction hindered the development of a true hemispheric spirit by
espousing the politics and interests of Europe over those of the new
world. The United States disavowal of the 2uloaga faction indicated to
Juarez that the American chief magistrate was beginning to take cogniz-
ance of this vital fact, and this made him extremely happy. Although he
told Prida Santacllia a month later that United States recognition would
undoubtedly help Mexico to obtain supplies from that republic, when
recognition actually came in April, 1859, he emphasised the boost it
gave to the moral cause of the Liberals 22ii
In May, 1861, Juarez noted that the Civil War in the United States
lessened the dangers of filibustering expeditions along the frontier. 22^
Juarez's attitude toward the United States during the American inter-
vention was divided into two parts. The first concerned his reaction
to the vagaries of the American government as represented by Secretary of
State William Seward} and the second, his response to the opinions of the
American people. At the beginning of the intervention, the two parts
Juarez, Archivo privado. pp. 1*, 9. Also Juarez, Epistolario.
pp. BO, 86.
"'Juarez, Epistolario
, p. 136.
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blended together into an harmonious whole. Thus in 1662 in answering
Romero's report of his conversation with Secretary of State Seward,
Juarez remarked that Seward's statements were most flattering to Mexico.
He instructed Romero to stimulate the good will for Mexico present in
the American republic, for in the case of an outbreak of hostilities, the
United States would undoubtedly enact the role corresponding to its
2?A
continental interest in the matter. This continental interest as
Juarez saw it appeared to be an inter-American concept within which the
United States would cooperate to foster the principles of Justice,
reciprocity, and mutual interest in protecting the North and South
American continents. In October, 1863, Juarez asked Romero of United
States intentions with respect to Napoleon's recent moves in establishing
a French influenced government. Since the United States had protested,
Juarez believed that no other road lay open to them but the sustaining
of their word now that what had previously ueen presumed was realized.
He hoped that God would enable the Northern representatives to quickly end
the Civil War. This would alter Napoleon's outlook on the Mexican
situation. 227
With 1B61» the harmony splintered, and Juarez began to differentiate
between the glides of Seward and the objectives of the American people.
It perhaps seemed to him that the United States government opposed the
French with words but not with deeds in antagonism both to the princi-
ples of mutual justice and reciprocity and to the desires of the
American people and the peoples of the hemisphere. And while Romero
continued fighting and working to bring the story of Mexico before the
22
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American people, the dichotomy kept intruding, hindering both the unity
and the success of their effort.
The American newspapers, wrote Juarez concernedly to Romero in the
pring of 186U, were completely ignorant of the true situation in Mexico.
They published only the prejudicial accounts culled from the interven-
tionist periodicals. To counteract this Plumb and Navarro recommended the
publication of an English language magazine, but Mexico lacked printers
with the ability to set type in English. Despite these difficulties, however,
by the summer of that same year, thanks in large part to the generosity of
Escobar y Armendariz, an English language magazine devoted to an expose' of
the events in Mexico was circulating in the United States and Europe and
greatly aiding the Mexican cause in the process. And to distribute informa-
tion still further, Juarez instructed Romero to publish if possible the
news notices remitted to hl-n for his own use. 228
Juarez also gave his wholehearted approval to Romero's scheme for a
New lork banquet to be attended by all the influential men of the city.
This would not only influence people in the United States but also in
Europe, where thinking men would understand that it was not Seward who
represented the public opinion of the United States. 229
Having plotted his strategy for molding the mind of the American
public, Juarez turned his attention to the more difficult task of mani-
pulating the government. In 1861* he requested information as to the
temper of the Senate on Davis' Mexican resolution, unanimously approved
by the United States House of Representatives in March. Senate approba-
tion, Juarez thought, would give to the resolution the character and force
228
"Juarez, Epistolario
. pp. 261-62, 272-73-"yIbid
. t p. 265.
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of law and this could conceivably change the policies of the administra-
tion or, what was the same thing, the journey of Seward toward at least
apparent intimacy with the Napoleonic legions. June found Juarez despon-
dent as to the resolution's chances for passage. Not even all the good
reasons of Senator SJcDougal would be enough to neutralise Seward's baneful
influence, whose policy in Mexican matters would never harmonise with the
Davis resolution. While he hoped Romero's sustained optimism was correct,
he, nevertheless, regarded a change in the Washington cabinet as an imperi-
ous necessity. What was happening in Mexico, Santo Domingo, and Peru
clearly manifested the intentions of the European powers with respect to
the Spanish American republics, and only God knew how far those aggressive
policies would extend if the United States remained, as in Mexico, in-
different to the Monroe Doctrine. Juarez awaited anxiously the outcome
of the battles around Richmond and the results of the upcoming presi-
dential elections. A decisive military victory would influence the couree
of the administration although he feared Seward's excessive prudence. In
addition the election results could conceivably force a more moral atti-
tude toward immediate work on the continental question which at present
had thrown itself down on the floor of Mexico. 230
By early 1865 things seemed to have leaned somewhat toward favoring
the republican cause. Although Juarez feared for awhile that the United
States might recognise the Maximilian regime, he later come to feel that
Mexico possessed at least the negative cooperation of the United States.
In that connection Juarez was also interested by the news of Romero's
recent visit to General Grant's army, but he still thought that, even
though the United States had good intentions for Itaxico, it was far too
23
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busy to help other peoples. Thus he told Romero that tiie Mexicans should
thank the United States for their generous feelings and try to obtain their
own triumph with their own scanty resources and without compromising their
dignity. In that way their victory would be all the more- glorious, and,
if by chance they should lose, at least t hey bequeathed to their sons the
231honor of free men.
On April 6, Juarez addressed a long letter to his son-in-law,
Santacilia, in New York expressing his views on the American Civil War and
its ijnplications for the future of Mexico. It was very difficult he
opined for the Southern rebellion to terminate with an arranged peace.
Passions on both sides were highly inflamed, and between the freedoa which
the North sustained and the slavery the South espoused there was no
possible transaction. Juarez applauded Lincoln's inflexibility since
Lincoln's triumph would be more advantageous for Mexico althoutfi he would
have preferred a quick peace without the sacrifice of so many lives. Mean-
while the Mexicans with time and their own stubborn resistance would vex
the French and make them abandon the subjugation attempt, thus effecting a
French withdrawal "without foreif?i help and this is the greatest glory I
desire for my country." 'Tie North's destruction of slavery and its non-
recognition of Maximilian was sufficient. Now perhaps, Juarez told
Santacilia, the North's victories were upsetting the traitors and in-
\-aders in Mexico as they gazed into the spectral face of the "Colossus
of the North"—a colossus moreover dedicated to espousing the cause of
the oppressed. As for the Liberals they would still welcome the aid of
the United States, but they would welcome it only as the aid of a
231Ibid., pp. 282-83, 29k.
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friend—without strings—and not as the aid of a boss. The Mexican
republic would refuse even to consider aid offers suggesting any humili-
ating conditions desrading Mexican dignity or compromising Mexican
territory. :Sith respect to non-governmental aid especially in the volun-
teer field, foreign soldiers unaccustomed to the difficult conditions and
the privations endured by the Mexican soldier would be worse than no help
at all. The sons of the rich never reconciled thenselves to the miserable
life of the poor. Thus, Juarez concluded, the fight should be continued
whenever and with whatever it could. 232
In August, Juarez opined that even with the ouster of Seward negative
help waa all that the United States was capable of rendering Mexico. He
never had, he stated, illusions about United States assistance because he
knew that rich and powerful nations never felt or, even less, tried to
remody the misfortunes of the poor. They were not capable of it for the
world was like that. If sometime they did help the weak they did it for
their own interest and convenience. This remote eventuality shouli never
serve as a hope for the weak. For him it was enough not to have an
enemy on the north. ^
"resident Andrew Johnson declared his intention to sustain the
Monroe doctrine in hi3 address to Congress at the end of 1365. This agree-
ably surprised Juarez who had hoped for little or nothing from Johnson•
speech. In his letter to hie son-in-law on January 12, 1666, he agreed
that Johnson had said what he ought as the chief executive and couldn't
have said more. He reiterated his concept of the relationship between
gffibid., pp. 308-309.
Juarez, Arcbivo privado
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the big and the small nations and emphasized the need for Mexico to redouble
her efforts for a single-handed victory and to avoid being tied like a
miserable slave to another iho might try to think, epeai, , -mi work for them.
Nevertheless, despite Johnson's speech the United States evaded the
Mexican issue and took no definite stand with regard to the Monroe Doctrine
per se.23^
Santacilla's notices from the United States received careful analysis
by Juarez. From them he foresaw either the withdrawal of French troops
from Mexican soil or open warfare between France and the United States.
The latter he judged rather unlikely, and the former, while inevitable,
might not happen so soon as some desired. Nevertheless, some event in
1866 would precipitate an open break. Seward's note to the French govern-
ment indicated a battle won, and Napoleon's promise to withdraw was undoubt-
edly valid as specious promises were made only to the weak. 35
Nevertheless, despite the slowly accelerating action by the United
States government on behalf of Mexico, Juarez himself grew more cautious.
In April he advised Romero to go slowly on his loan negotiations with the
American government as Congress perhaps would look askance at any conven-
tion compromising either United States neutrality or the United States
treasury. 3°
In June Juarez noted that the Liberals had gained a moral victory
with the nomination of Lewis D. Campbell as Minister t o Mexico. 2^7
The French left, and Juarez entered Mexico City in 1867. In his
P^Ibid., p. llli. Also Juarez, Epistolario
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proclamation to the people he paid tribute to the American government for
its role during the intervention. He stated thatj
The constant sympathy of the people of the United
States and the moral support given by their government
to the [Mexican]
. • . cause justly deserve the sympathy
and the regard of the people and government of Mexico.**
United States-Mexican relations over the next six years proceeded
relatively smoothly. In a letter to Karl Blind in London, Juarez affirm-
ed his faith in the spread of republican institutions throughout the
hemisphere. In another letter in speaking routinely of a filibustering
expedition, he observed that the American authorities would undoubtedly
take care to strictly observe the neutrality laws to prevent such ex-
peditions as they had over the past few months. In introducing the con-
stitutional reform urging the establishment of a Senate, he cited the
role of the Senate of the United States as a preserver of order. And
finally in 1871 he observed that Mexican relations with the United States
continued harmonious.
°
Despite Juarez's success in setting Mexican-United States relations
on a basis of mutual trust and reciprocity, possibly a certain disillu-
sionment hung over his later comments on the future role of the United
States in the hemisphere. He may have, in a sense and without compro-
mising Mexican sovereignty, offered to the "Colossus of the North" a
chance to be a moral leader in the Western Hemisphere—a role which would
be strongly supported by its neighbor to the south of the Rio Grande.
And the United States, while not exactly refusing the role, had shrugged
3"james Fred Hippy, The United States and Mexico (New lork: Crofts,
1931). p. 279. "
z39juarez, apistolario
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uneasily, almost as if the mantle did not fit or as if it imposed restric-
tive obligations on its new found power, and evaded the issue. The
United States did not want to face the continental question just yet.
And so Juarez, having been rebuffed, withdrew ana grew cautious. He
instructed Romero to go slowly. He analyzed the big nations and found
them wanting. Then he turned inward and withdrew Mexico also in an
attempt to secure the moral authority of the state at home if he could
not do it abroad.
Juarez died almost 100 years ago, but the challenge he flung at the
"Colossus of the North" faces it today, not only in the hemisphere but
all over the world. Do the officials today see the challenge? Did their
predecessors 100 years ago see and recognize it? How did the United States
"see" the Juarez regime? What did they think of it and its leader? These
questions the next chapter will attempt to answer.
CHAPTER V
THE UNITED STATES STUDIES JUAREZ'S MEXICO
United States Public Opinion toward Mexico and the Programs
of Juarez and other Mexican Liberals
from 1857 to 1867
The Rio Grande is not a wide river. At oertain times of the year
and at certain places along its course, it just barely attains creek
status. Nevertheless it can provide a large—at times an almost in-
surmountable—barrier to effective communication between the two coun-
tries because on each bank of that narrow river stands a culture. And
these two cultures differ one from the other in philosophy, in ethics,
in a system of values, and in custom and tradition. Each looks at the
other through the colored glasses given it by its cumulated heritage
and often sees a distorted image.
When "enlightened" American diplomats, statesmen, army officials
newspaper reporters and Just plain citizens gazed across the Rio Grande
at the Republic of Mexico during the period from 1857 to 1867, they
interpreted their neighbors in terms of their own experiences and philo-
sophy. They reacted to the continuing anarchy-fostering intrigues, to the
scant respect for constitutionalism, to the civil war and the subsequent
intervention. The important question however was how? How did they
view the momentous changes brewing within Mexico? Did they realize that
the erection of a new societal base was being attempted? Or did their own
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culture and national interests blind them and prevent a rational look at
the Mexican question within a Mexican context in order to understand the
aims of the Mexicans themselves?
In his 1858 message to Congress President Buchanan hoped for the speedy
extension of the authority of constitutional government in Mexico, the
exhibition of a less hostile spirit in Mexico toward the United States,
and the indemnification of American claims. The following year Buchanan
requested permission to enter Mexico both to settle American claims and to
aid the establishment of the Constitutional government. He cited the supreme
United States interest in tiexican welfare and. its duty to extend a friendly
hand and to aid in the establishment of order in that republic. For, if
the United States did not work to do something about Mexico, it would not
be at all difficult for some other nation tc burden iteelf with the enter-
prise, thus eventually obliging the American government to intervene under
more difficult circumstances in order to protect time-honored policy.
For Buchanan, who saw Mexico diverging from an Anglo-American concept
of order and proper respect for private property, the understanding of
Mexico was hindered by the rose-colored glasses. The support of e Consti-
tutional regime which was trying something different south of the
Rio Grande emerged only secondarily and peripherally from his analysis.
The important things were order and a sovereignty favoring the United
States.
John Forsyth lived in Mexico for two exciting years, from 1856 to
1858. How did he see Mexico and the new revolution? Forsyth had in-
structions to secure from the Mexican government a treaty of cession
21(0,Cue' Canovas, pp. 109, 155-56. Also Hippy, p. 272.
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and bent his talents to that end. In this connection Forsyth noted the
ideas of certain visionary liberals who regarded a treaty with the United
States as helping to contain the forces of the Church and the army that
were hindering progress in Mexico. While these fancies were perhaps the
creation of a dream and a visionary speculation, they were dreams, never-
theless, that were living in the minde of a great many of the Mexican
people. Forsyth, however, did not really understand the dream. He saw
in it only admirable possibilities for the future imposition of an
American protectorate, which would remove any potential European danger
and protect the Mexicans themselves from the Aztec incompetence:
What Mexico wants is a firm and good master to hold
her destinies in his hands and save her from her worst
enemy-herself . . . . 'Mexican institutions are crumbling
to pieoes and interposition, to gather up the wreck, from
some quarter, is as certain as it is indispensable . ' BUT
'regeneration must come from abroad in the shape of new
ideas and a new blood . ' 2"2
Forsyth adequately recognized the demise of the old Mexican institu-
tions. But he underestimated the ability of the people themselves to build
from the wreck a new vessel, in his typically American view, the sustain-
ing of Mexico, ae represented by the Liberal Party, to keep her in one
piece and out of the Hands of foreign powers signified a stopgap measure
until the United States with its naturally superior culture was ready
to "Americanize ;! her.
After Forsyth's retirement special agent ftiliiain M. Churchwell
received the next opportunity to present his estimate of the Mexican tangle
to the Department of State. Churchwell exhibited a potentially greater
i;';:Cue" Canovaa, p. US.
S|»ippy, P. 205.
Wagner, p. 31k.
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understanding of the 'Jexican ideal than either his predecessor or his
superior, although he too bound it to a considerable extent to the
territorial question. Churchwell considered the supnort of the Liberals
an object worthy of the "ardent moral cooperation" of the United States
government. If, he declared, the Americans would evidence a iiruch needed
interest in Mexican welfare as opposed to llMllllii territory, then the
Mexicans "... would adopt us as their virtual Protector and, profit-
ing by our advice leave no effort untried to emulate th; t of our example
which is good
. . .
.»"» m his opinion a new phase of the Mexican
nationality was a positive necessity and the dictates of common sense
directed that it be of American creation.
Churchwell, however, set in his statement a very definite limit on
United States influence. The Mexicans by implication, although they would
undoubtedly emulate their neighbor to the north as far as the choice of
some custoos and institutions were concerned, retained a freedom of accept-
ance or rejection. And while Churchwell realised the necessity for a more
disinterested policy and a higher moral leadership on the part of the
United States, he nevertheless regarded the creation of the new Mexican
nationality as an American rather than a Mexican responsibility.
R.B.C. Twyman, the American consul at Vera Cruz, also failed to recognize
the Mexican responsibility for the creation of their own now nationality.
On September 30, 1859, he wrote that the peace so necessary for the
regeneration of Kexico could be restored only through foreign intervention
and that all honest hearts "... turned to the United States of America
^Callahan, o. 260.
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for that Intervention—the only salvation for Mexico."
McLane ' s reputation as a champion of Kexican rights preceded his
arrival as foreign minister in the spring of 1059. His acts in Mexico
and his understanding of that country, however, failed to live up to his
advance notices. Vihile he noted that few Americans desired to undertake a
war of conquest in that republic ho still pushed for the cession of terri-
tory. He did not appreciate the offer of moral leadership implicit in
Ocampo's offer of a general and defensive alliance for the support of re-
publican institutions in America, but interpreted the total Mexican-American
relationship in terms of power politics. Kcl.ane observed that the offer of
Mexican support "... evinced so little appreciation of the relative
condition and power of liexico and the Tnited States that I have not felt
myself encourag«d to expect any practical result therefrom."^' As for the
treaty itself, "cLane indicated that its ratification would enable the
American government to dictate terms to Kexlco.
Not all the American officials in Mexico, however, saw the treaty in
terms of territory. John Black, the American oonsul in Mexico City wrote
that the United States had "... a scleral duty to perform to ITi'iaF, to the
WCRLD, to the cause of JUSTICE and HUMANITY, and to that of FREEDOM and
HUMAN RIGHTS—frora which it will never shrink."2^9 Black thus at least
recognized a certain moral responsibility for the United States in its
position as the foremost advocate of republican institutions in the hemi-
sphere, although it was doubtful perhaps whether he regarded this duty as
^ippy, P. 189.
f^Roeder, I, 213.
;?°Magner, p. 378.
•^Rippy, p. 225.
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performable outside of direct intervention by the United States.
As the end of 1861 approached, the clouds of intervention hovering
at the edge of the Mexican horizon grew more dense and dangerous. They
broke in January, 1862, with the arrival of the Allied fleets. And the
United States, although busily embroiled with its own Civil War, still
looked southward and protested this deliberate invasion of Mexican
sovereignty. But were they worried only of this threat to Mexican integ-
rity? Or did they perhaps, as has been contended, become indignant at
the presence of Maximilian and the French solely because they feared a
French invasion of United States territory? Such an army of French
troops placed on the side of the South and supported with the might of
the Second Empire could incline the balance of power in favor of the
Confederacy and forever break the American Union. 2' Did the Lincoln
administration and more especially Secretary of State Seward have any
sympathy for Mexico per se above and beyond their struggle to advance the
selfish interests of United States foreign policy?
American foreign policy over the years from 1861 to 1867 was primar-
ily shaped by one man and one man only, Lincoln's Secretary of State
William Seward. In early 1862 Seward glanced south of the border and took
one long hard look at the Mexican situation. On the basis of that look
he formulated his policy and stuck to it throughout the French interven-
tion, even though he was heavily criticized for a too moderate stand.
Seward's formulated policy predicated itself on the evacuation of
French troops. He realized, however, that the power position of the
United States government in 1862 rendered the possibilities of equal
250
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bargaining with the French difficult to say the least. So he contented
himself for the time being with protesting. Then he sat back to wait.
In April, 1861, Seward wrote to Minister to Mexico Thomas Corwin of
the critical need in the United States for a true understanding of events
in Mexico. For Mexican attitudes, both governmental and popular, could
exert at least a partial influence on victory or defeat for the North.
The Mexican President too could not fall to understand that the destruc-
tion of the Union would operate to the ultimate disadvantage of Mexico
as well as of the United States. Concurrently the continuation of
anarchy south of the Rio Grande would encourage oonspiratory powers in
their designs against the Union via the path of Mexican conquest. Despite
the strong United States interest in Mexican support for the Washington
government however, Seward enjoined Corwin to undertake his commission
In a spirit of disinterest, without vaulting ambition, and with an atti-
tude favorable to the interests of the whole continent. 2^1 Corwin 's
mission was to implement a new policy favorable to the development of
hemispheric rather than closed United States interests. This dream of
Seward's denied the control of Mexican territory:
This government believes that foreign resistance or
attempts to control American civilisation must and will
fail before the ceaseless and ever increasing activity of
the material, moral, and political forces which peculiarly
belong to the American continent. Nor do the United States
deny that
. . . their own safety and the cheerful destiny
to which they aspire are intimately dependent on the con-
tinuance of free republican institutions throughout
America. 'c
He hoped that Mexican sovereignty and independence would be honored by
25lprida Santacilia, Slguiendo la vida de Juarez, pp. 2B 3-£l».
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all the nations of the world since all nations were deeply interested in
the development of Mexican agricultural, commercial and mineral resources
and respected her love of civil liberty.
"
Nevertheless, while Seward indicated the peculiar vitality of the
republic as institution, he pointed out that the outcome of the American
Civil War would affect all the hemispheric nations since all were experi-
menting with republican institutions. "*"• He remarked that the American
states!
In some respects hold a common attitude and relation
toward all other nations ... It is the interest of them
all to be friends as they are neighbors, and to mutually
maintain and support each other so far as may be consistent
with the individual sovereignty which each of them rightly
enjoys, equally against all disintegrating agencies within
and foreign influences or power without their borders. ^55
This position of Seward's presented an interesting corollary. Non-interven-
tion by other countries in the affairs of Latin America also included
non-intervention by the United States. Seward accepted this fact. From
no* on the United States had neither the right nor the disposition to
interfere in Mexican internal affairs by force either to establish a
republican government or to overthrow a monarchy if the Mexicans chose to
256
accept the latter. ' Seward went even farther than a general statement
of the desirability of friendship. To insure the independence and inte-
grity of the Mexican republic he would, as far as his power permitted,
2
'3u.s. Congress, Senate, Annual Message of the President; Papers
relating to Foreign Affairs: f.'exico
.
37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1661,
Exec. Doc. 1, pp. 65, 67.
25«Seward here however moved beyond just a selfish concern for the
United States alone and hinted at a relationship not fully realized
until the inauguration of the Alliance for Progress almost 100 years
late:
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"... prevent incursions and every other form of aggression by
citizens of the United States against Mexico.
"
257 Thus in 186S Seward
vigorously opposed the army's proposal to advance into Mexico.
To the TJnited States minister in Paris Seward suggested an offer to
the French government of United States good offices in order to forestall
intervention. For while the country's resources attracted foreign
immigration and capital from all countries any "... attempts to acquire
them by force must meet with the most annoying and injurious hindrance and
resistance 1.' 5 This policy affected not only Mexico, but all sections of
the continent. And while all the Latin American states did not yet possess
full democracy, nevertheless, they were advancing toward permanent insti-
tutions of self-government through social ohange. The United States
favored such a development since it believed that such progress provided
the speediest and surest way to the fruitful development of the material
resources of the Americas.*&
If Seward preferred a policy of non-intervention and progress through
social change in the Americas, why did he not act sooner to implement
his position? The primary reason perhaps was the fortunes of the North
during the first two years of the American Civil War. Previously,
Seward wrote Thomas Dayton, American minister to Paris, that the strength
of the 'Jnited States had been enough to preserve the integrity of the
continent. Now although he was
2
->7u.3. Congress, Senate, Foreign Affairs Papersi ?Jexleo , 1861,
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. . .
very sure that this Government cherishes the
actual Independence of Mexico as a cardinal object to the
exclusion of all foreign political intervention, . . . yet
the present moment does not seem to me an opportune one
for formal reassurance of the policy of the Government to
foreign nations. 260
And not only was Seward sure of his policy. The American people, he wrote,
were equally convinced of the desirability of tne restoration of peace,
unity and order in the Mexican republic.
Opposition groups both inside and outside the United states heavily
criticized Seward for his acceptance of French assurances in 1861 and 1862
that they had no plans to establish a monarchical government in Mexico.
And perhaps Seward did accept thorn to forestall possible French interfer-
ence in the American Civil War. But he had a motive beyond this—one that
did not then and does not now often intrude itself into international
politics. A3 Seward notedt
We do not feel at liberty to reject the explanations
or to anticipate a violation of the assurances they
convey. 'He shall in the end be the stronger for having acted
directly, frankly, in good faith, and with reliance upon the
good faith of others. Under these circumstances at present
we decline debate with foreign powers on Mexican affairs. 2
With the end of the Civil War Seward reiterated tc Napoleon the
American inclination to see true self-determination in Mexico a bit more
bluntly. And in so doing he apprised the French Emperor of an interest-
ing bit of 'Tnited States continental perspectives. Even on the outside
possibility of Maximilian's acceptance by the Mexican people and thus
consequently
Staffi p- 255.
""U.S. Congress, Senate, Answer to Hesolut.ion of May 25, 1665: Mexican
Affairs , 1865, p. U65.
2S2U.S. Congress, House, Foreign Affairs Papers i Mexico
, 1865, Part I,
p. 71*9.
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. . .
even if it were necessary on our part to labor
for its [i.e. the Juarez government's] removal, the tradi-
tions and sympathies of a whole continent could not be
uprooted by the exercise of any national authority and
especially could it not be done by a government that is
purely democratic like ours. 2°3
And as a further comment and amplification Seward added that!
The Emperor's persistence implies that ne yet believes
to be certain what we have constantly told him that the
people of the United States, reasoning upon preconceived
sentiment and national principles, can not even apprehend to
be possible, namely: that a new European monarchical
system can and ought to be permanently established on the
American continent and in territory bordering on this Republic. 2°**
The United States regarded the action of the Mexican Conservatives as
subversive and undertaken without either authority or the backing of the
liexican people. 2^
In attempting to preserve the independence of Mexico however, Seward
not only pressed for French withdrawal and successfully counterbalanced
potential army forays into niexican territory, but he also warned Mexican
Minister Romero of the dangers of economic penetration posed by Anglo-
American speculators. °
Seward visited Juarez in Mexico a few years after the French retreat
from the country. And at that time he commented that he thought Juares the
greatest man he had ever known. 2j ' Challenged on his opinion by United
States Minister Thomas kelson, he replied that his estimate of Juarez was
the result of mature examination, and he signified his desire to sustain his
remarks.
^Uppy, p. 270.
"""ibid.
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In his foreign policy during the Mexican intervention, Seward
evidenced a basic sympathy with Juares's fight to preserve republicanism
and all that it symbolized on Mexican soil. And although not relating it
specifically to the Mexican experience, he nevertheless recognised the
need for social change in order to bring about true republicanism in the
countries south of the border. On the continental question, however,
Seward did little. While intellectually he considered the concept of an
Integrated cooperating, unified hemisphere, practically he did absolutely
nothing about the concent of a general alliance or some other type of
cooperative venture. He based his nolicy toward France and Mexico on good
faith, but did not accept the moral leadership offered by Juarez.
Seward did not act alone in the formulation of his Mexican position.
The Lincoln administration had no sympathy with the idea of a protecto-
rate:
'The President, 1 said Seward, ... is fully satisfied
that the safety, welfare, and happiness of Mexico would be
more effectually promoted by its complete integrity and inde-
pendence than by dismemberment with transfer or diminution of
its sovereignty, even though a portion or the whole of the
country or its sovereignty should be transferred to the
United States. 1 z68
In a later message the Resident expressed his admiration for the virtue,
heroism, and inextinguishable love of liberty exhibited by the Mexican
people. 9
Lincoln also concerned himself with the plight of the peons in Mexico.
In reporting an interview with the railsplitter from Illinois, Romero noted
Lincoln's gratification at being informed that Juarez intended to correct
^Callahan, p. 280.
269Foix, p. 271.
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the unjust lot of the peons as soon as Deace was restored to the country.^O
This then at the very least would indicate an interested sympathy on
Lincoln's part toward Juarez's ambitions for social change in Mexico, al-
though once again specifics would be doubtful as Romerc also noted in passing
on that lb61 conversation that Lincoln was not well informed on iiexican
affairs.
In general Thomas Corwin, the United States minister to Mexico, exhibit-
ed a considerable sympathy for the Juarista cause and urged the use of all
possible peaceful means to demonstrate United States friendship for
271
Mexico. He also extended this concept of support for Mexico into a
policy of support for hemispheric independence.
Shile Corwin was pushing Mexican support, his colleagues across the
Atlantic were stubbornly pursuing an entirely different tack. Thomas
Dayton and John I igelow, the intervention ministers to France, as practi-
cal men of affairs, steadily opposed any policies designed to defeat the
French experiment. In 186U Dayton opined that the United States could
not "... under existing circumstances, afford a war with France for
the Quixotic purpose of helping Mexico." ' Rlgelow considered that
emigration would ultimately render the American absorption of Mexico
inevitable. Keanwhile he proposed giving all possible assurances of
friendship to the French government. The Lincoln administration and the
American people should oppose only a government "... founded for the
avowed purpose of limiting the diffusion of the Anglo-Saxon race on the
American continent
. .
."
" and not the Mexican monarchy per se. In
^°Roeder, I, 365.
I '^Callahan, p. 288.
f^'Jartin, p. U32.
*' JCallahan, pp. 310, 316.
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addition the flagrant waving of the Monroe Doctrine would only serve to
perpetuate an absurdity. Meanwhile he too argued for restraint:
I think you will find, when the question is raised
in a practical shape with all its attendant responsi-
bilities before our people, that the opposition to the
extension of European influence in the Western Hemi-
sphere is a sentiment which they cherish, but not a policy
of making ourselves the armed champion of all or of any of
the Spanish American states, whose people belong to a
different race from ours, who speak a different language,
who possess a different religion, and nho have been trained
under social and political institutions having very little
in common with those of the United States. ... In a war
to redress the wrongs of Mexico or to propagate republican-
ism by the sword, we should, in my opinion, be likely to
fail.271*
Bigelow found considerable support for his point of view even within
the Lincoln cabinet. Secretary of the Treasury Hugh McCullough and
Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles expressed concurrence
—
privately. On
the other side the President, William Dennison, and Secretary of the Inter-
275
lor James Harlan pressed for vigorous measures.
Dayton and Bigelow completely rejected any type of leadership for the
United States in the Western Hemisphere. They possessed no concept of the
moral leadership based on hemispheric cooperation offered by Juare* and
at least partially and temporarily espoused by Seward. Republicanism did
not necessarily have to be spread by the sword, nor did the question of
expediency have to serve as the overriding factor in the conduct of
foreign affairs. Properly interpreted the Monroe Doctrine offered
potential. But it offered it only for men of vision and not for practical
men of affairs.
Andrew Johnson's ascension to the presidency injected a more militant
2%>erkins, p. 130.
275Ibid., pp. 129-30.
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note into the French-Mexican-American triangle, but not necessarily a
more profound understanding of the Mexican ideals. For while Johnson pre-
ferred to have the French withdraw peaceably, nevertheless, he did not
rule out the possibility of the use of force. In a ringing speech he
declared that after the successful conclusion of the "Rebellion," the
United states would attend to this Mexican affair and say to Louis Napoleon,
"Tou cannot found a monarchy on this Continent." He regarded an American
expedition to Mexico as a recreation for the Union soldiers. Then when the
army "revolted" in 1865, Johnson supported their efforts even though
Seward continued strong enough to pursue his policy.
Among the army officers, and especially among the higher ranks,
considerable agitation advocated the immediate removal of the French from
Mexico. But this growing discontent with the French presence did not
necessarily mean an understanding or even a sympathy with the cause of
Juarez. Rather, the army chiefs, in general, regarded the French inter-
vention as an integral part of the American Civil War because of Napoleon's
Southern sympathies. The forcible ejection of the French in their view
would cap the rout of the Confederacy.
In order to facilitate French withdrawal the generals undertook two
separate actions. The first consisted in the concentration of troops on
the Rio Grande. On May 17, 1865, General U.S. Grant ordered General
P.H. Sheridan to the Mexican border with 50,000 troops so that if war
came the troops would be in the right places. And Sheridan on his own
initiative also visited Brownsville "to impress the Imperialists, as much
as possible, with the idea that we meant hostilities."276 He also care-
276Callcott, p. 71.
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fully publicised his dispatch of agents into North Mexico to open contact
with Juarez.
While Sheridan gesticulated in West Texas, Grant commanded General
Frederick Steele to stage demonstrations all along tho lower Rio Grande. In
addition arms and ammunition were to be left at strategic spots along the
border for the convenience of the Liberal Kovermaent in Mexico. Meanwhile
General W.T. Sherman was cruising up and down the Mexican coast attempting
to effect contact with Juarez.'
The second separate action taken independently by the army culminated
in the abortive Romero-Schofield convention. This document formalized the
proposal of certain army officers, notably Grant and Sheridan, to raise
troops independently in the United States and send them to Mexico under the
command of American General J.M. Schofield. Thwarted by opposition from
both the Mexican and American governments, this scheme ultimately failed.
Neither Grant nor Sheridan evidenced any appreciation of Juarez's
ideals for the Mexican republic. They were interested in ejecting the
French as fast as possible, and that was all, for the confused situation in
Mexico disturbed their military sense of authority and order.
Grant looked on the Maximilian invasion as a part of the Civil War
because of the support it received from the Confederates. Thus success in
quelling the Confederacy would be incomplete until the French and Austrian
invaders evacuated "our sister republic." The achievement of this goal,
however, required circumspect action because of Seward's opposition.
Grant credited the American demonstrations along the Rio Grande with
effecting the French evacuation from North Mexico and the salvation of
277Ibid., pp. 71-72.
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Juarez. This in his opinion placed North Mexican affairs on a substantial
basis. The chief obstacle to speedy victory, however, was the person of
William Seward. After Seward's dog-in-the-nanger enforcement of strict
neutrality, thought Grant, it required the patience of Job to stand the slow
and pokey methods of the Department of State. '
Sheridan was even more belligerent on the Mexican question than Grant,
but he too had little reali»ation of what Juarez was trying to do in
Mexico even as far as the establishment of republicanism was concerned.
And although sympathetic toward the liberals, probably this favoritism
represented just the other side of an implacable hatred for Maximilian and
the French in Mexico. Sheridan even appeared to regard the Juarez govern-
ment as possessing no more permanent status than that of its opposition.
Sheridan aired hi3 opinions on the Mexican question in a public letter,
which stated that it was
. . . useless to walk with subterfuge (or detours) in
Mexican matters. We ought to give that republic a perma-
nent government. Our work of suffocating the rebellion
can't be considered concluded while this hasn't taken place.
Maximilian's coming was part of the rebellion and his fall
will pertain to its history. The greater part of French
soldiers will lay dovn their arms as soon as we cross the
Rio Grande. 2 •»
He erroneously believed that before the ap earance of the American troops
on the frontier the Liberals had no hope of winning. And in Sheridan's
opinion the American presence surged like electricity through Mexican
hearts and recharged their vitality. Nevertheless, Sheridan was
Philip Henry Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of TV'. Sheridan. General
United States Army (2 vols.} New York« C.L. Webster h Co., lHBO), I, 210,
21U, 216-17.
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°U.S. Department of trie Army—Department of the Gulf, Report of the
Operations of the j.S. Forces and General Information of the Condition of
Affairs In the Southwest and Gulf and the Department of the Gulf , Major
General ?.H. Sheridan, U.S.A. Commanding Hay 29, 1865, to November h, 1866
(New Orleans, 1866), p. 5.
careful to state that the .American troop3 were dispatched net because cf
any republican sympathies nor even because of any devotion to the Monroe
Doctrine, but beoause the French invasion was so related to tae rebellion
as to be essentially a part of it.
The administration and the army both reacted in differing ways to the
situation in Mexico. But in both instances the line of sympathy was
rather clearly drawn and the opinion nearly unanimous. The legislative
branch of the government, however, acting in accord with custom, split
rather sharply down the .ciddle—a split primarily visible before the out-
break of the Civil War and resulting from potential Southern advantage
in any conquest or annexation of Mexico. Later as the Civil War began and
spread, a continued process toward unanimity of opinion on the Mexican
question began to make itself felt. Viewed in the broader context of a
political spectrum, this unanimity fell somewhere to the right of the
administration analysis of the ideals and aims of Mexican society and
somewhat to the left of the position for the restoral of order by force
taken by the military and more especially by the army. In general Congress,
while condemning the violation of the Monroe Doctrine, also expressed
sympathy with the Mexican struggle for self-determination and republi-
can type independence.
During the Buchanan administration proposals to intervene in and/or
annex Kexlcan territory 3warmed through the Congressional air like locusts.
In February, 1858, Sam Houston, Texas freedoc, fighter turned United States
senator, Introduced a resolution calling for the establishment of a pro-
tectorate over Mexico and Central America. But even within the context
of "Manifest Destiny" and probable Southern support the project failed.
The Senate decisively defeated the measure in June.
llil
Buchanan's plea for troops in his state of the union message in
December, 1856, was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The Committee introduced a bill in January authorising the use of American
troops in Mexico only to protect American citizens. The Senate however did
not regard the measure as one of top priority and only considered it in
February in response to a special appeal from the White House. On a thirty-
one to twenty-five vote shortly thereafter, the measure failed of passage
with the vote falling rather concentratedly along sectional lines.
Buchanan's second plea for troops in December, 1859, fell on deaf ears.
Obviously, and perhaps strangely, the Senate felt no inclination to bar-
gain away Mexican independence. Nevertheless, there were some in Congress
who supported the President's position and argued for radical measures.
Theodore Sedgwick, the District Attorney from the Southern New York district,
condemned unequivocally the principle behind the Guadalupe-Hidalgo Treaty.
Now it was Buchanan's responsibility to rectify Polk's error and send
American soldiers to maintain order until Anglo-Saxon immigration could
gain the ascendancy and dominate the country. And in 1860 Senator Sam
Houston was still urging his proposal for a Mexican protectorate, based, ha
declared, on public opinion in all parts of the United States. ^
The McLane-Ocampo Treaty came up for ratification in 1859. Published
Senatorial reaction was mixed, but in general evidenced little under-
standing of Juarea's problems in waging civil war in .Mexico. The general
comments reflected the isolated parochial tendencies present on the
?niBippy, PP. 218-19.
,°flbid., p. 196.
283ibid., p. 195.
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American scene. Senator Simmons at first opposed the convention because
its acceptance would produce a radical change in the federal income system
of the United States by converting it from a protectionist to a free trad-
ing nation. He later, however, came around to an approval of both this
concept and the Treaty. Senator Pugh argued for a treaty reform produc-
tive of more benefits to the United States, i*ile Houston's opposite
number from Texas hardly considered the matter worth discussing. In his
opinion no government existed in Mexico strong enough and respectable
enough to make the Treaty stick and insure its ratification. " Tne
Senate rejected the Treaty in May.
Congressional apprehension over the French interv ntion divided it3elf
into concern for the violation of the Uonroe Doctrine and concern for the
subversion of Mexican independence and republican institutions with somewhat
more attention being given to the former. Nevertheless, a certain sympathy
for Juarez was not lacking.
As early as 1860, Ohio Representative Samuel S. Cox was expounding on
the dangers of French intervention in Mexico! "We ought to be prepared
not only to say, but to make it effectual, that no crown shall be esta-
blished on this continent." Four years later he was still pressing the
same point, declaring that "... the people of this country would back up
an administration that would give a proper defiance to this French inter-
9ftA
meddling." He made no mention however of the necessity of preserving
Mexican independence and integrity.
Around 1862 Charles Sumner proposed American mediation in the Franco-
281.
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Mexican dispute and contended later that the wasteland securities mentioned
in the Corwin Treaty were far different than selling whole states. One
Mexican author asserted that Sumner workei persevering!/ for all that would
redound to the benefit of Mexico. Sumner, he said, enthusiastically con-
demned the policies of Napoleon III and staunchly defended the Mexican
people in the Senate, if not with success than at least with grand con-
viction. 287
In January, 1863, Senator James Alexander ilcDougall of California intro-
duced a resolution into the United States Senate condemning French interven-
tion as an act hostile to the United States. The measure went down to an
ignominious defeat presumably engineered by Secretary Seward with the help
of Senator Sumner. 288
Seward could perhaps pressure the Senate, but he could not control the
House. On April 6, 106U, the restive representatives unanimously approved
a resolution excoriating the deplorable state of affairs in Mexico and
declaring that it was not in accord with the policy of the United States
to acknowledge any monarchical regime erected on the ruin;; of any republi-
can government in the Americas or erected under the auspices of any
v 289 .European power. Congress was beginning to realise that the success of
Maximilian's monarchy not only jeopardized the iionroe Doctrine but also
vitiated Juarez's attempt to found viable republican institutions south of
the Rio Grande.
In December, 1865, Congress requested information on yaximilian's
black decree—"a barbarous decree of the so-called Emperor of Mexico ordering
^Castillo, p. 2U6.
<°?MacCorkle, pp. 60-61.
"'Perkins, p. 107.
all Mexicans who bravely defend the sacred cause of their independence to be
shot without form or trial." " And Missouri's Senator Robert Thompson
Van Horn asked for an inquiry into the possible U3e of the resources of the
United States
... to restore to the Mexican people the free and
unrestricted right to choose their own form of government,
and of giving effect to the unanimous voice of the people
of this nation that no foreign power shall imposo despotic
government upon any state or people of this continent.^!
In 1866 Representative Thaddeus Stevens offered a proposal to lend the
Mexicans 20,000,000 pesos to prevent the overthrow of their government.
Thus although Congress pressed for the French withdrawal from Mexico,
it evidenced little sympathy with the aims and ideals of Juarez. Individ-
ual Congressmen did express concern over the demise of republican insti-
tutions south of the border or espouse the Juarista principle of self-
determination. They probably, however, possessed no knowledge of hi»
ideals for social reform or his conception of the differing role of
republicanism within the framework of the moral authority of the state.
Throughout its history the American press has played a significant
role in the formation of public opinion. How did it comment on or,
possibly, ignore the Mexican question in the years from 1857 to 1867?
Did it show any understanding of the conflicting principles that threaten-
ed to tear Mexico apart? Or did it confine itself strictly to polemics
against Napoleon's violation of the Monroe Doctrine?
On July 6, 1856, the New Orleans Daily Picayune noted that Governor
^°Callahan, o. 318.
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NOTEs This was not quite so idealistic as it looked, however, as Stevens
proposed Baja California, Sonora, snd Sinaloa or Chihuahua as security.
11*5
Juarez of Oaxaoa had published a protest against the provisional organic
statute on the grounds that it did not accord with the principles of the
late revolution. Somewhat later the same correspondent opined that while
the structure of the intended organic law made it quite evident that the
American Constitution had been copied throughout, still there were some
puzzling provisions not found in the United States document. ' J
The Daily Picayune correspondent in subsequent dispatches editorialized
his staunch support of the Liberal element. In August he opined that the
country proceeded as tranquilly as possible considering the clerical-military
alliance to forment despotism. If the clergy continued their machinations,
the Comonfort government would be forced to confiscate their property—
a
29 ii
measure he approved.
While The Daily Picayune reporter was imposing his prejudices on New
Orleanian society, his countermart on the Hew York Times was also molding
public opinion in favor of the Liberals. In August the New York Times
mentioned the exciting religious toleration debate in the constituent
assembly and later approved the reorganization of the National Guard as
evidence of a "right spirit" and conclusive proof that the Mexican people
supported the Liberal government. In February the Times found it necessary
to deny the wild rumors flying around concerning the Forsyth treaties.
Nothing existed in t he treaties, it declared, that was not mutually advan-
tageous to both sides. All the United States wished was to strengthen
friendly and neighborly ties, promote conmaroe, and perform the good will
offices resulting from its geographical position and the community of
political institutions. Six months later the Times noted, without comment,
gjjtbg Oaily Picayune (.Mew Orleans), July 6, 1856.
"uIbid., August 2BT"1856.
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the election of Benito Juarez, a ?rogresl3to , to the Presidency of the
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Supreme Court.
The fall of the Liberal government in early 1858 and the subsequent
triumph of the Conservative faction in the capital stirred the Times to a
rather crass Judgment of the usability of the Conservative and Liberal
Parties in Mexico! "The United States may expect nothing in the way of
treaties from the Church Party, and Hr. Buchanan cannot fail to see that
it is good policy to support the Liberal party in Mexico.
"
2? On the face
of the statement there would appear to be little sympathy for even the
Liberals in general on the part of the Times correspondent in Mexico. If
cast against the background of his earlier statement in favor of the
Liberals however, it could perhaps represent an attempt to elicit aid for
Juarez on the basis of an appeal to expediency.
At about the same time The Dally Picgyune was despairing of the future
of both Mexican politics and the Mexican people. While it noted that Juarez
was standing firm and the admirable confusion in the capital no doubt gave
him some encouragement, it nevertheless considered it an immediate duty of
the United States to rescue the citizens of Hexico from absolute barbarism.
Under such circumstances no Mexican nationality or material on which to
base a stable foundation of civilized government existed. Sel "-protection
required the United States to shape a policy looking toward at least some
absorption, although there was no perceived disposition for a policy of
.
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conquest.
The Picayune opined in January, however, that United States recogni-
^
.i«.w .fork "i.ji,-3
.
August 21, 1856, November 18, 1856, February 26, 1857,
and August 3, 1857-
t!;Wwr, p. 375.
^'
"he Daily Picayune (New Orleans), January 13, 185? and January 15, 1859.
11*7
tion for t he Liberals would provide them with increased moral influence and
develop the basi3 for the success of future negotiations between the two
countries. On the thirtieth it offered some interesting consents on the
social state in Mexico. In Mexico the primary difficulty was people. The
demoralized masses had no concept of nationality, and the Indians were
adverse to labor, claimed the writer. The civil war currently raging was
298fundanently a racial conflict.
In February things looked black for the Liberal cause and the United
States also, but the MWI in New Orleans reflected no sympathy for Juarez
himself apart from his identification with the interests of the United
States. 299
Press reaction to the McLane-Ocampo Treaty was nothing if not loud.
The American newspapers debated the issue at the top of their lungs, not
necessarily on its merits but in view of its effect on slavery and the
division in the United States. And despite many other differences, the
papers generally agreed that the compact involved an option on .'lexicon
territory.
The opposition voiced its opinions noisily. The staid New Tork Times
allowed that the Mexican Liberal Party had made shameful concessions to the
Southern slave interests and hinted that they had either been intimidated
or bought by the slavers. The Boston Courier and the National Intelligencer
pronounced against the Treaty, 300 and La Propagateur Catholigue, the
diocesan organ of the Roman Catholic Church in New Orleans, commented!
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Mexico may be destined to lose its nationality, but we
would have wished that it might at least lose it nobly. It
remained for Juarez to degrade the nation the more easily to
destroy it and to drown the spirit of independence in the
foulest of slime. 301
It was the New York Tribune however that really tore into the attack with a
fire-eating vengeance:
The whole country should understand the question in all
its bearings before the government commits itself to the
proposed radical change in relations with that huge, rotten
mass of slunk civilization. Whether the consequences in
store for us under the proposed new adjustment of our inter-
national relations with that country shall be the annexation
of its comparatively unpeopled provinces falling to us in
undisintegrated masses, as fast as we nay be able to spread
slavery over them, or whether they shall come in the shape of
a ready absorption of its area that is already covered by a
priest-ridden, mongrel, dwarfed, and semi-savage population
is alike unimportant to us in a national point of view.
Either arrangement would be alike mischievous and pregnant in
evil consequences ... We do not want to get into any
Mexican quagmires of Dismal Swamps. If we are after Sonora,
let us say Sonora. If it be other provinces let us name them.
If it be all Mexico, let us say so. Let the people understand
exactly what the government aims at. We protest against doing
things by stealth and under false pretenses. As things now
stand, the Free States must fight for their new share of new
territorial acquisitions. We demand that they shall know when
anything of this sort is going on in order that they may, as
Sir. Calhoun used to claim for slavery in California, 'have a
chance to get in.' If we are going to take Mexico or any part
of it, the people of the North want a chance to get in. J0k!
Concurrent with this barrage, Buchanan sent the Treaty to the Senate for
ratification, where the Tribune complacently observed that it appeared for
the time being at least to be "as dead as Julius Caesar. "303
But even this rather crude manifestation of expansionist philosophy
did not effectively measure the extent of the "understanding sympathy"
Juarez then enjoyed in the United States. When, some months later, Juares
^Boeder, I, 216.
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failed to extend the Treaty ratification period, the Philadelphia
Independent buried both the Treaty and its beneficiaries with a vitriolic
sneer:
When it was thought that a political object could be
promoted by extending aid and comfort to the mongrels and
mixed breeds of Mexico, who, under the name of Liberals,
were seeking possession of power but unwilling to fight for
it as brave men should do, the President was prompt enough
to recognize the Indian Juarez, who knows as much about
liberty in its high sense as he does about the Koran. It
turned out like most of his experiments, and the 'Constitu-
tional President of Mexico' has not been able to survive the
partiality of his friend in the White House. 30U
Strangely enough, however, some of the rare moderate opinions on the
Treaty came from the deep South. In New Orleans, The Daily Picayune re-
marked that $U, 000,000 certainly appeared like a small sum to pay for such
extensive and valuable transit concessions. Only fifteen years earlier,
for example, President James K. Polk had authorized .'$15,000,000 for transit
across Tehuantepec alone. Another interesting sidelight Involved the
Picayune ' s effort to establish some sort of a mutual trust for relations
between the two countries. It appealed to Mexico to "trust the loyalty and
good faith of the United States with respect to the use which they will
make of the powers granted
. .
.»3°5 and to the United States to
. . . abstain from abusing such concessions, avoid all
cause of friction, and reward the liberality of the Progressives
in Mexioo by aiding them actively and effectively in their under-
taking. JOo
The other expression of more moderate opposition, although it was
related also to the slavery question, came from the opposite corner of the
nation. Boston's Atlantic Monthly argued for holding back, noting that
*%bid., pp. 237-38.
306Ioid.
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the United States now had to choose between intervention and non-interven-
tion. The arguments proposed for ratification of the Treaty exhibited a
striking similarity to those justifying the partition of Poland, while a
conraon denominator for objections to the Treaty came from an American
aversion to the Mexican people. The author then examined the contaminat-
ing consequences of intervention as signified in his mind by the ratifica-
tion of the McLane-Ocampo Treaty. The American advance resulted from the
slavers' desire for more states. But in dark-skinned Mexico the rigid
Southern color codes would no longer be applicable. The argument maintain-
ed that, since the Mexicans had even less enlightened minds than the
Negroes who would be imported, the Ne-yoes would be restive at seeing their
inferiors in freedom. Just and humane legislation could never result. The
Mexican white race would help suppress the mixed and Indian populations.
In addition, the migrating Americans would hate these indigenous groups,
both as Indians and as low wage laborers. The author agreed with the
Southern Democrats who regarded territorial acquisition as unprofitable
because of the risk of introducing slavery and adding to the growing race
problem of the South. He opined that race prejudice represented the badge
of Imperialism. 307
Nevertheless, another eminent democrat, President Buchanan, seemed
to feel a bit differently about the problem and, as a decided advocate of
Juarez, had proposed to help him with all the power of the United States.
Thus with the aid of the American army, the 7-apotec Indian could speedily
succeed in placing his government in the palaces of Monteauma. This in
turn would make Juares likely to serve or to play a role uncommon in his
3°7rbld., pp. 229-31.
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country—to destroy its independence with the hope of assuring for himself
308
a more firm, and enduring government.
The American press understood the issues involved in the ratification
of the Treaty—the proposed assumption by the United States on ratification
of a policy of non-intervention with respect for the integrity of Mexico
as a corollary, the grave social problems implicit in annexation, and the
need for the establishment of a new policy of mutual trust and respect in
Mexican-American relations. But they failed to see the influence of Juarez
in the shaping of this policy and in general reacted against this hindrance
to an unrestrained freedom of action. And by milting it up with the slavery
question within the United States itself, they effectively precluded many
potentially rational discussions on the issue.
That was in 1859 . One year later the New York Times ran a front page
story deploring the "voracious demands" placed on the Juarez government as
a result of its capture of a Spanish filibustering expedition. The Times
correspondent woefully predicted immediate Spanish intervention in Mexico
and prophesied that without prompt United States interference the Juarez
government would fail and an ascendancy of Spanish influence in Mexico
would follow. He said that the country needed an honest military ohieftain
309
and asked if something could be done to rescue that unhappy nation?
About a year after the Times expressed its concern over the future of
Mexico—a reaction slightly in conflict with that promulgated in 1859
The New York Tribune also deigned to notice the struggling nation south of
the Rio Grande. In predicting Southern reccnquest as the effect of
immediate Union entanglement in a foreign war, oresumably the proposed
^Bulnes, Juarez y las revoluciones , p. 1*29.
3°9New York Times
, August 22, 1860.
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Allied intervention in Mexico, the paper stated that foreign involvement
would be infeasible but eminently Just ted in accord with the national
honor. It attributed Allied intervention to the speculations of Gabriac
Saligny and the Jecker representatives -who were "... the great element
for the attack which they themselves are directing against the independence
of Mexico." 310 Nevertheless,
Juarea has received new hope of expelling the intruding
swindler whose intrigues and corruption have for so long a
tiiae been opposed to all right administration and all honest
diplomacy. 'I-'-
Between lb$9 and 1861 the Tribune had experienced a rather startling change
of heart.
The attempt by Napoleon to found a monarchy in a neighboring American
republic was regarded as an insult and a standing challenge to the govern-
ment and to the people of the United States. 312 But Maximilian's attempt
at empire did something more than just insult the republican sensitivities
of the American people. It initiated a feeling of intimacy between the
neighbors north and south of the Rio Grande. The American press and the
American people came to a better understanding of Hexico, her institutions,
and her people. And with increased understanding came increased sympathy.
Mexico was now not just so much sparsely populated or desert land to be
civilized according to American norms and customs. It was a land with a
people and a tradition—a people with a dynamic President who put primary
emphasis on the importance of moral leadership in domestic and international
dealings. The growth of this feeling was traceable in the press as early
as 1B63.
310Bulnes, Kl verdadero Juarez, p. 126.
^'^Cailahan, p. 317.
353
Reflecting this new feeling toward tfexico, the New York Times reported
that McDougall's resolution formulated the duty of the United States to
invite French withdrawal and to aid Mexico as required to prevent the
forcible intervention of European states in the affairs of the republic.
The Times editorial comment characterized such action as a bold attempt to
sustain the Monroe Doctrine, but questioned the American ability to do so at
the present time. The public possessed no clear understanding of the subject.
And it was in enlightening the public mind and showing the country where its
duty lay that the resolution would prove most valuable. In an added aside
of misinioK!; t ion, the editorial asserted that Mexico owed France no money.
«
Additional sentences, paragraphs, and articles over the next twelve
months evidenced a change of sympathy. Juarez's closing address to t he
Mexican Congress and the orderly adjournment of that august body presented
a lesson to the enemy. The disaster of French arms in early I863 branded
the invasion a failure—a failure that was due to the unity, patriotism,
and courage of the Mexican people and was never dreamed of by the American
public because of the prevailing ignorance of happenings in Mexico. When
only one short year before the three great powers of Europe threatened
Mexico, she did not quail. Under the leadership of Juarez, "by his firm-
ness, honesty, and tact alone," she confronted the coalition, and Juares
was now moving the nation to act as one man to repel the invader without
yielding a single legitimate right or compromising a single shred of the
national honor. Mexican valor in the face of extinction was beginning to
radically alter American public opinion. Napoleon stated that the French
invasion was designed to limit American territorial expansion and establish
3xhiev York Times
, January 21, 1663.
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a monarchy. As far as the given reasons applied it belonged to Mexico
herself to answer the argument. But the imputation to the Lincoln adminis-
tration of desires to seize Mexican territory or to overturn its independence
were "utterly false." Since the end of the Mexican War, the desire of the
American people for Mexican territory had steadily decreased, and for the
last two years there had been no thought of it whatsoever.&*
On March 6 the Time3 published a circular containing the Mm» of the
Mexican government. The regime had determined to repulse the invader. The
dictatorship established to do so represented for the Mexicans a constitu-
tional means to preserve their free institutions. The Mexican nation
desired that which was necessary to save its independence, Constitution,
and Reform; and the government would not separate its cause from that of
the people. The Juarez regime wished an American confederation presided
over by an international assembly to promote hemispheric unity} and the
republic pledged itself never to make an unjust or dishonorable peace, to
assemble a general congress, to allow constructive opposition, and to
maintain and democratically develop the Reform on the enlightened principle
•aje
of the complete separation of church and state.
This considered opinion of a "Veteran Observer" hit the Tirr-s on
February 20. The veteran noted the mistake implicit in the non-ratifica-
tion of the Corwin Treaty, as ratification then would have prevented the
currently rising complications taking place in Mexico. The Mongol-Yexican
had endured endless calamities to displace the Latin race and overturn
monarchy in Mexico. As a majority he would soon come to be the ruling
race no matter how strong the white resistance. These people could not
jrjlbiti ., January 22, 1863, January 31, 1663, and February 2, 1863.
-"'Ibid., March 6, 1863
.
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be denied their country and the fruit of their labor. The republican
principle now dominated in Mexico with Juarez, a native Indian, at the head
of the government. And, asked the veteran, was that not the condition of
things most in sympathy with the desires of the United States?316
The Times continued its running commentary on Mexican affairs. The
French army struggled in thoroughly hostile country and the Mexican army
was filled with hope, courage, and determination. The Mexicans "... however
unable to govern their country, can yet defend it with tremendous vigor."317
To Mexico's well-wishers the decision not to defend the capital came as a
disappointment, but a stand may well have been impossible. The army was
running short of arms, and the United States exhibited an unfriendly front
with the administration prohibiting the export of articles needed by Mexico
in her emergency. This last act would some day rise in Judgment against the
United States. The French in Mexico protected the Church Party, a group
which had declared its intention of extirpating the democratic element.
Who, asked the Times
,
would rejoice at this? Only the bigoted priesthood,
the Anti-Progressive, Antidemocratic Party in Europe, the bigoted retro-
gressive Church Party in Mexico, the Confederates, and even some Union
people. Such a situation caused
. . .
sorrow to every true American who would preserve
his nationality and constitutional government, every lover
of progress, freedom and Justice, no matter to what nation or
country he may belong. 318
Despite the seriousness of the problem, however, it was not yet improbable
that the friends of freedom and Justice would have a word to say for the
3
^Ibid., February 20, I863.
nlSii*' Maroh 20 , 1863, April 15, 1863, and May k, 1863.JJ-°Ibid ., July 2, 1863.
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preservation of liberty and constitutional government on the continent.^
Three Times articles in July went a long way toward a minimal under-
standing of the aims of Juarez. The first, in connection with the above
article, noted that Juarez's original policy had been predicated on with-
drawal into the interior, and the talk of defending the capital, if in
earnest, represented only an after determination. This comment on fact
showed a comprehension of what Juarez was trying to do and of his method of
defending the Mexican nation at a time when guerilla warfare was relatively
uncommon. The second story prophesied a thorough hatred for Maximilian by
the Mexican people at large and castigated the injustice and misery brought
upon Mexico by the French invasion before it even mentioned American interest
in the matter:
We may deplore his [Napoleon's] success thus far on
account of its gross injustice to Mexico and the misery it
has already brought upon that country. But we have also to
deplore the French conquest of the neighboring Republic in
consideration of our own interests. 321
This also indicated a certain change in emphasis in the American oress which
in combination with the other attitude shifts over the previous two years
meant that the American newsmen were beginning to better understand the
issues in Mexico and to better appreciate the aims of Juarez at least in so
far as the preserving of republican institutions was concerned. And by the
end of the month a Times letter had characterized the Mexican Church Party
as traitors, thus adopting standard Liberal practice. In September the
paper testily informed Maximilian that the great mass of the Mexican people
were republican in spirit and that his enthronement represented only a
ff*rbld., July 11, 1863.
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comic interlude before a tragic ending. In October the exchanges of esteem
between Lincoln and Romero were "gratifying. "322
At about the same time that Placido Vega was attempting to export arms
to Mexico from San Francisco, customs officials in the city allowed the
departure of the Rhine
,
a ship loaded with provisions, but not arms, for
the French. This action caused an immediate outcry of anguish in the
San Francisco press. The Call branded the action for the French and
against Vega as discriminatory and stated that, while they complained
... of British violation of neutrality in aiding one
of the belligerents in our own struggle, at the expense of the
other, it will not appear very well in history to have it said
that we were doing the same tiling toward one of the belligerents
in the Mexican war, absolutely aiding the French in their war of
conquest, but denying all countenance or courtesy to those who
are struggling to save their nat -\ve lands from the heel of the
invader. Are we in league with Napoleon to despoil Mexico? Are
we afraid to deny his ships what we deny to the people he would
reduce to menials? Or can someone reconcile the seeming
partiality with national law and neutral customs?
3
23
Although the Call subsequently modified its statement after an examination
of the legal aspects of the customs action, the article mirrored the
American sympathy with Mexico's fight for self-determination.
As the American Civil War fast approached its termination, the press
attitude toward the French presence in Mexico grew more and more belliger-
ent. In early 186U the New York Herald proposed a hundred thousand man
army composed of both Northerners and Southerners that would enter Mexico
to help Juarez drive the French invaders into the Oulf . In December, 1665,
the New lork Post enjoined Seward to tell Napoleon to get out of Mexico.
And a Washington correspondent of the London Times commented to the effect
i:^
bld" July % l663 ' September 2, 1863, and October 30, 1863.
*»«W« Frazer, "Trade between California and the Belligerent Powers
during the French Intervention in Mexico," Pacific Historical Review, IV
(December, 19U6), 393.
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that these words expressed the feeling of the American people with
absolute certainty. The people would rather go to war with France than see
her remain in Mexico.
American press opinion thus underwent a significant change of attitude
toward Mexico in the period from 1857 to 18*7. The American people, whose
views the papers both molded and reflected, came to realise at least, to a
limited extent, what the Juarez reglne was struggling to attain in Mexico.
fihile they did not perhaps understand the full implications of the reform
program or favor his ideal for hemispheric unity, they, nevertheless,
wholeheartedly approved his espousal of republican institutions and to an
ever increasing extent his insistence on the right of self-determination
for Mexico. And while the Monroe Doctrine connotations undoubtedly played
a part in fostering American sympathies for Mexico, there was also
developed some appreciation for the republican cause itself.
The attitudes of diplomats, government officials, army officers,
Congress, and the American press have been examined for evidence of
United States understanding for and sympathy with the drive of Juares for
independence and self-determination for Mexico. But one other significant
factor remains. This important factor is the average American—John Q.
Public. How did he feel about Mexico from 1857 to 1667? Or was he too
mapped up in his own personal activities to wonder or ask about hie south-
ern neighbor?
In the field of private enterprise in 1858 the slavers favored the
absorption of Mexico. But all of the slavers did not mean all of the
South. On June 13, 1858, a private American citizen, Bexar County, Texas,
Sheriff jailiam Henry, addressed the first of his letters to Juarez from
San Antonio de BeJar, Texas. Henry was, he wrote, a confirmed opponent of
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the Conservatives and the clerics and was prepared to sacrifice his life
for the Liberal cause. He assured the Mexican President of the sympathy
of the citizens of the Southwest and offered to raise troops for the
Liberals in the United States. 321*
Juarez politely declined Henry's offer of troops. Nevertheless on
July 1, the Bexar County Sheriff continued the correspondence. He said
that the Americans of the Southwest considered the Mexicans their brothers
in ideals and aspirations, as well as their immediate neighbors. As such
they were always disposed to aid in annihilating the monsters of fanati-
cism and tyranny that in Mexico sacrilegiously disfigured Christ's Church
and used it to destroy the political and social existence of trusting,
innocent people. He again offered to raise a body of troops that would be
under Mexican command and paid for by the Mexican government. Henry's
missive hailed the social and political regeneration of that beautiful and
privileged country, Mexico, so brilliantly inaugurated in current history
by the Liberal Party. A Liberal triumph was sure as the cause was of that
stamp that, while it perhaps bowed for a moment under adverse circum-
stances, never died. 325
Henry stated that he was not alone in this sentiment. Every fine
inhabitant of the United States harbored the same feeling and applauded in
his heart the great principle embraced in the Mexican revolution. Each
cried to the sky for its victory and was disposed to aid in any possible
way, motivated purely by sentiments of brotherhood and good will. 326
Edward Dunbar, American businessman, did duty as the New York Times
correspondent in Mexico in i860. As such he was perhaps the first Ameri-
^Ocaranza, pp. ltf-50.
gfodd. . pp. 51, 5U.
J
'°Ibid., pp. 57, 60.
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can to push for a relationship between Mexico and the United States based
on mutual justice and reciprocity. The defeat of the HcLane-Ocampo Treaty
disappointed Dunbar, who protested against its manipulation by professional
politicians. He wished to bring about a sympathetic understanding be-
tween two liberty-loving peoples—the one intprest which had been neglected
by both the Congress and the American press. If, he wrote, the administra-
tion had formulated an intelligent, decided, and just policy with regard
to Mexico which resulted from convictions based on knowledge, the Treaty
could have been carried in the Senate despite fire-eating Republican
opposition. Dunbar charged the Republicans with fostering their own selfish
political ambitions without regard for the cost to the country at large.
McLane had been vilely abused, and for what? He was scorned for promoting
the cause of liberty and for trying to create permanent amiable relations
between the two republics. 327 As for the climate in the United States,
Dunbar stated:
whether such extraordinary conduct on the part of the
American people and Congress, so contrary to their professions
and the spirit of the age, arises from apathy, ignorance,
partisan feeling in politics, or the lack of anything like
real sympathy with freedom to other countries, time alone can
determine. At the present moment we are united with despotic
agencies to smother the new born hopes of freedom in Mexico
and cast the people back into darkness and despair. The United
States occupy the meanest position toward Mexico that it Is
possible for a powerful and free republic to hold toward a
weak and despairing neighbor—a position that will prove a sin
and a shame to us in the future. 32"
Dunbar reacted this bitterly because his country suffered from the
reflections that the Mexican question cast on the American character. For
in the last analysis the reason for the failure of the Treaty lay in the
32?Roeder, I, 232-33-
3<iBrDid., p. 233.
161
American people, who had no more moral power than their politicians because
they knew nothing at all about Mexico and thus had no convictions, but only
an abysmal indifference to the Mexican people. Part of this indifference
resulted from a dearth of news from Mexico and the bias against the Liberal
cause. Propaganda favoring the Liberals was perverted, falsified, or
denied, /nd for this abominable situation the American press, Frescott's
history, Catholic publicity, and more especially race prejudice were
responsible. The Republicans had lumped the Mexican question with the
abolition issue in the United States. Thus the Mexican natives were abused
from one end of Christendom to the other for striving to achieve their
freedom, with the Republicans the foremost in denouncing the Mexicans and
in trying to crush their aspirations because they were Indians and had dark
skin. Dunbar opined that national character was the first and the greatest
of national interests. •"
Such were the reactions of a few private citizens on the Mexican civil
war and the UcLane-Ocampo Treaty. And significantly enough the feeling of
these men was generally very sympathetic to the ideals to which Juarez was
dedicating his life. But what about the French intervention? Did the
American public react in general as the disillusioned Dunbar had charged?
Or, with the advent of better communication across the two banks of the
Rio Grande, did the American people come to better understand their
neighbors?
Henry Higginson fought in the Union army. He was a simple man, but he
thought of Mexico. Not intellectually and dispassionately perhaps, but he
realized a problem was there. Sometime during the Civil War he expressed
his intentions and opinions on the matter to a sister in Boston stating
329Ibid
., pp. 233-36.
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that he intended to go to Mexico aid fight the ! ranch after the Civil War
was done with the thought that it would be enjoyable to out off the French
soldiers who had been boasting about their fighting and victory.
While Higginson fought and gleefully meditated on what he intended
doing to the French in Mexico, a group of the elite of New York City were
invited tc a dinner by Viatias Romero. The time was December, 1863, and the
host, the Mexican Minister to the United States government at Washington.
The dinner was in essence a propaganda gesture designed to create understand-
ing of and sympathy for the Mexican position. He succeeded. Hiram Barney,
the New York Customs Collector, regretfully noted that, while his official
position did not permit him either tc express his sentiments and syt.oathies
for Mexico with as much vehemence as he felt or with as auoh freedom as he
would in other circumstances, nevertheless, he thought that the United
States had not yet offered Vexico the aid it was duty-bound to give in this
critical situation. He voiced the empathy of the American people with
Mexioo and hoped soon that instead of the establishment of monarchies on a
republican continent the opposite would occur. 330 jBaas ff# Beekman toasted
Mexioo which, "while it struggles for its independence, struggles also in
defense of the principles which the people of the United States have alwayB
sustained and defended. "331 mXXUm Cullen Bryant, the radical editor of
the New York Post
,
became a bit more violent. Maximilian's utilization of
the American Civil War and a wearied Mexican republic to overthrow the
republican institutions the Mexican people had themselves established by
virtue of their sovereignty was the vilest atrocity committed in the world
-Ir**!*****».**»« Answer to Resolution of Kay 2$, Ifl^i Mexican
Affairs, 1865, pp. 39b, li02. —
™
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sinco its creation. And Bryant declared:
The baseness and villany of this action has no equal,
and its lowness can only be compared with the greatness of
soul, elevation of sentiments, and pure patriotism tilth
which the Mexicans are endowed, defending the independence
of their country and sustaining the constitutional govern-
ment of Juarez, who is now the emblem of that holy cause.
I propose, then, gentlemen, that we drink to the government
of Juarez, that eminent patriot who has not hesitated to
wrestle in defense of a holy cause with a European colossus
and who has beaome the representative of patriotism and
constancy, presiding now over a government which will
realiae by its triumph the highest hopes for the welfare and
prosperity of Mexico. 332
The Hew Yorkers however were not satisfied with this limited opportun-
ity to air their views. Therefore, in March, 186U, the cream of New York
City society gave a dinner of its own with Romero as the guest of honor.
The object of the feast, as one participant conceived it, was to serve as
a frank reproach of the people of the Mnited States to Europe. 333
The proposed toasts expressed a considerable degree of enlightment and
a high degree of relatively disinterested sympathy for Mexico and Ju area's
ideals. David Dudley Field asserted the profound American sympathy for
Mexico without inquiry as to possible Mexican mistakes, for the Americans
themselves had made as many. He proffered all the encouragement that a
neutral nation which still believed in the power of nationality and free-
dom could offer. And, interestingly enough, Field affirmed that the
overriding consideration underlying the Mexican-American empathy arose from
Safri PP. 399, ii02-Jj03.
Jii
222i'> P- !t03. The guest list ran as follows: W.C. Bryant,
William K. Aspinwall, Hamilton Fish, John ft. Hamersley, Jonathan iiturBis.James ,«. Beekman, J.J. Astor, Jr., Smith Clift, l'f.E. Dodge, Jr., David
Hoadley, Frederick DePeyster, ft. Butler Duncan, Ailliao Curtis Noyes,Henry Clews, Fred C. Gebhard, George T. Strong, Henry Delafield,
Tf'J.' nelrePoat > George Opdyke, David Dudley Field, George Bancroft,C.A. Bristed, Alexander Van Rensselaer, George Folsom, Washington lTunt,Charles Pong, .fillard >arker, Adrien Iselin, Robert J. Livingston,
Samuel B. nuggles, James T. Brady.
a common opposition to a church claim for the power to interfere in state
affairs. The United States held as dogma the complete separation of the two
bodies, and, he said, all. true and loyal 'fexicans were struggling for the
same end. And in their fight to achieve this objective Americans of all
creeds and parties bade them Godspeed. 331* Charles King declared that in
honoring Juarez the guests acted in harmony with the United States govern-
ment also. Juarez was of the people and labored to see his country great,
prosperous, and free—individually and socially, politically and, above all,
spiritually. In that last, that is, spiritual bondage, lay ootentially the
gravest danger 3ince that, more than factionalism, damaged Mexico. King
sympathized with Juarez in his tussle against a domineering clergy who now
introduced foreigners to ruin a country that they could no longer rule.
He, at least, could not be insensible to Mexico as a reoresentative of
American as against European interests. Mexico could never become an
European aopendage with the assent of the United States. After the Civil
War, which now interfered with American aid, was over,
... we shall
. . . have disoosable such a force on
aea and land as will impart unlimited power of persuasion
to the diplomatic declaration we shall . . . make that
Mexico must and shall be Mexican, that ;,Iaxico .Mist and
shall be American and not European. 335
George Bancroft blamed the civil 3trife on the clergy and credited Juarez
with fighting a holy war. And United States sympathy for his cause only-
increased when the struggle widened to include also a battle for Mexican
indeoendence and integrity against a European nation. The Mexican patriots
deserved the "sincere and ardent homage" of the United States. William
Cullen Bryant then spoke in his usual vigorous superlatives. Maximilian, he
ffiilbid., p. 409.
J-^Ibid
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declared, had bought a lawsuit accepting a throne the French would not have
dared to offer if the American people were not engaged in fighting ruffians.
After the Civil War Americans by the thousands would pour in to help Jfexieo.
Georgo Folsom expressed himself in accord with Mexico's conflict for e
principle and assigned that nation first place among the republics of Latin
America by virtue of its soil, its resources, and its contiguity with the
United States. George Opdyke believed that the sentiment of all classes
and parties was entirely hostile to Kuropean armed intervention on the
American continent and more especially when such intervention attempted to
overthrow a republic and erect a monarchy. Jonathan Sturgis hoped that
Mexico would soon be freed from her foreign and domestic enemies. TYith
American affairs settled, the United States army could be in Mexico within
sixty days, but, interestingly enough, now only "... if her people
desired it." James Beekman lauded Juaraa's achievement as Governor of
Oaxaca; and Washington Hunt branded the French invasion and attempts to
found a monarchy as a ".
. . wanton offense against republican liberty and
the independence of nations" non-nermlssible to the United States.
Frederick DePeyster cited the patriots' claim to a government of their own
choice against a narrow interest Church Party. Henry i\ "ierrepont delivered
the condemnations of the people from Brooklyn concerning the French invasion.
Smith Glift eiphaslzed an interesting point strongly held by Juarez. The
two were convinced that Mexicans alone would conquer the European invaders,
"loung America," in the person of W.H. Dodge, regarded the French invasion
as a direct insult and pledged his support of the Monroe doctrine. John
Hamersley closed the toast by emphasising the kindred traditions and common
future of the two sister republics.
^
336ibid
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This dinner, more than any other single expression of private opinion,
indicated that there was in the United States an understanding of the main
problems confronting Juarez and the ideals and principles that he proposed
to use in their solution. This, however, was not the only trace of
increased comprehension of Mexican problems. Other straws in the wind in
1861* hinted at the same conclusions. The political platforms of 1661* urged
support for the republic south of the Rio Grande. The Republican Convention
declared
:
The national policy known as the Monroe Doctrine has
become a recognized principle and ... the establishment
of any anti-republican government on this continent by any
foreign power cannot be tolerated. 337
When Vega's right to export anus to Mexico was questioned by Charles
James, the San Francisco customs official, Treasury Department Special
Agent Thomas Brown and Surveyor General of California Edward F. Beale went
to bat for Vega. Beale, in attempting t o persuade Jaaes to let the arms
through, charged him not to "lend his aid to the extinguishment of the last,
feeble flame of republicanism in a neighboring country. "338 Despite j^
pleas, however, an order was Issued prohibiting the arms export. This was
bitterly condemned by the San Francisco press, and, when the order went to
the Attorney General for a decision on its legality, he ruled for
Juares—a move that increased sympathy for the Mexican cause throughout the
United States. 339
The bankers and industrialists as a group were also relatively favorable
to Mexico as they understood that the French intervention was as much an
unjustified aggression against Mexico as a threat initiated against the
^Callahan, p. 29 7.
^- Frazer, p. 392.
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United States. 31*
The Monroe Doctrine Committee of New lork, headed by K.Q. Squier,
opened activities to recruit for Mexico. Although the amount of understand-
ing sympathy the group as a whole entertained for Juarez and his cause per se
can be questioned, at the very least their sentiments were musical, as
their slogan ran, "If the old-world minions on our continent remain, we'll
take the old familiar guna and go with Grant again. "&1
A rather more noble expression of empathy from the public, however,
came from James H. Carlstom from the headquarters of the Department of
New Kexico at Santa Fe, New Mexico. Carlstotc wrote Juarez expressing his
heartfelt sympathy for the Liberal cause and offering Juarez asylum in the
United States if he should find it necessary to take refuge outside the
country. Despite this offer Carlstom indicated his belief that not many
months would elapse before Juarez would defeat Maximilian. Then neither
foreign influence nor bayonets could threaten him in the free discharge
of his duty.
1857-1867. This was not a very long time when measured in the eons
since the beginning of the world, but it was a very long time and a very
eventful one when measured within the narrow contexts of Mexican and
American relations. For within those years the two peoples came to look
at each other differently. They began—and the impetus for this beginning
was owing perhaps in large part to an Indian named Juarez—to understand
each other's traditions, ideals, and institutions. This change in
attitude from distrust on the one hand and contemptuous scorn on the
^Castillo, p. 2W*.
H.R. Miller, "American Legion of Honor in Mexico," Pacific Historical
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other toward an amiable modus vivendi and a developing nsutual trust and
reciprocity was reflected in the government attitude, in the press, and in
the coumonts of the average American. The depth of mutuality was not
complete or perfect; it had a long way to go, and it had to overcome a
half-century of suspicion and fear but it was there—a landmark for the
present and a hope for the future. Thus, the years between 1857 and 1867
signified a landnark and a hope not only for the development of amiable
relations on the banks of the Rio Grande, but also for the fostering of
friendship and truat throughout the hemisphere.
CHAPTER VI
JUAREZ'S NEW SOCIETY IN THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
The Consequences of Juarez's Thought
on the History of Mexico
Analysis ended with a new legend for the Mexican people. The years
rolled on 5 the nineteenth century faded and the twentieth dawned. But the
dream planted by Juarez in the hearts of the Mexicans did not fade. It
spread and blossomed, influencing others with its gentle touch, increasing
its appeal and intensifying its challenge. The dream provided a base on
which to hinge a meaningful program for political democracy based on social
justice and an all-embracing moral authority.
Juarez had dreamed of a new society and a glorious place in the sun for
his beloved valleys, deserts, and tropical rain forests. But Juarez did
something more than just dream. He took steps to make that dream a reality.
He attempted to base the state on principles of authority and justice.
This authority was something all-embracing and moral, and it looked toward
the perfection of the state. It attempted to enforce ethical guides and
maxims on the citizens of the community through the instrumentality of a
constitution. Justice for Juarez signified something unique also. In the
nineteenth century liberals in general identified justice with the exercise
of political rights. Juarez however went further. He recognized that
political rights were relatively meaningless without a corresponding develop-
ment of the economic and more especially, the social resources lying dormant
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In the country. Thus he emphasized public education, equalisation of
income distribution, and land for the peons.
But Juarez did not dream for Mexico alone. He extended his vision to
Mexican-American relationship and perhaps even hoped for its implementa-
tion in hemispheric relations. He predicated the conduct of international
relations on the principles of mutual trust and reciprocity rather than on
the principle of expediency. Then he utilized these ideals in dealing with
the government of the United States. The results achieved were somewhat
startling. During the ten years from 18?7 to 1867 respect for Mexican
independence and understanding of Mexican aims surged sharply upward in the
United States. While a significant portion of this attitude probably re-
sulted from internal factors in the United States itself, a part of this new
respect likely came from an ever-growing admiration for a government based
on principle and one willing not only to honor committments, but also to
defend its integrity, independence, and republican institutions vigorously.
The United States failed to fully appreciate Juarez's vision of hemi-
spheric unity. Despite a certain minimal comprehension by Seward, the
implementation of the dream remained abortive. America del Norte was not
ready to dream in terms of a moral leadership of the American hemisphere.
Did Juarez succeed generally in imposing his philosophy domestically
and internationally? ffas he able to convince his people of the govern-
ment' s claim to supremacy? What effect, if any, did his conduct of Mexican
affairs have on the great nations?
At home Juarez the reformer destroyed the power of a Mexican colossus
in the person of the temporal power of the Church. Through his emphasis on
equal Justice, he vitiated the privileges of the special courts, thus
insuring that future economic and social equality would not be prejudiced
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by political inequities. By introducing the tax reform measure after the
French intervention, he made m attempt to particlly solve the social in-
justices plaguing the country. But most importantly he imposed upon the
Mexicans a nationality, a concept of belonging to the state before the
Church and of owing a primary loyalty to this state, and to the moral
authority therein represented, ijnder Juarez no citizen could say, "I obey,
but I cannot comply," for that was treason to a spiritual entity. Con-
currently for the ruler an obligation existed to preserve this entity to
which the Mexicans gave their loyalty intact. This explained Juarez's
stern insistence on the non-alienations of territory throughout his rela-
tions with the united States. Juarez would concede privileges to foreigners,
such as the humane gesture to the French troops at Vera Cruz during the
yellow fever season, but only so far as these were consonant with the inde-
pendent sovereignty belonging to the Mexican nation.
Juarez did not succeed in fully realizing his domestic dream. But he
provided the Mexicans with a total philoeophy, a base to work on, a vision
that wrote itself into the Revolution of 1910 and the Constitution of 1917.
No longer could the politicians intrigue only for themselves. From now on
some of them at least sometimes had to dream for the future of Mexico.
Juarez could not fully implement his ideals for international relations
within the fields of foreign policy either. The civil war and the ensuing
French intervention rendered the circumstances within which the Mexican
nation carried on international dealings extremely difficult. But even
within this framework Juarez managed, to accomplish much, especially in his
relations with the United States. Mexican governments were no longer «XL
alike and equally untrustworthy. A government now existed that was somehow
different, that oommanded respect in spite of its relatively weak power
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position. The United States government and the American people took a while
to realize this change and still longer to implement and adjust their own
policy and attitude accordingly. And even then the adjustment was not com-
plete. But it was, nevertheless, there, and it resulted in an increased
sympathy for and an understanding of Mexico, her hopes, her fears, and most
importantly, her dreams. Americans did not perhaps understand fully Juarez's
Ideals for social and economic reform or the far-reaching implications of a
moral authority for the state. A few saw the struggle as a social one which
was ripping apart and reweaving the fabric of society. Many saw with favor
the establishment of republican Institutions south of the Rio Grande and
frowned severely on the French intervention. And while the American people
often mixed the Monroe Doctrine and the interests of the United States with
their sympathy for Mexico 1 s fight to preserve her Independence, they,
nevertheless, recognized the challenge to the principle of self-determina-
tion and sympathized with Mexico's heroic response to that challenge. And
over the years of the empire, they also came to realize the role of Juarez
in the establishment and preservation of the Mexican republican institu-
tions and to perceive albeit inchoately that somehow something new and
different was happening in Mexico.
Of all the opinion groups in the United States perhaps the two that
understood the aims of Juarez most clearly were the very high and the very
low. On the one side, the average citizen with no particular ax to grind
so far as Mexico was concerned could and, if given any access to accurate
information, usually did form a comprehensive idea of Juarez's aims and
ambitions. For example, the dinner-going New Torkers recognized not only
the political implications of the civil war and the French intervention
but also the social innuendos involved with the defeat of the clerical
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party. And on the other side, the one man in the United States most
criticized for the deplorable state of Mexican affairs was most probably
the one person within the American territorial limits who most completely
understood the ideals of the Mexican President. He did not perhaps agree
with them all. At least in one field, that is, in the formation of a
Pan-American confederation governed by an international assembly and led
morally by the United States, he virtually ignored Juarez's dreams.
Nevertheless Secretary of State Seward recognized what Juarez was trying to
do for his country in both the political and social fields. And that
perhaps accounted for his characterisation of Juarez as the greatest man
that he had ever known. American ministers to Mexico realized facets of
the dream. Some sympathized and some did not. But neither they nor the
army nor the Congress realized its full connotations. The army had only one
object—to eject the French. If that objective also involved ejecting the
Mexicans, well, that was Immaterial. Individual Congressmen and much of the
American press also glimpsed facets of the diamonded dream. But they
seasoned it with a large admixture of the Monroe Doctrine and the slavery
question in the United States, thus destroying its refulgence and its beauty.
They, more perhaps than Seward or than an informed average citizen, distorted
its image and its full beauty by looking at it through dark glasses.
Nevertheless, they did understand a portion of the vision.
The sun set blood red behind the Sierras on that Mexican day in
July, 1672, and plunged the land into darkness—a darkness that was equaled
only by the gloom of Mexican hearts mourning the death of their leader. But
Juarez's death was only physical. His dream lived on in the countryside.
Like the rays of the rising sun, it bounced off the mesquite, lit the poor
huts of the Indians, and insinuated itself into the Mexican landscape. The
17U
dream was not finished then, it is not finished now. But then as now it
provided a base, a way of hope, a promise of plenty for all, not only in
Mexico itself but throughout the Americas and perhaps throughout the world.
A harvest of golden corn, a contented people, a moral peace at home and
abroad. Fantasy? Sf, said the skeptics; and no, said humanity and
Benito Juarez, the "Benmerito de las Americas."
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In analyzing events on the Mexican scene from l£5k to 1872, several
related concepts appeared to run consistently through those stormy years
of revolution and invasion. These gave the period the unity and the con-
sistency of purpose and direction that had not been characteristic of the
first thirty years of the Mexican republic's life. This purposeful unity
and direction during the decade after the 1856 Reform did not, however,
develop spontaneously. The weaving of the period's conceptual threads
into a unified pattern came because of the dedication of one man—Benito
Juarez, a Zapotec Indian and the President of the Mexican republic from
1858 to 1872.
Who was this Zapotec Indian who figured so prominently in the 1856
Reform and who later came to be known as the Mexican Lincoln? What was
his role in the task of weaving the historical concepts of the time into
a unified whole? Did Juarez aotually influence the formation of new
ideas? Or were his ideas only borrowed from his compatriots? How did the
weaving of these conceptual threads affect Mexican internal events and
Mexico's relations with the powers beyond her borders, particularly her
dealings with the United States? If Juarez, by synthesizing the thoughts
of an historical period, did conceive a philosophy operative in his
domestic and foreign policy, did he receive support or sympathy from the
United States?
An examination of the historical concepts operating in the time from
185U to 1872 and the role of Juarez in unifying them led to the formation
of a central thesis proposition and an acoompaning corollary. The central
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thesis predicated the existence of an all-encompassing state philosophy on
the part of Juarez which he attempted to impose both on the Mexican and the
international scene. The corollary examined the understanding and the
reaction of the United States to this philosophy of Juarez.
In undertaking the research, the primary sources utilized were the works
and letters of Juarez, Congressional documents, and United States newspapers.
Secondary souroes consisted mainly of biographies of Juarez and various
analyses of the history and diplomacy of the period.
Research results yielded one very positive and one rather shady conclu-
sion. Examination of the central proposition revealed that Juarez formu-
lated a philosophy more far-reaching and more absolute than that of his
associates which he employed both in his domestio and foreign policies.
The foreign effects of this new philosophy in so far as influencing the
attitudes and actions of the United States were concerned were nebulous.
While a very definite change of attitude occurred over the period from 1857
to 1867, support for republicanism a la Juarez was generally admixed with
the provincial concern of throwing out the French-imposed empire in Mexico
because it had aided the South in the Civil War. Understanding and some—
perhaps much—sympathy, however, did exist for the ideals of Juarez, but the
full realization of what he wished to accomplish was limited to a few—and
mainly to those few who had some contact with Uatias Romero, Juarez's very
able minister in Washington.
More important than the concrete conclusions reached, however, was the
increased intellectual breadth that follows a deep scrutiny of one subjeet.
The examination of these thesis questions produced a greater understanding
of a particular historical period and suggested implications applicable to
present day events within both a Mexican and an international context. And
v
the growth of this more acute perception of history's value as a stud?
of the past for the present and future represented one of the chief values
of this thesis.
